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The
Analytics
of
Church Government

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—BY—


Rev. Robert Woodward Barnwell

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TO MY AUNT
ESTHER HUTSON BARNWELL
WHOSE
HIGH IDEALS OF MENTAL AND SPIRITUAL LIFE
AND
INDOMITABLE SPIRIT OF SELF-SACRIFICE
SECURED FOR ME
IMMEASURABLE BLESSINGS
THIS EFFORT
OF
HEART AND MIND
IS DEDICATED
WITH
ALL AFFECTION AND ESTEEM

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Preface

The quality of suggestiveness is all that I dare claim for the discussion herewith offered to those who care for new incursions into such old territory. The surety of conviction that blesses the author from the study of the subject is not, from the very nature of things, to be expected of others. It is enough if all along the line, which is a very extended one indeed, suggestions break into view which the reader can feel glad to receive. Analysis has just that very advantage—it is stimulating by reason of the many avenues it opens, and things are seen in relation. But while the only assurance of interest that I venture to give is in the line of suggestiveness, yet I must confess that the motive lying behind all my effort is zeal for a truth. I have not simply tried to write a book, nor have I thrust into an always burning discussion in order to exploit a view. My desire has been to re-fortify an old citadel by a most thorough-going circumvallation, trying to leave no approach unguarded, and especially to make all secure against a flanking or an undermining attack. I shall not succeed in this extensive desire, of course, but this confession will explain somewhat the extent of the foundations I seek to lay, and the pains taken over outlying bastions. Twenty years of thought and purpose, and unsatisfactory writing, have culminated in this effort. If I fail, I will face it humbly; if I succeed, even a little, I will rejoice.

R. W. BARNWELL.

St. Paul's Rectory, Petersburg, Va.

Introduction

The great difficulty that attends all discussion of the matter of ecclesiastical government is the paucity of definite facts. When every possible quotation from Scripture and the history of the first one hundred and fifty years that gives a statement of facts is collected, the mass remains extremely small. In the early years, when the Church first established her forms, there was ample evidence to guide, but the establishment being accomplished, and the lapsing of centuries coming on, we are left with very meagre data to go upon, if we undertake to question that early settlement. Ordinarily, the actual conditions seen not many decades after the death of the last apostle would be taken to fairly represent an earlier condition as well, but the controversies of modern times will not allow such a mode of settlement, and even the giving to such a condition any force whatever is questioned. We are therefore compelled, in order to satisfy minds we would fain influence, to try to let the settlement of the momentous matter be viewed in the light of only such facts as we can find expressed in Scripture, and the earliest records of the historical period. Besides, too, in addition to being few, the facts are also very general in character as a rule—enough to connect an established condition with a past, but hardly definite enough for a new building.

But there is a background for facts, as well as the facts themselves, that enters in as an important factor. Some background will be placed behind the facts by every mind, and therefore, it is necessary to discuss backgrounds as well as facts. In the light of the paucity and general nature of the facts, the nature of the background becomes a more weighty element in the discussion; for this background can well depend on principles much more closely set forth than the facts which happen to be at our disposal. At any rate, the proper background is an essential element, and only after having clear conceptions of both this and the facts will we be able to form our convictions.

To get at this proper background we must remember that Church Government lies in the spheres of Religion, of Govern-

ment, of Ministry and of History. I have conceived as necessary to adequate consideration, that in the sphere of Religion, there must be an analysis made of the forces and lines of Grace, and Faith; in that of Government, we must understand the principles and the forms of government, and of ecclesiastical government; in that of Ministry, the forms and functions; while in the sphere of History, come the origins and developments of Systems, and the status of conditions at the time of the Church's birth, in those matters bearing on the new departure about to be inaugurated. The Church came in the middle of time, *and was a product as well as a new beginning*, and just to be able to draw our lines between the old and the new,—just to see what use was made of old things in the formative stage of growth, is a gain.

But certain acts of our Lord are much plainer than some acts of the Apostles, and it is part of the plan I design to follow, to place those acts against the background derived from study of the above matters, and by means of thus gaining a new Background to test the remaining facts. By careful analysis, verified by the test made by means of our Lord's acts, a background might be gained, against which, what facts we have given in the Acts and the Epistles of the Apostles will become more luminous.

At any rate, whether proof appear or not, as the result of all our labors, it cannot but be, that such analysis as will be entered into will be of benefit to the cause of investigation along lines of Ecclesiastical Polity.

I almost wish it had been possible to omit the first chapter, for the reason that the analysis of Grace and Faith is one that must go so deep into Theological Anthropology that it makes that chapter seem a thing apart from the rest of the book, which is far simpler and plainer, but there was literally no help for that effort to ground the foundations of the doctrine of the Grace of Orders aright. The more near to the very bed-rock we could approach, the better; for my whole conception of Authority was to be built upon it, and that conception of Authority would run through everything. If the reader is thrown out of the furrow of inclination by this first chapter, let him skip it until such time as the need of it is made plain by assumptions based upon it. Then, if unwilling to grant those assumptions, there will be no

help but to wade through the intricacies of that opening chapter. But I am convinced that only by viewing Grace as both of the Holy Ghost and of Christ, and distinguishing between the two operations, and by recognizing the distinctions of Personality and Nature in the whole man, can the true basis of God's part in the Church be made plain.

No appeal is made to authorities because the effort is made to avoid staking anything on opinions. The argument is one by analysis, not scholarship. The position ought to appear founded, not buttressed.

So, too, I have not attached notes or appendices, for I wanted the whole to resemble a straight away sail from open sea to port, not a coasting voyage, with excursions into all kinds of creeks and bays. No one confesses the power of the scholar's form of presenting thought more, but it was set aside for the simpler method. It is hoped that some little scholarship will be apparent, even though not attested; but let the truth be told,—the Frenchman's love of Ideas, and the German's love of Abstractions appeal to the author more strongly than the Englishman's love of Quotations—quotations, for the most part, as we know, from the Idealists and Abstractionists of other times.

The book is divided into three parts because the subject of Church Government always involves both a discussion of evidence and a discussion of general principles, and these two require each a distinct manner of treatment (which probably also causes a distinct style); while for the sake of order and clearness the last three chapters relating to deductions are also classed in a separate part.

Only a few friends have read the manuscript, and upon only one did I impose the task of criticism—the Rev. Prof. W. A. Guerry, of the University of the South. To him I acknowledge here a large debt, though still falling short of meeting his suggestions. I went as far as I dared, but probably should have dared more.

Part II

Underlying Principles and Considerations

CHAPTER I

Grace and Faith

There is in the Bible a simple text, which commends itself to readers of every school of theology, and yet which no school of theology, from the very fact that it is a school, a party only, has ever taken to its thought. Even more, the very broadest divisions in orthodox Christianity are, with very simple analysis, traced up to different understandings of the accent which is to be placed, now on the word "Grace," and now on the word "Faith," in that famous passage of St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, "For by Grace are ye saved through Faith." Rome, for the very life of her, cannot forbear so to accent "Grace," that Protestantism must of very necessity quarrel with her; and, on the other hand, the assertions of Protestantism in the line of "Faith" have drawn unqualified anathemas from Rome. Even when some particular Branch of the Church braces itself for desperate effort to hold equally to the truth of both, it will soon be found split into sections, leaning, one to one side, another to the other, and growing as violent in charges and counter-charges as the larger divisions of the Christian world. Every school is willing to come back to the text, assert it broadly, strongly, defiantly, preach from it to sinners of the other side, and vehemently declare their own right thinking and fair doing. Nevertheless, the line of cleavage is along the line of accent, and even if no one can just exactly determine the true balance, yet the unbalanced condition of all schools is too patent to need description.

If any one should attempt for himself the task of keeping full and true the balance, he would, as with many turnings he proceeds, inevitably be reminded of the Church's efforts in early times correctly to define the Divinity and Humanity of the God-man with due regard to each. Again, in another line, he would recognize the immensity of the task of so conceiving humanity, that Personality and Nature would neither give nor lose to each other functions nor spheres. Still again, he would be driven to attempt to so analyse the work of Christ in the world, that he

could assign now to His Divinity, and now to His Humanity respective grace, as it is variously adapted to particular work. As, for instance, in the question,—When *He* raises man from death, is it by means of working *in* man by a risen Humanity, or *upon* man by a rescuing Divinity? Surely, the task of theology to the end of time will be the balancing of “Grace” and “Faith.” Consequently, no man, and no body of the baptized, at the present time, must be inordinately blamed for weighting the balance. It is not only human to err, but it is error’s own field, this theological stretch of almost uncharted country.

The very forces of Nature, too, in the realm of mind, necessitate warfare on these lines. The tendencies of men are, both according to the age-spirit and the individual propensities, prone, either to quiescent reliance on help, or to active energies of achieving. Some prefer to let others even do their thinking for them; others will barely tolerate aid of any kind. The very Faith of some is exercised only so far as to accept; that of others reaches out eagerly to obtain—almost seize. When the Church of Rome developed her system, men demanded, and she gave to them in accordance with a world condition of darkness and lack of vision; but when the roots of Protestant systems struck into the soil, light had come, and the plant lifted up its head to a sun bursting through the clouds. The philosophy of human nature almost explains, why, in one age, it was the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in another, the Fellowship of the Holy Ghost, with all the implication of co-operating Faith, that most impressed the children struggling to deserve the love of God.

But now, in the following treatise on the analysis of Church Government, so much depends on a fair recognition of principles springing from Grace and Faith, that, although we may well pardon, in the past, and for the future, a reasonably limited one-sidedness, yet, if we are to accomplish our aim, we must not ourselves commit the fault which we have insisted is so natural as to be almost unavoidable.

The task of strict analysis would be, indeed, hopeless, at this stage of the world, if we had certain subjects to deal with. Fortunately, for the purpose of Church Government, we have the larger outlines only to distinguish and combine; and for this

purpose, the stage of theological analysis to which the religious world has already attained, possibly suffices.

All efforts to solve from the Scriptures the Divine mind upon the subject of Church Government are, perhaps, most deeply of all, prejudiced by the Protestant or Roman accent on "Grace" or "Faith." Men take with them in germ the idea they wish to evolve in terms. The most conservative of them are as guilty as the radical. It is inevitable. One cannot discuss the subject at all without the bias derived from one's accent on "Grace" or "Faith." The only hope of fairness is, that the analysis of "Grace" and "Faith" be first made and shown, so that the inner logic of mind may be judged as well as the outer logic of word. Even though one should try to hold no brief for any theory or system, but rigidly to analyse as far as the subject goes, yet because the subject is approached, it is necessary to fairness, that whatever bias be carried into it should be known.

Views about "Grace" and "Faith" are unquestionably involved. There has never been a discussion about the Ministry but what there has been an inevitable drift to the point where it was seen that each side leaned to his interpretation of Biblical facts or statements in consequence of views about Grace and Faith. For instance, upon what principle is a Church member under Authority? Does Faith attract him there, and then persuasively keep him there? Or, does Grace put him there, and bind him there? Is he free to come and go, or is he helpless to validly break away? When a Protestant changes from one body to another, he feels, as a rule, that he has a perfect right, but a member of the Church of Rome is brought up to believe such a change is a terrible sacrilege. To one a change of Faith is conclusive; to the other, where Grace has placed him, there he must stay. Now, if the Ministry be a product of the Church's mind, and if it be a proper subject for adjustment, the right to change might be clear; but if the Church can no more change its Ministry than it can its Sacraments, and a person baptized is under officers as children are under parents, it is easy to see how a change must mean a most momentous step. The Grace of Orders has been an issue for centuries, and while the scope of that idea brings chiefly into view a doctrine of help, it bears directly upon

such questions as a change of membership very fully. Indeed there is no escape for any one attempting an analysis of Church Government from going deeply into the subject of Grace and Faith, their relative place and workings. Even though such analysis be sure to make the chapter devoted to it markedly different from every other, both far more complex and, sad to say, dryer, yet manifestly it would be a vast mistake to omit such analysis and thus leave a fundamental out of consideration. In fact, while a discussion of underlying Grace may make dull reading for some, and to others resemble a running start of tiring length, yet to scholars who know the importance of it, no apologies need be urged.

Faith is so marvellous that often things are attributed to it that are really out of its sphere, and it is the object of this discussion to present the scope of Faith. Then, too, Grace is such an indefinite term that it is necessary to discuss just what we mean by Grace. So there must be sought some good starting point from which to make this plain.

Grace is God's help to humanity but it may come either from Christ or from the Holy Spirit, and each of these kinds must differ. Again, it may be given to man either in his soul, or in his body—(let us remember Christ's resurrection of our bodies). An analysis of Grace must pass through these fields therefore, and probably the very best starting point would be to look first at the present-day scientific discrimination between soul and body, and then adjust our analysis of the workings of Grace to our conclusions. We cannot ignore what Science says about the body; and its late conclusions as to the extent to which all our thought and feeling can be traced to mere mechanism compels the Christian to consider what room is left for the soul. We cannot contradict what Science has found out about the body and brain-mechanism. We can only hope to get our bearings properly by considering Grace in connection with them. But all the science as to *body* cannot destroy man's convictions as to the existence of a *soul*. They call it Personality now—"Mechanism" and "Personality." There is and needs must be a Person. So then our discussion must include a recognition of these modern positions.

They are so well known that the briefest statement will suffice, which is here given, as follows:

Little by little, material scientists have been claiming the powers of man as but the functions of the *mechanism* of his physical being. The senses stimulate nerves, the nerves the brain cells, molecular changes take place, the tides of blood flow and ebb around the changed tissue, and thus are explained the mental, moral and even spiritual processes of man for all his life. Yet most confidently can it be asserted that there is something in the being man that mechanism cannot explain. An interpreter of signs, molecular changes, blood torrents, mechanical forces and pressures; a determiner of action; a projector of future mechanical signs, changes, torrents and pressures—the Personality must and does exist. The metaphysicians' claims are as strong, on the side of Person, as the scientists on the side of mechanism.

Seeing then, that man is thus a Person with a mechanism, (and let us say, since we are Christians, that, if this mechanism of matter die there is another mechanism, one of spirit, that cannot die, which the Personality can and will assume), let us briefly discuss, so far as suits our purpose, the Energies of the Personality and the Energies of the Nature.

First. There must of necessity be an energy of the *Person*. For, when a man lifts a hundred-pound weight, muscular contraction expresses just that much power; and the power that contracts the muscles is also so measured. (No account is here taken of mechanical aids.) We finally get to the will, still carrying our supply of force; and the will must get its energy from the Personality, in ultimate analysis. Energy must be attributed to the soul, therefore. Only when we come there can we halt.

But, now arises the question, does the Personality possess different kinds of energy, such as that of thought, feeling and will, or let us say, too, of faith, love, hope, etc.? It would seem not. It really appears, in the light of mechanical science, that the energy of the soul passes through the mechanism in different directions, and as that energy turns, or is turned towards different objects through the appropriate channels, it becomes memory, fancy or reason, hope, love or faith, muscular, mental or moral power. Thus, with muscular power, the energy of the soul is

the ultimate power, and the modifiers are those peculiarities of will, nerve and muscle, that come from the mechanism of the man. There is a memory department of the brain, and it would seem, a department for every part of man's powers. Indeed Science will not allow any function to be without mechanism, and all the metaphysician can claim is, that there is a personality, and that energy is its attribute—energy enough to use and control the mechanism. Religion teaches us, conformably with this, that Personality can possess either the earthly mechanism or the spiritual—aye, even more, that a certain Personality did possess a Human Mechanism and a Divine (Nature, we prefer to call it, in this instance); and that in consequence of the vast energy of His Divine Person, however, limited by the Human mechanism, and in consequence of the limitations of the Human Mechanism, however filled with Divine energy, the God-man presents the peculiar phases of His marvelous life on earth.

Let us posit, then, as an essential element of our analysis, the conceptions of (a) Personality, as bare soul, (not necessarily altogether bare, but bare so far as not coming endowed with the qualities which are now seen as belonging to the mechanism, in opposition to former ideas on the subject) with energy; (b) Nature, as mechanism apportioning energy in all its complex relations to God and creation. Our conceptions of "Grace" and "Faith" must fit into these positions.

We come now, to a narrowing of the position. In spite of the truth of the above statement, such powers of man as reason, will, faith, etc., have always been conceived as of the Personality itself. They may be called in fact personal faculties to distinguish them from more animal faculties, like appetites, etc., but still they are all of the mechanism and not of the Personality. Energy, the Personality must have, in order to use the mechanism, but *only that which emerges from the mechanism* can be distinguished as fancy, or memory, or faith, or love, or nerve force, or muscular activity. The personal energy may be only the steam which drives the mill, as it were, or it may be more but the tides of blood must flow over the brain tissue in certain parts of the head, ere energy is seen as memory. Science may well ask—What would a soul without a mechanism be? Can the musician

play without an organ of sound? Can the soul think and feel without organs of thought and feeling? Energy is not thought, or faith, or love until it emerges with the impress of some determining mold—material mechanism, or spiritual mechanism, it matters not which, just so we have something with the function of making energy into its diverse forms.

Faith is the eye, hand and mouth of the soul—its receptive faculty. But, how? We must get clear conceptions of this important point. Let us put it thus. Without a mechanism, the soul, notwithstanding all its energy, would stand helpless before a fact, or a person, but, by means of a mechanism, it can stand in relation to either; just as by means of a digestive mechanism, it can make a grain of wheat contribute to the souls abidance in the present body. All manner of ways has the soul, by means of its wondrous mechanism, the body, of dealing with its environments. It can love a person, know a fact, conceive an idea, will a movement, read a sign and strike a blow. Again, given a person or a fact, it can have many ways of treating this person or that fact. Yet again, we find, that amid all the relations to a fact or person, a wound to the brain will destroy one relation (memory, for instance) and leave the rest. It is simply then, of the nature of the mechanism, that faculties exist for certain relations of the Personality to environment. It is, too, a simple fact, that, by means of a certain power of the mechanism, the soul can go out towards a person or a fact in a manner that is not love of the person, or knowledge of the fact but *belief* in either. And, now, because the movement towards the object is an incomplete relation, an unsatisfied tendency, we behold a great function as pertaining to the believing power of man. Going before love and knowledge, and yearning for them as its own completion, Faith becomes a *motive power*, influencing the whole man. Some relation towards persons or facts there must be. Love is final, and so is knowledge. What is the beginning of relationship, but faith; and what the function of that relationship but to draw towards the end?

It were useless here to inquire, why the Personality has such

attractions for persons and facts, that it reveals a propensity to move towards or away from them, as surely as magnets exhibit similar qualities in their spheres. It is enough that the condition is real. God and Truth are Personal necessities. Love and Knowledge are the consummations. Faith characterizes the process until the end is reached. Now every Personality has its initial energy, and its initial affinity for God and Truth. There is also the initial Nature to be considered. Finally, there are in all these the changes for better or worse that ensue upon the initial stage. Therefore, we see the problem of Salvation is worked out with all these matters of affinity, energies and growth as factors. But, since our law of Salvation is "By Grace, through Faith," we must work the problem so as to find the value of these terms.

In the matter of the soul's affinity for God, any increase brought about by God's nearer approach and clearer revelation (magnet like) is at once seen to belong to the province of *Grace*.

Again, that the *Personality* should be able to grow in energy seems natural, and this too would be credited to *Grace*.

Then, too, there is a field for *Grace* in the mechanism itself, since that can be, through weakness in one direction, a poor mold for Faith; or through strength in some other, a determiner towards antagonistic efforts.

But, on the other hand, the Personality has control, more or less, over the mechanism, and is the seat of responsibility. The mechanism may have its tendencies, by reason of its variations, in different individuals, or, at different periods, in the same individual's life and growth, according to its brain cells or nerves or flesh and blood, appetites, passions, affinities, etc.; but, there is an inalienable responsibility of the Personality, whether he laughs, talks, eats, sleeps, learns, works, believes or loves wisely or unwisely. Although he can not add a cubit to his stature, a man can yet gain a cubit through obedience to law, and by reason of Grace utilized. To seek the goal of his highest affinities is the acme of his responsibility, and, by controlling his mechanism *Faithward*, he can draw himself Loveward. Even though God Himself, with nearer and nearer approach stand before him, only by pouring his energy through his mechanism *Faithward*, can he

draw near to God, so as to pour his energy through the same mechanism Loveward. (And the new mechanism, or mechanisms*? after this life, is strangely interwoven with the present in all these ways). It ought to be observed of Faith, in this review, that, it can not bring God or Truth to the man, but it brings the man to God and Truth. Its power is on the Personality and Nature, but on nothing outside. Its power on the Nature is through the Personality and its control, conscious and unconscious, over the Nature. If unsatisfied, it reacts on the Personality, which is induced to exercise its energies in many directions, in order to fulfill the demands of belief. Faith can form nothing, and generate nothing. It can go out knowledge-ward and loveward, and return revealing what it has found of fact, or even fancy; and even as the Personality has its affinities, so this unsatisfied quest by Faith leads the soul on.

But, *is not another Nature—another mechanism in process of building* all through the life of the Personality in the earthly? Is there not a spiritual Nature being formed? And is not the new logical to the Personality, in its growth or deterioration, in the old? If so, then we can see the influence of Faith on Personality, and its constructive part in the new building. Faith then is in a sense *formative* after all, in that it finds its expression *in the new building*. Let Christ be the object of Faith, and the Personality will have Christ expressed in that spiritual Nature, which is in process of formation. But Faith can not be creative or generative. It is receptive and reproductive, but not creative. Pre-existence is presumed in very terms. Perhaps the best presentation of the case would be this, that Faith is the assimilative faculty of the soul, as that soul in this life, like the caterpillar, grows its mechanism for the next. But the process is, that it draws the Personality up to the selected truths, facts or standards, and in that strange new building the *soul expresses itself* in the new relations. We shall see more further on.

If this be a fair setting forth of Faith, let us turn to see the province of Grace.

* Note—Is the Soul disembodied utterly—i. e., without mechanism, between death and resurrection? If not, is there yet another mechanism, or only the one spiritual one?

Grace may be described both as the Fellowship of the Holy Ghost, and as the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ; and in as much as man has both a Mechanism and a Personality, we must discuss both *kinds* of Grace in relation to both *parts* of man.

The energy of the Personality is God-derived, and the Holy Ghost is, Himself, energy. Hence, the term, Fellowship, is eminently exact, for it expresses the idea that the Spirit can aid our spirit or energy by co-operation, and He be our Paraclete. So, too, He can enter into all energies and forces, this Lord and Giver of life, and in the realm of the mechanism find opportunity for Grace, or gifts of power, that soul-energy might now be love-molded, or Faith-molded, the better; or that the blood may flow to memory chambers, or the cells where noble ideals are stored. Being too the agent of Christ, He can apply the Grace of Christ according to the laws of our Personality and Nature.

There is, therefore, no difficulty about the Grace of the Holy Ghost. The naturalness of energy working with energy, and the Lord of life with life, forbids dispute. Our care must be to keep distinct, in our minds, His operations from those of the Second Person of the Trinity, Whose work is not so clearly understood.

The term "Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ" is, we must believe, designed, and we can hardly deny, that, in using the human name, and the term "Our Lord," something is involved as connecting Grace with Him, not only as of the Trinity, but in respect to His *God-man* power. This we will see further.

As regards man's *Personality*, and *Christ's Grace* given to the same, we must say at once, that, since Person can not enter into Person, and, since the Holy Ghost gives the energy to quicken its energy, we can see no way for Christ to be Grace to Personality, except as follows: The magnet can approach nearer the iron to be magnetized, and thus exert greater attraction, and be more revealed as the iron's affinity. Or, and it is a very great point, He might work in the *Nature* or *Mechanism* in some way, but differently from the Spirit, so as to strengthen and change that important part of man, and the seat of all his weakness. Rather should we speak in the plural and say—the *Natures* or *Mechanisms*, for man has both physical and spiritual natures. Then,

in as much as there is action and reaction between Personality and Nature, Christ's work may indeed be a work on the Personality.

It will do no harm to repeat that Personality can not enter into Personality. Person can stand before Person until they grow more alike, but to enter into Personality would involve absolute contradiction. And, the second point, that the Holy Ghost's own distinctive and personal operation is proper to co-operation with *energy*, and covers that whole region, is one that needs nothing more to be said. The Grace of Christ must be, and is, different. Now, we can, in considering the remaining ways left open to us for a conception of the work of Christ's Grace, either conceive Him as standing before the Personality as God revealed most nearly, and Man revealed most ideally, and the God-man revealed most attractively; or, we can conceive Him working somehow in the mechanisms, one or both, and through them on the Personality, according to regular or special laws; or, yet again, we can ascribe both ways as the way of Christ. It is evident that the first is certainly true, and no one could think of denying that Christ appears before man's soul to be received in faith and love and knowledge. It is the second that gives Theology its modern agitations and confusions.

But before beginning the analysis of the second, we must speak further of the first, and in doing so, let us picture to ourselves the conditions, and endeavor to do full justice. Christ is standing in all the beauty of the Biblical presentation before the soul. For what purpose? That the soul may by Faith draw nearer to Him, and the inner man which is in process of formation may more and more grow into His likeness. Now, this inner man, this spiritual man, this never dying man, this man of resurrection, when the material mechanism is dust and ashes, and passed into other forms of life, is common to all men, good or bad. The existence of it is not due to Faith but to God, and the processes of life. The quality of it—its resemblance to Christ, may be due to Faith, but its entity and its energy is apart from Faith. The Chambered Nautilus is building both character and additional cell, even while it lives in the cells of its birth. So, man inevitably builds, because of life processes,

and Faith is given him that the new building might be due to his own efforts as to its quality. Thus we can see that Christ is carried over into the new building by man's efforts through Faith. Christ Himself might simply stand before the soul, and the Holy Spirit, the Lord of all life, build the new man after His pattern, in direct proportion to the degree and kind of Faith. The Holy Spirit, however, works in such wise that it is the soul (like the Nautilus secreting its shell) that grows its future mechanism, unless, indeed we understand that character alone is formed here, and the Resurrection mechanism prepared in Heaven as a gift for the Last Day.

This distinction between Faith and life forces is thus clearly manifest, and it remains with us to say, whether this standing before the soul as its magnet is all the proper sphere of Christ that there is. Should we stretch Faith to its utmost bounds, we can not make it enter into the life force. The eye, the hand, the mouth, the assimilator it may be, but the actual constructor it can not be. It may so modify the soul, the builder, that the soul must build according to its patterns, but the soul has Faith for one purpose, and its constructive powers, as regards the new mechanism, are separate and distinct.

We are obliged then to consider the possibility of there being another (the second) operation of Christ, and there is indeed abundant room for the "Grace of Christ" to enter into the new mechanism which is being built. A man can not be born again in the earthly mechanism, but it is Scripture that he can be born again in his *spiritual nature*. Nor is it at all foreign to reasonableness, that, while the new is being built, it can not only be modified by Christ, by a process of standing before the soul, but also by a process of entering into the structure of the new. He is God as well as the Holy Spirit is God, and if the Holy Spirit can enter into energy, why can not He (by the Holy Spirit) enter into mechanism? There is no unreasonableness; we only need Scripture to affirm it. Indeed, the first conception—that of Faith transferring the image of Christ to the budding and blooming soul, is not complete. We want an operation of Christ, dependent, indeed, on faith conditions, but prosecuted by Himself

through the proceeding Spirit,—an operation whereby He Himself lives with His might and power in us. In this desire, all Theology joins. That Christ dwells in the heart by Faith is indeed glorious, but that His life-power is our life-power, even as in a vine or a body, is the full reach of our Christian doctrine.

As we go into this division of our analysis, it is well to clarify our ideas as to the Spiritual or inner man and the new mechanism. First of all, there is no new Soul or Personality. It is all that we call the Nature which is the mechanism, and it is the Spiritual Nature which is the new mechanism. The Scientist has an easy time, comparatively, in dealing with the present mechanism, because he is steadied by the presence of a body. The Theologian, trying to analyze the Spiritual mechanism, is met on the threshold by the difficulty of locating the body of the new mechanism, or Spiritual Nature. It will appear, but is it now? St. Paul says, "There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body," but are we warranted in saying that the words mean, that it now exists, either as laid up in Heaven against the Great Day, or actually behind these material bodies, so that, if not all sleeping, but all being changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, it would appear? We must be content that the Scriptures leave the question so entirely open that when Science and Metaphysics say, that a Soul without, or stripped of all mechanism, material or spiritual, is inconceivable, we are not dumbfounded, but see such a condition is not predicated of the Soul by the Bible, except it be by an unnecessary interpretation. We would not build on the theory that the Spiritual body has existence now, embedded, as it were, in our present natures, but it is not precluded.

However, body does not exhaust the term, mechanism. Mechanism is Nature. God hath not body, parts and passions, but He has nature. The Personalities of the God-head are distinct, and the unity is of the Nature. It is too, this same one infinite Nature that each Person of the God-head uses to the full in the operations proper to His Personality. Science, too, tells us that great differentiation is necessary to high organization. Mechanism is not, therefore, synonymous with body. It is the instru-

ment of differentiation, possessed in order that energy might break into different streams of thought, or will, or movement. In present and ultimate man, the instrument involves body. In intermediate man, we know no more of the instrument of organization than we know of the functions of the Soul in the Intermediate Time. Because God can see, and hear, and feel; we say He has organization. Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc., denote the infinite character of His organization. But body as belonging to God, we deny, and the term, mechanism, for all its mechanical ring, avoids the limitations and yet suggests organization, so that possibly it might be used even of the Deity. In the case of man, after it is purged in thought of material ideas, it seems a good word. Nature, as a term, is not sufficiently antagonistic to Personality for the purpose of strong delineation.

Another point to be cleared is the question of character. Where does it inhere? We attribute it to the Personality, but it is so involved with the mechanism that confusion must result. Let us do what we can to see the inter-relations. The energy of the Personality, until differentiated by the mechanism, is not in the form of Faith, Hope, or any other quality, but when so differentiated it is still the energy of the Personality. Again, the mechanism changes under its workings, and itself receives the characteristic impress of its different streams. Again, it is Personality that controls the mechanism, and determines the flow of the streams. Nor need the mechanism be a multiplier of force, but the mechanism induces the flow of the streams, even to the point of testing the control of the Personality, as in the case of habits. Again, the very size of a muscle, or fullness of healthy blood, mixes itself up with character.

Now the man who deals with only the problem of the soul in the body, or Personality and mechanism united, has a simple task, compared with one, who must predicate their separation to a certain extent, and say to what extent. If totally separated, what would become of character so involved in both? Suppose we introduce the hypothesis of another mechanism in process of formation, under the conditions of registering changes as they are made in the old. Then we could see how character could

be carried on. But if we have too simultaneous mechanisms, one physical and the other spiritual, do both react upon the Personality at the same time? It certainly seems very perplexing, but while so much of the process and the intermediate stage is very dark, yet we have revealed a very clear picture at the end. Another mechanism does exist with all the marks of identity with the first, and a complete register of its ultimate character and attainment; and it exists visibly, although spiritual, and with bodily form. The same soul is its indweller. It has registered everything. So we are not adrift for an abiding place for character, but we are loath to go where Scripture can not be the rock—that is to say, we can not declare the process in its fulness. Some things are very plain and some are not.

The plainest thing of all is the abundant room that there is for the operation of Christ in the way of Grace. Christ is possessed of man's nature in its *spiritual form*, and of God's power, and every man is building a new mechanism. What an opportunity to enter into the new creation. For instance, man will need a new body for the Resurrection, and out of what elements will it be composed? Those of the Saints will somehow bear a marvellous resemblance to that of Christ.

But let us pass at once to the direct issue, and ask—How does Christ give Grace to man in the mechanism? Truly the most satisfactory answer is along the line of Regeneration or new birth. For, consider the term in connection with the Personality, and then with the mechanism. If the Personality be born again, it assuredly does not become a new Personality, but, as the term distinctly means, is found in a new nature or mechanism. It can only be the mechanism that can be renewed. Whether we be Creationists or Traducianists, all accept the Soul as deriving its *mechanism* from Adam, and regard the soul once born as persistently identical, however the mechanism in which it is born may change. If then, there be a second birth, it must be that a change is wrought in mechanism. Nor would a mere modification of present mechanism satisfy the term, birth. Now,

that man's physical, Adamite mechanism is revolutionized is, of course, out of the question, but, in as much as man has a spiritual nature, it must be in regard to this that the term is used. So far then we are on solid ground. It must be mechanism that becomes new; and Soul is re-born because born for a second time in a mechanism. Again it can not be the old Adamite physical nature, but the spiritual nature of man that is the seat of so vast a change.

Therefore, to proceed, this spiritual nature is common to every man. Even in regard to the resurrection body, every man shall rise. It must have its roots then in the Adamic nature also—at least be profoundly connected with it. But, is there no way to so work on this connection as to engraft the nature on to another stock than Adam's, give it connection with another parent, as it were, in such wise that strength and life might flow into it for its renewal? If it be asked where we can find another parent, or the power, we are answered by all the Scriptures, that Christ took our flesh and wrought the old Adam into the new spiritual man, and does so attach humanity, by the power of the Holy Ghost, to Himself, in this new humanity purified and raised from the dead, that every Christian is called a member of His body. If, again, we point out the indubitable fact, that the old connection of the spiritual nature with the fleshly is still maintained, and that, therefore, if there be a new connection with Christ, through this engrafting process, there must be two roots to the spiritual nature, which is both Adamic and Christian, then again we find that in truth this condition would only explain how it is, that the soul can have its choice, through Faith, whether it shall live in the Christ or Adam root, and thus the sphere of Faith be vindicated; which indeed is a most vital consideration. Finally, we must confront the necessity of seeing in the process of grafting above mentioned the real qualities of a birth. Here we are aided by the Scriptures, which use the engrafting process as well as the regenerating to describe the Christian's relation to our spiritual head. But, apart from that, it seems only necessary to point out, that we must not press either metaphor, describing the spiritual process, too far. Either one, in respect to

putting another source of health, strength, character, duration of life and fitness for future environments, will answer. Were it the object of the new birth to bring man back to a formative infancy, grafting would be a poor substitute; but, if it be to give a new stream of life to a weak and diseased branch of an effete root, then the two terms are not appreciably apart.

The second great reason, for believing that Christ works directly in the nature by Grace, is found in the constant picture of man's relation to Christ as member of His body. This term discussed in connection with Personality and Mechanism, takes us inevitably to the side of Mechanism. That, in so far as we have connection with Christ, it is with the mechanism or nature of Christ seems manifest. Of course, the risen Christ, the spiritual Man who is the head of the race, is meant. The Personality of Christ is Divine, and, together with the Divine Nature or Mechanism, is out of the question. Nor does man's Personality become clothed with Christ's human spiritual Mechanism in such wise that man would possess it in addition to his own spiritual, and his own physical mechanism. So, too, man's physical mechanism can not become attached to Christ's body physical or spiritual. The whole region is not the region of the physical, but of the spiritual; and the sphere is not the sphere of the Personality, but of the Nature. Christ in His human, risen, glorified, *spiritual mechanism* attaches man's *spiritual mechanism* to His own, in such wise, that man's Nature can receive the life of His. Man becomes a member of His body.

Finally, if even the above engrafted relation is possible, by means of the Holy Ghost, the whole story of the Bible indicates it as the reality of its teaching. That Book is a prophetic, and then an actual account of the assumption of a mechanism; of the processes of the elevation of that mechanism to the height of man's possible destiny—even unto transfiguration; of the putting off the mechanism as material and the clothing the Personality with it as spiritual; of the exhibition of it as spiritual in such wise as to give man his only conception of what final man shall be. And, it gives this vision not as a conception merely, but as an object of deep abiding belief. No vision of the man who is without Christ, as he rises for condemnation, is given us;

only do we know anything of resurrection mechanism as it is both human and Christlike. That Christ works in the Nature seems beyond question, as we thus view that Nature. The very seeming indicates it; and is it only seeming? On the anvil, and in the furnace of Christ's life was the humanity wrought in which we will live. Spiritual God-man, and spiritual mere man, and the Holy Spirit Himself, these form the data for the spiritual New-man, who is to be neither God-man, nor mere man, but Christ-man or Christian.

Yet is not Faith excluded in this work, in and through the Nature. The Nature must never control the Personality, but the Person his Nature. Christ does not seize the Nature, and through it force the Person into His image. He merely, as has been said, so attaches the spiritual nature of man to His own, that it can obtain His strength. The spiritual nature is already linked to the flesh of Adam. The Personality must choose its plan and material for the new building, and draw from Christ, or Adam, according to Faith. Just as fully as when Christ stands before the Personality, and outside of the Nature, so, when he stands within the Nature, must Faith lead to choice, so that Personality controlling Nature, the actual growth or building may be the Person's very own. The work of Faith must not be made void but established by Grace. But Faith is not Grace and can not create Grace.

What, then, is Grace? The Grace of the Holy Spirit is, essentially, energy—Divine energy, inducing and increasing all personal and natural energy; and the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is human nature—the human nature that has lived, conquered, and, risen in glory, is itself spiritual and strong in its every fibre; and which can supply the human energy that is capable of responding to the work of the Holy Ghost.

One further word about the mechanism of the old Adam and this part of the subject can be left. If this same Adamite mechanism could be improved, rendered more productive of Faith, Love, Temperance, Virtue, etc., it stands to reason that the spiritual nature, logical to it and having its roots in it, now in process of formation, would have the benefit of all the improvement. There can be no doubt that Christ standing before

the Personality can so influence man that even the old Adam improves. It might even be thought that this exhausted the line of Christ's work, were it not for His own revelation of deeper work through the Nature. The question can not be, therefore, as to great help coming to man, and, therefore, Grace, through the objective presentation of the God-man, but it is as to the further help, coming through an operation peculiar to the God-man, by which He uses Divine power to give human nature of His own forging to men, and that too, in their very natures themselves.

The work of God is, therefore, complete. No part of man is omitted as a fulcrum for the leverage of Grace. The Personality is variously influenced, the energy of the Personality provoked and increased, the energy of the mechanism, both in the material and spiritual departments, is cultivated, while the work is extended so far as even to open a way for the true humanity of Christ to pour its floods into the spiritual nature of man, whence, by reaction, it even influences also the material mechanism of present life, causing this too to contribute to the building of the new man, after the pattern of Christ.

To some theologians, a confirmation of this analysis will be seen in the position they are inclined to take, viz: that God and Creation could only meet through an incarnation (Fall or no Fall), which would bridge the chasm between the height of Creation (man) and Divinity—an incarnation resulting in the God-man, who would carry Divine strength into manhood, and Creation's voluntary obedience to the very throne.

Our analysis of Faith and Grace is now complete. It remains to show its bearing on our subject. Truly it seems almost too large an accumulation for so small use, but, nevertheless, it has been brought together merely to establish, in full perspective, the correlation of Faith and Grace, in the sphere of Church Government—that is to say, the principles of *Association* and *Incorporation*. The constant leaving out of sight of one of these principles has vitiated so much of the work of the past, that it seemed the very first step to fix the matter so that *it could*

not, and would not be done. To be sure, there might be shorter ways of demonstrating the twin principles of Association and Incorporation, but a correct analysis of Grace and Faith seemed the very best, because the very surest.

In the above analysis it was seen, that, even though God opened fountains of Grace within the Nature, the Personality, only as it wrought through Faith, could profit by that Grace. Faith alone could bring the soul into such relation to God, or Truth, or Grace, that it might apprehend that for which it was apprehended. The Church is, therefore, necessarily, the whole body of the Faithful, *i. e.*, of those who by Faith see, accept, reach out for, grasp, feed upon, assimilate, and reproduce the gifts of God. This Faith is not a possession proper to the whole, taken as a unit, but it is individual, it is particular, it is of the individuals own will and choosing. Now to ignore so great a principle as this in the matter of Government were the height of folly. If even God's gifts must wait on Faith, how much more all rule and control. If God can not be received, except as of Faith, how much more the blessings of Government. The drinking soul equally with the drinking animal necessitates that the Government over it recognize the principle of choice. And Faith is greater than choice, so that there is far more reason for the placing of Association as of basic importance in Church Government.

But, if there is something common to the whole body of Christians, and, if this is not a mere brand, or mark, on the outward man, but a something in the very nature, and that, too, the spiritual nature, then another principle appears. If, on analysis, this something common to all, and in the spiritual nature of all, is seen to be that connection with Christ, which makes them members of one body, and that body His body, then the principle of Incorporation has as strong a position as that of Association. As a Father has a right of authority over his children, so, if Christ has made all natures to be attached to His nature, He, and then, after Him, His delegates have authority over those natures. The principle of Association depends upon the Personality; that of Incorporation upon the Nature. The whole man can only be governed rightly when both are recognized. It

is true then, that "*Faith attracts him there, and persuasively keeps him there,*" and, also, that "*Grace put him there and binds him there.*" For, once in Christ, only God can sever the branch. But what good were a regard for formal connections, to the hurt of living relations?

In conclusion, it can be seen, how hard it were for humanity to take Church government, which, as it came from Christ, ideally recognized both principles, and carry it on through such a life as the world has manifested, without fallings off on one side or another, and without breaks, in the very struggle to mend. Therefore, with broadest sympathies that prejudices will allow us, and even rending our prejudices for charity's sake, let us seek through the records a vision of that Government which rightly allots the twin principles.

CHAPTER II

Authority and Consent

The consideration of Government and its general principles comes before that of Church Government and its specialties.

Whenever a Government is to be established, these three things must be carefully kept in view: the liberty of the individuals governed; that of the whole body of the governed; and that of the Government itself. By liberty is of course meant not "formal freedom," but "real freedom," the object of all law and government. Surely government has as its supreme *raison d'être* the guidance of men and bodies of men to an order of right conduct; and so, also, it must equally secure **its own life** in an order of righteousness. Oftentimes the liberty, both of men and the body of men, has been considered, but not with equal wisdom has the life, permanence and order of the government itself been provided for. Thus even a constitution can be written, which will balance admirably the rights of men and the whole body of the governed, but, nevertheless, sowing the seeds of death in the very forms of its own structure, it may be by too great rigidity, or it may be by too great laxity. A written constitution has the fault of rigidity, if not amendable; and, if amendable the danger of being hacked to a pitiable torso. A Constitutional Monarchy may totter from an excess of the old Adam on the Throne. Therefore it were folly to guard the independence of the individual, and the progress of the people, and not endeavor to protect the permanence of the government, which secures these very things. Nor is it to be assumed, that the care taken for the first objects secures the lasting of that which provides for the rest. A government is an organization, and has its own corporate life and laws of health as soon as it begins to be, and apart from all the work it must do for those for whom it exists. There is for it, therefore, a sphere of order in which it will find its own liberty. The region is marked out as logical to the two crossing lines of Authority and Consent. Particular forms of government are only to be judged according to

capacity, to preserve and present these twin principles; and again, particular forms of government are only possible according to conditions of the peoples. But, under no conceivable circumstances can government fulfill its function of both living in liberty and blessing the governed in an order of right conduct—their true liberty, unless these two ideas dominate the whole structure in harmony. As to Authority, it must be exhibited in origin, and in continuance. There must be in rule the right to rule. Authority must be exhibited in strength and power, both as against external attacks and internal dissensions. Authority must be exhibited as generative. Consent must be exhibited as accepting the past, supporting the present, pledged to the future. Consent of the individual extends not as far as the consent of the body, because the liberty, or real freedom of the individual is that of one who is by nature a herd or flock or pack-member, and his social relations dominate his private by very instincts. He is neither right nor happy away from the herd. The herd's consent will secure his, by natural law. Struggle for leadership he will, sulk he may, but nature is all for following when the mass moves.

Much has been written about the right of Consent—the consent of the governed. It is well to glance at the principle upon which it is most firmly founded.

If government was intended primarily for restriction, and was satisfied with restriction, it would be almost useless to speak of the Consent of the governed, but government is made as a guide to liberty, and is for development, not restriction. The co-operation of the governed is an absolute essential, therefore, to secure the purposes of government. Government is perverted, if wielded for restriction only, and is a failure in its very heart, if Consent is ignored or contravened.

It is now necessary to make a distinction as to the right of Consent and the right of self-government. Beyond all question there are races utterly incapable of self-government. Co-ordinating faculties, legal acumen, and much besides is entirely lacking. Republican forms may oftentimes be ruled out by the inability to find men competent for the simplest offices. But, nevertheless, these people are no more to be governed contrary to their

consent than any others, if government is to fulfil its purposes. Forms must give way to Principles, and Authority and Consent, united in whatever arrangements the circumstances allow, must still guide the Rulers. Even if people are as children, yet it must be remembered that the government of children is based on the same principle. Only when dealing with soldiers, where orders to face death require Authority to rise above life-value, can the principle of Consent be cast away. It must be admitted that even Despotism is sometimes a necessity, even as in child government there must be paroxysms. But Despotisms see themselves their own destroyers, and that, too, through the self-assertion of Consent. That which was meant to be led can not altogether be driven.

The practical difficulty of pleasing the governed, and gaining their adhesion to Authority in its origin, continuity, power and propagation are the problems of practical governors. The principles will not down, because of practical difficulties. Government can not vitiate its purposes or its principles because of difficulties. Even tribal forms have at times been the best forms; and so, too, every possible form has found a field with more or less success. The form most repudiated and abhorred in all times, climates and lands (and, remarkable to say, the one whose action is most plainly exhibited in History) is Tyranny; which, even while it governed, yet failed in the purpose of government. As to Republican forms, it can not be too plainly said, that while ideally the highest, yet an enlightened people, and a self-restrained people is required, if at one and the same time the people are to constitute the Authority and receive the rights of Consent. To make the one strong enough to balance the freedom of the other; and to secure the latter against the subsequent usurpations of that, which, even in its beginnings, is given strength, is the glorious problem of the future statesmen, when a people can be found fitted for the foundations. In the meantime, the best races are experimenting with varying success, and undoubted progress in nearly all the possible forms. Probably God has designed that all States and Governments shall be subject to a certain leeway, which He Himself shall direct by the strength of His own currents and winds.

When we come to the government of God's Church, we are made absolutely sure that the purpose of government is liberty, and that restriction must be dignified into guidance. Here, too, we can not but see clearly that the individual and the body of men must both be cared for, in their spheres, and that the welfare and permanence of the government itself is of vital importance. Authority and Consent too, must remain the cardinal principles controlling, rather than subject to forms. But, over and above all, we must be brought face to face with the radical necessity which there is in Church government for the operations of God that constitute its distinguishing feature. For, it is clear, that the main object in view in Church Government is the introduction of God, in power and might, into the midst of man's weakness, along the very lines of self-government

If we were called upon to assign a reason why God Himself determined and established Church Government, we could find none greater than this—that, because Church government was to be His Government, it must be one adapted to Him, as well as to men. It was not to be one by which they could govern themselves, but one in which, and through which He could best govern them; and yet not as above them, but in, and through them. How little would Church Government differ from any other government, even though God be its founder, were it not for this consideration of His continuance in it. The claims of Church Government must not only be that its origin is of God, but that God is ever its present life and authority; and therefore, *pari passu*, the construction of Church Government must be such (and ever such) as to put no stoppage to this Divine operation. In looking them for the Divine plan, due regard must be had for this most essential feature—THE CHURCH MUST BE A PATHWAY FOR GOD.

Of course we can assign several reasons why God Himself determined the form of Church Government, but there are two which must not be left without a plain expression of them. One is, the vast difference between God's conception of time, and man's impulsive view of it. Another is, a similar divergence of view in regard to Force. Man is ever prone to be short, sharp and decisive. Time is a troubler to his mind, and he longs to

handle the lightnings. When a century must elapse for results to vindicate a policy, he is in despair. When a multitude of points and peaks carry off all that electricity that might have roared and flashed, his mind reverts to thoughts of the weak things of Nature. But with God, time is a chosen servant, and in His own operations He counts not a thousand years. When man arranges for Government, his mind runs on crises and decisions. God must prevent these in behalf of growth and of living sentiment. He Himself lays down forms so that the element of time can not be eliminated. Man might base all on Authority: God provides for Consent. Accustomed to present even Himself, despite power and majesty, before the human heart, for acceptance or rejection; accustomed to wait long years upon the soul in matters of very salvation, why should He hesitate to subject Truth or any other thing to similar processes of Time? Consent once gained to Authority marks out so different a path from the one which would be traced after helpless submission to Authority. Again, as to Force, God exhibits a modicum, as we see from storms and earth-quakes, etc.,—enough to keep us in mind that all power is His, but for the most part (vastly so), He suspends convulsive outpourings and overwhelming manifestations in deference to His fixed policy of long and gentle drawings. The apparent weakness of God is one of the marvels of our world. The rebel dares Him to His face, and only balmy sunshine seems to answer from Heaven.

While, then, we have often read arguments which lay stress on the vigor, concentration and authority of this or that form of Church Government, we are forced to conclude, that if God has expressly ordained forms of government suited to His own presence and His own ways, He has had great regard for the elements of gentleness and patience as necessary to wisdom and success. The continuance of Government is at stake as well as the welfare of the individual and the mass. The Church as adapted to God and His presence, can not be designed on lines of tyranny, and it will lean to long times and gentle processes. Authority and Consent will be as the mathematical axes of its construction. The problem of Church Government is not that of gaining strength from power, but strength from willingness—or will.

God in Authority, and God in Consent; these are two phases of God in Church Government. We will consider each in turn.

The proper place of Authority is the place of dignity, stability, adaptability, respect and power. Law, it would seem, ought to flow steadily and not alternately stagnate and swirl. Strength is of supreme importance, not that it might over-ride, but induce Consent. All the requisites of Authority look to the winning, not the forcing of Consent. Therefore, when we recognize God in the place of Authority in Church Government, it is not for the sake of violence of method, and summariness of action, for He Himself has not entered and enthroned Himself for that purpose, but for the sake of winning, without struggle and conflict, the ends sought. "Lest haply we be found fighting against God" is the thought that should be present in the minds of all under Church Authority. The visible Authorities will in any case be men—men of like frailties with the rest of mankind, but, if behind them God Himself be, even seeming weakness may become very strong. The State suffers greatly from having nothing behind the head and front of outward seeming, save such things as she dare not reveal too nakedly. Of infinite value to the Church is God's presence behind the outward front and face of Authority. Now, of course, in this age, no one can dream of supposing God committed to, and sanctioning all that the visible powers set forth, and not because the Church is divided, but because the Human element is recognized as a corrupting element, or at least a possibly corrupting element. (Even in the Communion claiming infallibility, that gift is but rarely appealed to, or provided for, and, confessedly, there is involved a process which specially subjects the earthly governor to the Heavenly.) But even in this age there is always the thought of God behind the visible men who wield the governing machinery of the various Communions. Therefore, because God can inspire, direct and speak, using human elements, such easily defied things as the various governing bodies of the several religious communions enjoy an amount of respect and deference unknown to the State even in Czardom. There is nothing new at all in this thought of the presence of God inspiring and directing Authority, but it must be remembered, that, even when His inspiration has been cast aside by the rulers, and the visible authori-

ties have gone directly against God, yet, to the multitude, the thought of God behind the visible promulgators and executors of law, or policy, or doctrine has sometimes been too powerful to resist. From one standpoint in fact, it looks as though visible authorities have ever tried to induce the masses to regard God as behind their promulgations, and then, having gained that point, to put forth what suited their purposes, which were often very much of the earth, earthly. The vast need of God as the Inspirer, and Director of authorities, is made only too patent by the history of the Church in all ages. But, what a large mistake it is to look solely in the region of Authority for God's ruling of the Church! Many of those promulgations are utterly against God. Has he failed then? No! His function as Inspirer and Guide to authorities has been exercised, but not regarded. And this disregard is strictly in line with man's treatment of God in all spheres of action. After all, however, God's functions have not been fully exhibited. He has often been found inspiring the government against the iniquities of authorities. The God of electricity is not only in the clouds, but also in the earth. The God of hearts is not only in the Christ at the door, but also in the yearning and hungry soul within the bars. The God of law and order not only commands, but receives. In fact, God governs the Church through every function of the Church. He is in Authority, and also in Consent. When the authorities will not be guided, God, who first endeavored to work with them, is found working with the people. And it is the ignoring of so great a fact by authorities that has caused much of the Church's, and the world's troubles. God is with us, cry the rulers. He wishes to be, but you bar the way, answer the people. Why do not the rulers sometimes suspect that God is indeed with the people? If He did not work with the people, how would there ever be a consent to Authority? In truth, History is a continual revelation of God as working out the problems of Church and world government, not only by ordering, but by receiving; in turn, rejecting where He has been rejected, and confirming where He has been acknowledged.

God in Consent is no new principle, however, to the world's intelligence. It could not but be, that the claims that God was

behind every iniquity that authorities put forth, would be met by counter claims that tended to equal exaggeration.

Now the proper place of Consent is the place of the veto, which is as separate from the place of Authority as judgment is from law. To erect the veto power into the law-making power would be the greatest of mistakes (though admission to a share may be granted, by virtue of a principle elsewhere treated of). The law-making power must be concentrated, because of the need of dignity, stability, adaptability, respect and power; but for the veto power the broadest basis is necessary. In a Republic, a President's veto is a technicality, but the people's veto is a finality. Again, to endeavor to make the whole people legislators is but to bring in the ignorant for the most delicate of work, but in as much as the test of law is to be its effect on the masses, their veto power is inalienable by the very terms. The essence of Republicanism is not so much the right of the people to elect, as it is the right to veto. It is of course a point gained additionally to be able to propose and make law, but the citadel of free government is the right to annul. The first requires representatives, but the last rests for its chief force upon the power of inertia inherent in the mass. Now it is this very inertia of the mass that God knows so well how to utilize to defeat the errors of authorities. In the end, after long periods it may be, the iniquities of Church and world fall away surely and effectually.

Whether the Church be monarchical or republican in form need not here concern us. There is a ruling centre, and there is a veto power, and God, even as He is God, works in both for the government of the whole. Law is only letter until it works. God must be in the letter and in the working equally. If He is in the letter He will be in the working, but if He be not in the letter, how will He ever be in the working? This is the consolation of the Church—Her failures are of men, Her successes are of God: Her failures fall away, His workings endure. The Church is governed to Her divine end, and, meantime, souls are saved even amid the worst confusions.

But are the forms of Church Government arranged for the work of God in Consent, as well as in Authority? Certainly, if God first instituted the government of the Church, and made it

to be a pathway for Himself, we are to conclude, that it is so arranged in its very forms, as to serve this purpose. Had He intended only to direct authorities, we would not and could not have seen much that the world has actually passed through. Had He, on the other hand, left forms of Authority to men, and contented Himself with inspiring the people to accept, or resist and agitate, we might indeed explain the many-hued aspects of authorities, on the principle of their being altogether human, but this supposition of Him as working indeed, but forbearing to work in the conception of law, and the setting forth of law, would be altogether far-fetched. That He works with authorities is entirely granted by all, and has ever been; and that He works with the people is just as safely evident. He who arranged the forms of matter that He might work both in positive and negative affinities; He who arranged forms of life that He might work in generative and also conceptive faculties, is also the same, who, in a sphere of order and law, provides both for promulgation and reception—or Authority and Consent. Duality of powers, and duality of forms that are as matrices for the powers, these we know as the very signs of Divine workings. God must meet God, life must meet life, order must meet order, and if God in any wise design the forms, this meeting of complementary forces must be the very object of His care. Let us conceive the law-making and executive power placed in position natural to Authority, not that it might crush, but be Godlike; and so, also, let the veto power be provided for as slow-gathering, time-taking, accumulative, irrepressible, naturally casting off and taking on, and finally vehement and strenuous when long suppressed—all this in order that it be not crushed, but be able to array itself with God for resistance to what is un-Godlike. It would not do, at this stage of the discussion of Church Government, to touch upon specific forms as embodying these two principles.

Of the greatest moment is the following consideration. Which is naturally the greatest power, Authority or Consent? Which has the advantage of position? The first shock of meeting in antagonism is not the real test of course. Only when we note the reserve power of Consent do we see its superiority. Authority can be overthrown, crushed, scattered and annihilated, but Con-

sent is embedded too deeply and broadly to be thoroughly reached by the forces of Authority, for anything like this. It can oftentimes remain silent, and yet be as powerful as if shouting. Let Authority beware! Let it remember too, that its real power must lie in wisdom not aggressiveness. But, Authority needs to win without issue, much less battle. Woe to the King who stirs up his people to battle against him when every man can become a soldier. Authority must have, therefore, a vast preponderance of seeming strength. It must have powers of concentration and rapid demonstration. Its voice must be distinct, and its power of decision clear. If it fails in the first movement, it is hardly apt to acquire greater force, save only by turning to tyranny. Consent will not know how to speak for a long while. It will begin to act before it finds its clear voice, or formulates to its own mind its true position. In God's government, as established in His Church, all this is, of course, carefully considered. It will guide us, doubtless, to note the balance of parts in the various systems of Church Government alleged to be of God.

And, now, we come to a point that is often overlooked, and it is this. Authority can never in its most peaceful winnings of Consent, and very much less in its warfares with it, dispense with the weight and prestige which comes from valid origin. The lack of it ends Authority, even if there be cases where the having it avails little more than the preventing of this end. Then, too, the origin of Authority must not spring out of Consent; or Consent could claim power to nullify, to unmake what it has made (the weak point of written constitutions), and to change what it does not like. It is very aggravating, too, to present generations, to be called to assent to the Consent of former peoples and even races. Authority is a pitiful weakling, if it have not so strong and clear and independent an origin that it can keep its head on its shoulders. It is shorn of life if it be shorn of origin that is independent of Consent. In the State, where self-government is aimed at, Consent may be parent to Authority, but it is a weak point. In the Church, however, God's Consent is the inevitable origin, *i. e.*, God's appointment apart from, and above human Consent, though not necessarily contrary to it—rather the opposite, of course.

Finally, it ought to be observed, that the just and due balance of the parts of Church government, upon which so much was to hinge and depend, could hardly be worked out by man soon enough for this balance to begin at the beginning. Granting that experience might bring men to knowledge of requisites, yet it is plain, that a right start was necessary. How to embody, at the very first, the principles of Church Government, making the Church a pathway for God, through the double way of Authority and Consent, giving to Authority all it needed to be Authority, in law and administration, and to Consent all it needed to be the veto power, effectually and pre-eminently, and the assenting power, continuously, to do these things in such wise, that neither the one nor the other could be decisive, save by following God's ways of time and growth—this was the problem, and only Divine wisdom could perform the task. Mark, that the principles of Church Government are but the principles of government, and that the great need was for forms that would guard these. Again mark, that only such forms as would securely guard the principles needed the Divine institution. It was not necessary to establish the whole structure of forms (entailing the logic, that men would be mutilating God's work, in case that any one form should be touched). From the very fact that Divine wisdom was at work, we would expect something simple and yet comprehensive. Therefore, pursuing our analysis, let it be observed, that Consent, by its very nature, could not have locality given it very definitely. It would be weakened if that were the case. The Roman Tribuneship of the people, as seen in the case of the Gracchi, is a case in point. Consent gains power from diffuseness. As a vehicle of God, it would be best, that it rest on breadth of foundation, and permeate the whole structure, formless, but finding utterance according to circumstances. With Authority the case must be different. Here, there must be locality—office and earthly rulers. And, so, we are led on to the point of noting, that it is the central office which is at stake chiefly. Indeed it is perfectly possible to see, that if God authorized a single office, and determined its powers and relations (plurality or singularity, for instance), He thereby determined forms of government which would naturally determine all others.

In other words, while contending that true analysis of Church

Government makes us conclude, that God established forms, it is not necessary to say—all forms, but controlling forms, central forms. Let Him but give Authority earthly expression and definite source, and He would impress Himself on all forms under it, working, as ever, through Authority and Consent. It may be He went further; it may be that He ordained locality for Consent, and divided up Authority in major and minor offices, etc., but, it is only necessary that God should locate Authority, and form would spring into existence. It is easily tested. Locate chief authority in a Council, a Congregation, an Assembly of officers, a number of officers all of equal powers, a single supreme officer, and how vast the differences, as logical results follow!

But, it must be said, that it is a great point gained, when we see that whatever may be the locality and powers of Authority. Consent must be untouched in its vitality, so that it can not be throttled; and, that by the very choice of the seat of Authority, and limitation of its powers, God has preserved the functions of Consent to the Church.

CHAPTER III

Grace in Authority; Faith in Consent

We ought now to be able to combine the results of our analysis of Grace and Faith, and of Authority and Consent; and this we proceed to do.

We have seen that Church Government differs from any and all other government by reason of the element—God. It is not only necessary that God should be the founder and instituter—the source of Authority, but He must forever be in Church Government as its life and power. It is not a case of the Church governing for God, but God Himself governing through the instrumentality of the Church. As was said in the last chapter, Church Government must be adapted to God so that He might govern through it; and that one great reason why He Himself determined and established Church Government was, that his place and movement in it might be fittingly provided. We have also seen that He has secured His place in it by means of working with Consent, as well as with Authority. He knows how both to inspire Authority and prepare Consent. His methods too are those of time and growth. Either the earthly authorities may not hearken at once to His inspiration, or the powers that hold Consent lend themselves to His influence, but taking His time and working by growth, He finally brings the two together. By working with both powers He antagonizes, neutralizes and reconciles until He governs, just as with positive and negative forces of Nature, or with generative and conceiving faculties He works His own will in the end.

To conceive the Church in any other light than this is only to conceive it utterly different from all of God's own creations, from His whole Universe in fact. Even in secular governments we can see the play of these forces so plainly as to bring the thought that it is by these antagonisms and reconciliations that God gains His ends for all governing; but in Church affairs God has pledged His continual presence, and according to our analysis, He works all

to His mind by means of working, now with one, and now with the other.

Authority is positive, is generative. Consent is negative, armed with veto power, in fact conceptive.

What, then, is the special form that God's help and presence will take, as best suited to the contending powers of Authority and Consent? It seems very simple to answer, that He will equip Consent with Faith—the grace of Faith, if you will; and Authority with Grace that will invigorate for law-making, doctrine-settling, the determining of worship, the executing of decrees or laws, the administering of ordinances, the preaching of word, the teaching of truth, the helping of those committed to its care—in a word, all the functions of a ministry; and we can, for brevity, simply call this Grace.

Consent is primarily concerned with receiving. It has no proper function until some word, law, decree, doctrine, sacrament, prayer or discipline is brought to it for acceptance or rejection. Faith to see God behind it, and to accept it as from Him, or to refuse to see God and reject it—this would be Consent under God's guidance; but, of course, Consent will be no more infallibly subject to the influence of God than Authority might be. Consent might be recalcitrant, refusing Faith, even where God urges; or yielding, where God would work firmness of rejection. God, we must know, will have His difficulties with forming Consent, as well as with controlling councils or officers in the right way. The Council of Nicæa was ultimately received, but only after a long time did the Church settle down to the acceptance of its decrees. But, after all is said, it is very plain that, when God begins to work with Consent, it will be to stir up and direct the powers of Faith in the man, the people, or the whole mass of the Church, as the case may be.

With Authority, the Grace of God is likewise bestowed according to function. Authority must manifest itself in a multitude of ways. The entire functions of the ministry, both taken collectively and individually, universally and locally, officially and in those other ways collateral with official action, although more nearly touching private life, belong to it. Wherever Authority proclaims itself, there the people look for God—His wisdom, love,

order, patience, gentleness, power and every other quality. No plea of the frailty of humanity avails. Being the Church, God is looked for. Being Church Government, absolute perfection is demanded. This is not wrong. The Authority is God's authority, and ought to be stamped with God's character. The Grace, then, needed by Authority, is that which would enable the people ever to find what they look for; and we must conclude that this Grace is given. If we ask why it can not be manifested fully, and always, the answer is of course plain—Authority is as recalcitrant to God's guidance as Consent is seen to be. Its task may be harder, or no more difficult, but it is perfectly patent to all men that Authority is very imperfect as a manifestor of God's perfection. Grace is its great need therefore. We might say a grace Faithwards—that God might be perceived and hearkened to; but certainly a grace of action—that God might be expressed in law and doctrine, word and worship, precept and example.

If we be disposed to criticise, either the body of the Church, for withholding Consent at proper times, or the authorities of the Church, for ungodly action at proper times, no one can demur; but neither result has prevented the Church, in the main, from its progress, and God's grace to authorities, and help to Consent is seen to have existed all along. Again, this progress could not have taken place unless God had wrought with both.

Now, having seen God striving with each of the two parties—with one for Grace unto action, and with the other for Faith unto co-operation, the great question is ready for us. Could God withhold Grace from the one, or Faith from the other? We can not conceive it. It is the field of His labor. He can antagonize them, neutralize their errors by playing the one against the other, and take time to reconcile them, but He will unceasingly be found acting with both. The conclusion then is inevitable—that wherever Authority is found, there is found Grace also. And the corollary of this is equally true—that the line of Authority is the line of Grace, the line of God's effort to govern through the instrument that He has chosen. To abandon His own instrument of Authority, to empty it, and make it void—this we can not for a moment allow as of God. Just as the task of God is in the case of all, so is His task in the case of each—that of making Author-

ity an expression of Himself. As the task is, in the case of law-making or the exegesis of doctrine, so is it in the case of pastoral work, or the expounding of the word. Nor, when we behold the recalcitrance of the mass, can we wonder at that of the individuals.

We are still very far from determining when, or where, or in what form God established Authority for His Church. We have only gone as far as to show that Authority needs its complement, Consent, in order that there may be a government by God; and that we are to make an allowance for time and growth, ere we expect to see God's wisdom issue from the oppositions and reconciliations of these two; and that He is pledged to work with both; and that He gives grace to both, to the one for Faith to receive, and to the other for Grace to energize; and that both the powers established for Authority and those established for Consent are continually opposing His efforts, entailing every kind of disaster in the course of things; and that, notwithstanding this opposition, God does often settle the antagonisms of the two, and makes the world progress to its liberty in right thinking and doing; and, finally, that we can not separate Authority and Grace, but the line of one is the line of the other.

Having seen this union of Authority and Grace, we are almost compelled to ask ourselves, what would be the logic of the situation, where Authority did not manifest God, but Grace was rejected and the act, or law or doctrine issued godless and wrong? This must of course often happen. To expect it to be otherwise, would be to expect men to be absolutely amenable to Heavenly guidance and perfectly righteous in action. Now, however hard it might be, to apply a corrective for such action, yet it is very plain that the error results from not following Grace, and not from absence of Grace. Man is at fault, not God. This conclusion does not commit us to blind following of Authority, but rather frees us, and sets us the task of bringing Authority back to the bearings of right. However, no such instance can drive us to deny the offer of Grace, *i. e.*, the presence of Grace, and that is the great point we must be brought to see. Once grant that the Authority so erring is in truth the Authority that ought to

have done differently, and we grant the presence of the Grace that was rejected. So too, we can not assert the absence of God, working for faithful acceptance, because a hearer rejects a true preaching of the Gospel. We are too accustomed to the thought of God standing at the door, for us, in either case, to doubt His effort. Grace in authority must therefore mean Grace present, or Grace offered, or Grace ready; and not Grace utilized. God will always be found working on both sides, but often accepted on only one, and sometimes indeed rejected on both for a brief period.

A question that has all along been pending may now be taken up. This Grace of God that is given, is it the Grace of the Holy Ghost, or is it the Grace of the Lord Jesus Christ? In general it may be said, it is the Grace of the Holy Ghost, but acting, not in His own special province, but as the Agent of the Head of the Church. It is, of course, Christ, the Head, who is governing the whole body, but the functions called into play for the work are the functions of giving wisdom, energy, thought, love, etc., and it is the Holy Ghost who confers these gifts. It may be indeed a narrow field, and an intricate task, that of discriminating between the work of the Holy Spirit in His own sphere, and His work as the Agent of Christ, but it is impossible not to see in the character of the work to be performed, the need of operations proper to the Holy Ghost, and yet, that as Christ has promised His personal presence to the Church, the *agency* of the Holy Ghost is posited. However, the Church is a body—Christ's body, and there are "bonds" and "joints." This fact will account for much. The Holy Ghost is "compacting," forming, building the whole rough mass into a likeness of Christ, into a fit Bride for Him. There is, deep down under the surface, therefore, a sense in which it is the Grace of our Lord that is conveyed. Each part is a member of Christ, and as the effort is to make each part grow to the measure of Him, so also is it to make the whole reproduce Him. The question too arises—could this presence and work of the Holy Ghost go on unless the work of Christ were already complete, and Himself prepared to be wrought into these earthly forms, this earthly organization. We know that the Holy Ghost found no temple in man's nature, however He might work from without upon man's nature, until Christ's work was done, and the stock

prepared for the graft, the nature for transmission. In other words, while the Holy Ghost can influence any organization on earth, yet, in the Church of Christ there are those peculiar conditions, which make His work there special, and this special feature is, that He can work Christ into His Church, but into that only.

We are thus better able to bring our ends together. Ordinarily we might say, that God working by the Holy Spirit can take any body of men, and by working upon the minds and hearts of the authorities for good ruling, and the minds and hearts of the people for good following, by playing these forces, one against the other, in process of time secure His own results. So He does to a certain extent, but let us remember that there is a difference even to God between the leavened and the unleavened flour. He leavened His Church first, that He might work with it better. We must not forget the leaven. If results came only because of method, this play of Divine forces in Authority and Consent might do for all bodies, but it is both method and material that makes the work of God in His Church progress. Therefore, our conclusion so far is, that while the line of Authority is the line of Grace, it is in the sphere of God's Church that this is essentially true. Or, to put it on the other side, the line of Consent is the line of God's grace unto Faith, and this especially true in the sphere of God's people.

Thus we are able to discuss the difference between *de facto* and *de jure* governments. God undoubtedly works always with all governments—all organizations. He is ever striving to lead to order and righteousness. He is ever found working with both of the contending forces of Authority and Consent. A *de facto* government of Church, or State, or any other body, is a field of which He takes advantage instantly, and for the fullest results obtainable. If ever there forms in our mind a suspicion, that amid all the contending organized bodies of Christians, some *de facto* governments are not *de jure*, that condition would not preclude our free admission, that God works with them by the same method He works in the Church itself. Again too, we must remember that all the baptized partake of Christ, and the great bulk of Christian organizations, (if not each and every one, as we like to

think, is composed of baptized members of Christ. A *de facto* organization of baptized members of Christ may therefore be sufficiently of the leavened material prepared by God for special work, in order to enable Him to reap large harvests of progress. The conditions that obtain in Consent might in very fact be complete for His work, but in the region of Authority there may be some bar. However, is it not too plain for discussion, that that which is both *de facto* and *de jure*—this is, par excellence, the heir to the glorious promise—"Lo! I am with you," and destined to shine, in the end, with all the lustre of truth and righteousness.

If, so far, the analysis has been correct, we may now turn to see a very simple conclusion. The term "Grace of Orders" has been a veritable bone of contention in the theological world, but is really a very harmless expression, in the light out of what has been said. It simply means, that, where there is valid Authority, there are special conditions in which God can work; that the proper recipient of Authority is heir to all those special preparations which will enable God to come to him fully for the work. The fitness of the recipient is not touched upon, so far as concerns character, ability or spirituality, for all these things are personal. No man may be fit for God because of personal character. The special things concern those preliminary conditions which enable God to work with Authority in His Church, as He can work nowhere else. However we might think good character a better condition than anything else, yet it is not so. Until Christ had completed his work, the Spirit could not begin the special operations of redeeming men by dwelling in them. Certain gifts of Christ to His Church, certain bonds between them come first. When these are complete, secure, warranted, then comes that Grace to Authority that takes it in all its ignorance, willfulness and sin, and makes it serve the purposes of God—yet only by battle. No law by which men receive Authority can be made that will bar incompetents (and an incompetent will but make God's task the harder); but to say that God withholds His efforts because the instrument is poor, is only to make us wonder what he does when a whole age of men is corrupt. God's machinery, however, has been made for work where many incompetents exist—where all are incompetent to a large extent. It is the argument for greater

effort on His part; and in saying He has prepared to make use of bad tools, we but reiterate the law—Grace in Authority.

It is, of course, the usual way of the world, to consider the matter of Church Government in the light of Authorities governing for God (and so in a sense they do), but the real situation is, that God governs through men, grouped into the complementing forces of Authority and Consent, and in this view we can see, that, never mind what the character of those composing these two forces may be, God's action is not seen in either one, necessarily, but only after the ultimate results from the agreement of both have issued. Again, the world is expecting Authority to be competent, only as it is ideal in character, and so worthy of God; but, we have seen, that God has established as the condition of His presence, not worthiness, but some peculiar relation to Christ. Not, however, that worthiness does not make God's task of governing easier, quicker, etc., but that it does not increase His presence, or unworthiness bar it. As we contend it should be rightly conceived, the Church is a special organization so linked to Christ as to be a special field for the work of God, by reason of those bonds; that God is ever in it, working as only he can work; that worthiness is a great aid to the success of the work, but not a condition of the presence.

A perfect illustration is the presence of God in the Holy of Holies. The Covenant, the Temple, the Holy of Holies, the Mercy-seat, these were conditions of the Shekinah (the presence), but the obedience and faith, etc., of the authorities and the people affected the success of God's work. So, too, we who are members of Christ, can also say we are, "Temples of the Holy Ghost; which is in us; which we have of God," but we know that His presence there only secures the results aimed at when we cooperate with Him.

It has been said, that it is true in a sense, that authorities govern for God, and we can, with a little thought, see to what extent.

It is one of the conditions, inseparable from the nature of the beings whom God allows as authorities in the Church, that, while sitting in the seat of Authority—which Authority is expected to be Godlike in wisdom and work—those so placed should be all

unworthy. God's settlement of the difficulty is not in telling the people to discriminate and judge when the Authority is right or wrong, but, rather, in the assumption of the task of bringing results in spite of the difficulties. Having the counter force, Consent, and the elements of time and growth at His disposal, He does this, and, rather than disparage and weaken Authority, puts it before the world clothed with all dignity. Its government must be taken for God's true will. God may dissent, work against it, and overthrow the decrees, judgments, laws, doctrine, acts, etc., but they must perforce have temporary standing as if of the following of God. We may wonder how God can let a man, or group of men, who will often follow wrong, manifest ignorance, be corrupt, etc., stand for Him, and we may wonder how these men can claim to act for God, when their acts are so plainly unjust, untrue and corrupt, or so utterly foolish, but all of this is of the necessary weakness of world conditions. Men who are placed in the seat of Authority can only go ahead to act for God as best they are able, knowing that their acts will stand for His acts, and at the same time possibly be in fact far from having His approval. But when we say that God governs through men, we have the real condition expressed. Even those wrong acts of theirs fall into a place appointed for them, and occasion His other operations. He is so wont to deal with just such elements that His government is thoroughly adapted to them.

Reverting now, just for a moment, to the question of those special conditions which enable God to be present in Church Government in special sense, it must be enough to say, that we know of their existence better than of their nature. Like the question of His presence in the temple at Jerusalem it is hard to explain. There can be no doubt, however, that the coming of Christ, and the establishment of the Church in intimate relation to Him changed conditions radically.

The suggestion which arises most naturally is this. In the system of evolution, Force is developed from a simple form until we see it manifold. Matter, first in one element, becomes found in some sixty or more. Then, these two are united for a new phase of creation. Life, too, is developed, and then introduced where Force and Matter already are. Afterwards, Mind is introduced.

Subsequently Spirit (which in another sphere has known an evolution resulting in Angels), enters the region where Force, Matter, Life and Mind are found growing and crystalizing. Finally, another whole beginning is made, and God enters Creation, in order to take it up into God, whither its destiny has ever wrought it. Now, just as each phase in the series has witnessed the new erected while the old stands, so the new and final creation in Christ comes into life while the old has not passed away. God can be, and must be present in the final creation as in no other. In other words, the Church must, and does present a field for Grace as nothing else ever did or could do. God did not just found the Church, but is essentially in it. Influencing all government, He is in the very midst of this. Church Government is not a government of, for, and by the people; nor of, for, and by the Authorities. **IT IS OF, FOR, AND BY GOD.** It may, like all the rest of God's worlds move haltingly, and with many fallings away, towards the appointed goal, but no evolution amid, and by means of antithetical forces, ever moved more surely to the appropriate consummation than does the kingdom of Christ.

It only now remains to see, that in such an organization as the Church, Authority and Grace can not be separated, but are practically convertible terms.

If God were simply the originator of the line of Authority, and if He merely promised to help all those who rightly held office, we would have a very different condition of things from that actually existent. There is a line in which God can move, and there is a line in which He can not move. Just as the whole Church is prepared for His presence in a way the governments of the world can not be, so, too, in its own way, the case in point. Just as also the conditions of Israel made a pathway for God, or just as the Temple and Mercy-seat, in a sense, enabled His presence, so, too, is it with the case in hand. In that strange kingdom of God, in that mysterious body of Christ, in that new sphere for the processes of evolution, where not spirit-men merely are developed, but God-men (Sons of God) are born and bred, there are lines along which God moves naturally. There are others, too, foreign to Him. There are lines where He moves for certain

results, and there are lines reserved for other workings. This comes not from lack of power, of course, but from the very fitness of things. Thus we can conceive a mode or form of government far more adapted to His presence and workings than another might be. As long as that exists—and, of course, it will never fail—it will have His Authority or Presence as no other would or could—from sheer lack of adaptation. (Why do we forever consider Church Government as adapted to the world? Let us think of it also as the pathway for God. Let us ask ourselves—what form best suits Him and His movements?)

Now, in the light of this resolution of both Authority and Grace into the Presence of God, the whole question of the Grace of Orders ought to end. Where God is, Authority is, and Grace is; and since God comes into that which is prepared for Him, moves along lines adapted to Him, and abides under conditions peculiar to Him, our task is but to find how Authority is seated, in order to know where Grace abides—Authority for every function of the Ministry and Grace for every act.

Wherever it really and truly is—this Authority and Grace, the member is subject to it, and ought to accept it. Grace, too, brings him into the body—“puts him there and binds him there;” and Faith “attracting him there should keep him there.”

Faith in Consent

The preceeding discussion of Grace in Authority has in very large measure set forth the complementary position of Faith in Consent, but some further discussion can not be out of place, and is, indeed, necessary.

We are carried into another sphere of man's nature when we pass over to this side of our discussion, namely the sphere of feeling. Authority, in its judgments, is primarily in need of mental qualities, but for Consent there is brought into play chiefly the emotional elements of judgment; and this arises from the very necessity of the respective attitudes of the two parties to the whole decision. Judgment, we must remember, is according to the whole nature of man, and must be “*en epignosei kai pasē aisthēsei*,” as St. Paul suggests when he speaks to the Philippians concerning

"love abounding more and more." Where judgment is abstract, deduced from premises, sifted out according to logic, or vision of conditions, etc., it may stand the approval of mind and break down entirely before the bar of the heart. And, on the other hand, feeling can often dictate what the mind must disapprove. Religion and religious things are more subjected to this double judgment than anything else, and God, seeking to lift the entire man and all humanity, has recognized the principle most plainly. From the very nature of the case Authority is cut off to a very great degree from the judgment *en pasē aisthēsei*, but the masses of the people are almost shut up to this form of judgment—the judgment of feeling. There is absolutely no way of securing this mode of judgment in its full power to Authority, never mind how constituted. It is inherent only in the irresponsible masses. The very sense of responsibility destroys sensibility to it, and drives any rational being to dependence on his mental powers, but where all sense of responsibility is taken away, feeling will rise to judge, and reason will hide away. The *vox populi* has just this merit, and just this defect. It is a judgment natural and necessary, but one-sided, and like its standard, feeling, easily biased. If Authority leaned to aesthetic perceptions and judgments, it would be disastrous to all diacritical ones, but, still, there must be some place for this judgment by the aesthetic man. God has located this judgment of the feelings in the masses, thus rendering them, or rather recognizing them, wholly unfit, *en masse*, for decisions, promulgations and all acts of Authority, but eminently fit as the testers of every thing that bears on human nature. Can not this indeed be said—that when the masses seek to originate, then the *vox populi* is almost sure to be wrong; but, when wisdom has framed its creations, and submitted them, then let it bow its ear to catch what the *vox populi* proclaims. In truth, the whole decision can not be rendered by either Authority or Consent alone. They are complementary to each other and God's voice can only be known when the decree of Authority, and the agreement of the consenting masses unite to exhibit a heavenly harmony.

Nothing can ever make the masses judge otherwise than by feeling, but, of course, the feeling takes the higher ranges as well as the lower (*aisthēsis* implies the very highest perceptive faculties

outside the sphere of *epignosis*.) Now, the great ministrant to feeling is Faith, and Faith has just this marvellous adaptability to this sphere, out of its many spheres, that it can transmute into feeling every thing it brings to its possessors. If the masses are given to judgment by feeling, Faith is a true servant for them, for all things in her hands undergo her transforming touch. She receives hard, cold words or facts, but ere she delivers them there is a warmth about them that adapts them not for minds, but hearts. Faith is not only of Reason but of Love. She forms convictions; and the masses are not only full of feeling, but of convictions—which are opinions centred in feelings.

So, then, the masses have a part in all decisions that are of God, and just as vision, and guidance, and power of action, etc., are needed by Authority, so this power of Faith, that brings all into the sphere of feeling, is a requisite of Consent.

It was a great mistake to think that the great trouble of Church Government has come from Authority heedless of Grace. The faithless masses that refuse Consent are fully as much to blame. God has trouble with one as much as the other. It is easy to read History, and arrange whole chapters of charges against the rulers of the Church, but it is enough only to make also a list of those things done rightly, or positions correctly assumed, and note, at the same time, the struggles against those right things, in order to see how wrong the masses often were. For instance; in the very beginning the Church began to worship Christ as God, but every conceivable revolt has taken place, seeking to upset this action of Authority. Every one, save the last, has signally failed, and, through the agreement of Authority and Consent, has been set to rest. The last is tottering, but does not yet yield. In each case Consent has finally confirmed Authority, but it was "so slow of heart to believe," and, taking the whole history of the struggle, we are won to admiration of the conduct of Authority, and to amazement at the opposition. In fact, if we note each general position ever assumed by Authority on any line, we will find, that never mind how right it was in the beginning, yet Authority has had to carry out its conclusions to the small ramifications of each subject ere battle ceased. Consent does not altogether yet admit that Authority was right in its settlement as to whom to baptize,

or how to baptize; whom to ordain, or how to ordain. Authority, right or wrong, must do battle to-day (so faithless is Consent) over things that centuries ago seemed to stand settled. Here nineteen hundred years after Ignatius, bishop of Antioch died, these pages are being written to urge, that the Authority of his day knew what offices were continuous in the Church of God.

But there is no use to dispute over the relative blame belonging to Authority or Consent. By means of their struggle to conclusions, things have been wrought better than if by their peace at the beginning, and what things are not yet worked out, doubtless need further definition. Faith, too, is very nearly man's severest test. When he masters that he will be in possession of Love also. Men believed not Moses. They believed not Christ. The Faith which is to "attract men to the Church, and keep them there" is the kind that moves mountains.

Finally, it is impossible not to see, what tremendous power resides in the masses when vested with the veto power. Let us recall what was said before, that the veto power of a ruler is but technical (and yet even then it is of great weight), but the veto power of the masses in the Church is measureless, because it is of nature and ineradicable. It is a fair match for all the powers of Authority. Every decree of Authority must move the mass. If, on the other hand, the inertia of the mass is not overcome, there is a veto. So, as we read history, we behold more tasks undertaken by Authority than accomplished, and more rusty and exploded canons than we like to look upon. So, then, on the one hand, inertia works a veto, and on the other, it takes Faith to work consent. Do we sympathize with poor weak Authority, or do we pity this mighty giant?

CHAPTER IV

Ministerial Office and the Apportionment of Functions

Just as a view of government in general helped us greatly to the discussion of Church Government, in the last two chapters, so now, the discussion of Ministerial office in its general bearings will help us, when we come to narrow our view to the office of the Christian Ministry. On that account we now proceed to consider the range of the works and powers which, from the nature of the case, appertain to ministration in religious office.

Fetichism reaches only to the conception of power or powers in the invisible realms, but as soon as the idea of a god, a personal being emerges, then there also comes the idea of a ministry, in place of the idea of a "medicine man" or charmer. The function of the medicine man can remain as vague as the conception of the powers above are vague, but with a ministry comes a differentiation of functions that brings an end to the former indefiniteness. It is not impossible that something like a ministry can exist, even while the idea of mysterious power has not yet passed to the definiteness that pictures that idea in the form of a god, but the limited character of the functions exhibited in Fetich service, is due to the limitation of ideas concerning God. As civilization advances, the idea of a god emerges, but not in the form of one god, but of many gods. The idea of one god is itself the sign of minds further removed from the savage period, or at least unreflective conditions. But with the idea of definiteness in Deity, comes definiteness as to the service, and therefore also the ministers of Deity. Each god must have his spokesman, and also the receiver of things brought as offerings to the god, and these two functions naturally would tend to divide and become located in different men. They might indeed remain in the one minister, but they might not, and historically did not. Another function would also emerge. In the relation of this or these servitors of the god to the people adhering to that particular god, and mani-

festing adherence by obedience, or by offerings, or both, the position of authority of some nature over these people would come as a matter of course. Prophecy, Ministration, Rule, nothing could keep back this threefold development of function when once the idea of a god appeared plainly in the minds of men. The location of them, and the development of them is another matter, but the existence of these three functions of service is not only necessary, but is historically a fact seen among all the worshippers of gods. Especially, it may be said, is the employment of prophetic functions a sign of the advance of ideas concerning God. As long as only vague powers are believed in, no men seem to dare to stand out as spokesmen for them, even though they undertake a general kind of propitiation; and the assumption of this office is a token that ideas of Deity are advancing.

If the office of Prophecy is combined with that of Ministration, the powers of Rule, whatever they be, settle naturally there also, but if the two be divided, and apportioned to separate orders of men, then, naturally, there ensues a struggle for the attachment of ruling powers to the one or the other; though, generally, such struggle inclines to centre the rule in the ministering order. The ruling powers grow out of the possession of the others, and it has seldom, if ever, been seen, that ruling officers exist as a third and independent order. Of course, we can see how great an advantage the ministering order would have in any struggle with the prophetic. In fact, there is something inherent in the work proper to this order of prophets that isolates them, while, on the other hand, the usual functions of ministration would tend directly to throw power into the hands of the ministrants. In fact, among all the ancient civilized peoples, especially Babylonians and Egyptians, we find the prophetic office possessed of very little power of rule, and always this power tending to accumulate in the hands of the ministering order, until it is able to contend even with the State for dominion over the masses of the people, setting ecclesiastical against secular authority in a way which has so often made history.

Prophet, Priest and King has been the title looming in the distance before every ministry of every god of every people, and more or less progress has ever been made towards the grasping of

it. This has been because these are the natural lines of ministration, and because the goal of desire is ever that which it is possible to make real. The Priest has been the one most able to pursue the course of power, and he has seldom failed to try to absorb even the prophetic office, if not by personal assumption, yet by locating it in the ecclesiastical body at large, or somewhere under the priestly control.

There are no other functions of the ministering office than these of Prophecy, Ministration, and Rule (though the teaching office will be noticed hereafter as a development of the Prophetic, and Rule has a line of division into—Rule proper, and the Care of souls). They may be combined, or taken separately, but there are no others that naturally grow out of the very nature of the thing, and all these are indeed so proper to it as to appear invariably wherever the worship of a god exists.

When, therefore, Christianity comes upon the scene, we may examine, and see if it violates, or transcends, or falls under the rule. We will naturally expect differences in the arrangement of these functions, and differences of the degree to which the powers of each division are carried, but after making an examination of all the ministerial scheme or system, we will not expect to find the natural functions of ministration lessened or increased; for reason forbids that there should not be a minister of word, and a minister of worship, and that some degree of rule should not accrue of natural right to one or both. As a matter of fact, the same ideal of Prophet, Priest and King is not only held, but realized, in the very founder of the system.

Ministration, then, under analysis, and in history, falls into the three heads as above given, and we may pass to consider the natural reach and limit of the office of prophecy, ministration proper, and rule.

First, then—As to Prophecy. The worshipper of a god was obliged to tell something about his god. That compelled him to either speak himself for that god, or to quote someone as speaking. In the war of men on behalf of their particular god, it could not but be that the god himself must be made to speak somehow. So also, in every effort to persuade men to action under the influence of religion, oracles, or dreams, or visions of seers, or direct mes-

sages must be pleaded. "Thus saith ——," must be the logical resort of the one desirous of persuading.

But, after this first origin, there could be very little development (until the time of the Schools of Prophetical Teachers). The working out of effects could only be accomplished by the nature of the message, or the manner of its delivery, powerful, mysterious, dramatic or anything else, as the case might be; or, by some personal quality in the character or influence of the prophet. There was no room for degrees of office in the sphere of prophecy. It was too personal to admit of being divided and apportioned, and so it remained throughout the history of heathendom, and when Israel came there was no change, for there could be none. *It is an office of parity*, knowing no degrees or orders, and gathering honor and respect, not for the order, but for the man. The truth, or seeming truth, of a message is worth more than all else, and the humblest might have this as well as the most exalted. The nature of things barred out gradations by their own force. Only in combination could it aspire to more, *i. e.*, only by borrowing from one of the other functions of ministration. Our Lord combined it in His Church with both of the others, and so we have rather lost sight of the fact, that there is no room for degrees of order among prophets, springing out of their own functions.

The prophetical office, too, is, by a natural antagonism, opposed to that of ministration proper, if the two are separate. All through History this is seen, especially Jewish History. Not only did the Master gain honor for the prophetical office by combining it with the others, but He at one stroke ended the old bitter warfare between them (though He thereby put them as two tendencies, to battle still for leadership within the narrower sphere).

Secondly—As to Ministration proper. How far the Charm-worker, with his incantations, could be considered a ministrant, we need not discuss, for it was at such an early period that man began to worship gods (in the personal sense of the term god), and it is so characteristic of the intelligent races to do so, that we need not go back to analyze the passage from the lesser to the greater conception of religion. Given the conception of a god, and his worship will be led or directed by a ministrant. Offerings, dues, sacrifices, rites and ceremonies open a large field for this

side of religious office. Family religion can be content with occasional assumptions of official duties by the head, but, if religion should become common to the masses, some ministrant in common relation to all would be a necessity. This is, of course, historically, as well as rationally true.

Now let us observe, how, in direct contradistinction to the prophetic office, which was incapable of development into degrees, the office of ministration necessarily, or certainly, at the least, very naturally developed those degrees, wherever found. Essentially it was an office of service, and the services or work would naturally fall into classes. Equality was almost an impossibility. There would surely be preparatory work, and there could be special work; while the general need and demand for the typical work would regulate the general character of the ministrations. Degrees of attendants variously entrusted with minor tasks, an order of regular ministrants, and higher still a small number charged with occasional and exceptional duties of special significance would of necessity, as it were, arise. A threefold ministry has been found everywhere that ministry has been found, simply because the special and occasional, and the regular and frequent acts of worship called for different treatment; and because preparatory work must always be done, and yet be of a nature little comporting in the minds of men with the dignity with which the higher work was vested, even though itself of a sacred character, and not to be assigned to untrained or unprepared hands. Possibly, by effort a parity in ministration might exist, but division into orders of ministrants is as natural as sunrise and sunset.

While it was the function of the prophetic office to speak for Deity, all functions of worship pertained to the office of ministration. These would begin at the lowest and ascend to the highest; and from a simple cleansing of hands that might be stretched out in supplication, and all the way through the speaking of words, up to the celebration of elaborate rites of sacrifice and offerings, the gamut of ministration would run. It is necessary, indeed, to observe the wide range of ministration. Every thing on one whole side of sacred office is ranged under the head of ministration. Just as the prophetic side of things is clearly marked, so also the ministrant side. The ministry of word exists, as well as the

ministry of acts. The breadth of the ministering office must be clearly seen, because of a narrowing tendency that has run through History, in consequence of the prominence of one or two particular acts of ministration characteristic of all ancient systems of worship. These concerned the offerings of victims in sacrificial rites, and the offerings of other gifts in divine worship. They were so characteristic and so unique, so confined to religious service, as to give distinct tone and color to the whole life or work of ministration, and indeed to blot out almost every other tone or color. Thus the *hiereus*, meaning originally "one in sacred office," became so entirely in men's minds to mean a "sacrificer of victims," that to this day it conveys that idea, even in languages in which it is a loan word. Undoubtedly it was general in its meaning, and became limited because the prominent function in ancient worship was the act of sacrificing. That is all natural enough, but it would not do, in any full survey of the different sides of sacred office, to limit our thought of the side of ministration to one function, which was not the only one, however, typical and universal it may have been in any or all ages.

The function of speaking words in worship—offering prayers is as clearly a function on the side of ministration as that of offering gifts or sacrifices. If the minister was evolved from the enchanter or charm-worker—the utterer of incantations, this is seen to be a natural growth, and on all grounds of reason we see the same thing. The prophet, with his message from the god, occupies one whole side, while the one who brings the peoples' words or offerings to the gods stands on the other.

However, there is one point in this connection to be looked into, and that is the function of blessing. It evidently, in its nature, belongs to both sides, seeming to spring directly out of prophetic functions, and yet to so depend on conditions manifested at times of worship, and almost inseparable from them (as, for instance, when repentance has been exhibited by adequate sacrifices), that we are not surprised to find that, historically, this function has accrued to the side of ministration. Again, a special blessing might belong to the prophet, but those which were general, and in some degree perfunctory, *i. e.*, following definite acts, naturally fell to be included as duties rather than gifts; debts due

the people, because pledged on conditions, rather than signs of particular grace and mercy.

The three degrees existing in the office of ministration we have seen arose naturally. Preparatory, regular, and special work was a necessity of the case. Now, it could not but be that the special should take precedence. Coming at times of great solemnity, and rising above the ordinary in the minds of all, these special acts would demand special men, endowed with special powers. Circumstances might well differ in marking out the particular functions assigned to the chief ministrants. From the standpoint of ministration, their functions might not be, inherently, any more honorable than that of the general officiant, but, being made special because rare, grew to greater honor just on that account. But, again, it might be that the highest reach of worship should be made occasional, and placed in these special hands alone, and thus mark the office as distinct in degree or order, and not simply conspicuous by the occasion.

But, after all, we must remember, that the third power—that of Rule, could be united to the functions of Ministration, and help to elevate the ones entrusted with special acts to the position of special honor, at the same time making a distinction of degree or order by means of this union.

Thirdly—As to Rule. Here, again, we see an opportunity for separation into degrees or orders, but first let us glance at the origin of Rule in a body of worshippers. This power springs out of that of ministration rather than that of prophecy; for the charm-worker exists before the prophet, and powers of rule exist even with the charm-worker. As he developed into the minister of a particular god, he did not lose his control. However, when the prophet of the god appears, he can easily bring under control the worshippers of that god, and either antagonize or increase the authority of the minister. His power would be personal, variant and proportioned to his message, while that of the minister would be official, constant and proportioned to the worshipper's own devoutness rather than any quality in the minister. The prophet's power could hardly be regulated by law or custom, but that of the minister would naturally look, for regulation, to these things. In any struggle between the two, the minister would have vast

advantage in the regular order of things, though temporarily the power of a prophet might rise to great height. Islam presents the acme of power lodged in the prophets, and brings into high relief the full workings of a system that exalts prophecy and minimizes ministration, to the last degree possible among men. Israel's history presents wonderful battle ground for the working out of the study of the effects of prophetic and priestly rule, and the warfare between them. But Christianity exhibits the most intricate and interesting study of all, because of the union of high prophetic gifts and well developed functions of ministry in the same officials, and, at the same time, opportunities of rule that have enabled a papacy to crown the preliminary work of a Roman Empire.

Rule, as we have said, allows of degrees as well as ministry. It is sometimes to be measured according to territory, and sometimes according to specific function. It is the latter that concerns us chiefly, for while an *episcopos* of a parish may be only an elder, and an *episcopos* of a number of parishes—or diocese—may be an apostle, yet, since the latter must be an *episcopos* of *episcopoi*, we are thereby carried into the region of function rather than territory.

Rule may have many degrees, theoretically, but if vested in officials already divided into degrees, by virtue of their functions, it is natural for it to settle into the same degree. The addition, however, of rule as a function of various offices will of itself help to define these offices, and, as we saw under the head of ministration, it may be the union of special functions of ministration with special powers of rule that elevates one office over another.

In the Christian ministry, we would infer from the gift of prophecy, a parity of orders; from powers of rule, we could suppose a large number; but, if it should be true that there were in the sphere of ministration a preparatory, a regular and a special grade or order, then that threefold division would naturally be the determining factor, crystalizing the rest. The rule would naturally settle down into such a division of itself. Prophecy could adapt itself to the three as well as to one, simply knowing no change or division internally, and held as an entire function by each. Rule might try to make more than three by

stretching out functions of ministration beyond the natural limit, but if the other stood firm, there would be no difficulty about the accommodation of Rule to that settlement.

It should be noted just in passing, for the sake of exactness, that preparatory work or function is capable itself of being divided. There were, besides Levites, drawers of water and carriers of ashes, etc., but no purpose would be served by going into the matter of minor divisions in the field of preparatory or assisting work.

It is now necessary to go into another matter of some importance, viz.: that concerning the Authority by which each of the three functions of religious office is carried on.

The prophet, of course, must have this authority from the divinity whose prophet he claims to be. His work depends on his message, and that on its being a message from the god, or something authoritatively spoken in the god's behalf. It would be incredible that any other source of Authority should take the place of this. Oracle, dream, vision, revelation or exposition—all would fall to the ground without the connection as to authority being recognized. The people could not designate a representative from themselves to whom the god must give his messages. The whole process is the other way. The "Preacher" must be "sent."

In the field of ministration, the case is different. The rational origin of ministration brings in the representative idea very strongly. All men must worship, all need to offer for sin; but all men are not in condition for holy exercises. The special cleansings and special training can not pertain to all, nor can all men speak the prayers in common worship. The force of circumstances it would be natural, if not absolutely necessary, to have a spokesman, a delegate, a representative, who, keeping himself always prepared for solemn rite and offering, and trained in all the details of the ceremonies, could act for the masses. But, on the other hand, while this is plain enough, it is not to be lost sight of that some connection between this their representative and their special divinity must be established. The God could send a prophet with his message without any previous recognition of the prophet by the people, and altogether independently of their approval; but we can not suppose the same condition on

the ministrant side. The people could hardly, in their offerings to the god, leave out of sight the warranty of acceptance. So we find the minister, as well as the prophet, claiming to belong to the god, and to receive power and authority from him. The people's authority is looked upon as altogether secondary however existant, but the prime consideration is that the minister be recognized by the god as his servant. In the absence of any definite designation by the god, certain ways or methods of reaching conclusions, which were assumed to be acceptable to the god, have always prevailed, and the one so selected and set apart has been regarded as vested by the god with authority. It is hard to conceive how authority in the ministry could have stood the various attacks made upon it, were it not for this connection on the one side with the people, and on the other with the god. Historically, indeed, the office of ministrant was developed among peoples who had but little idea of authority as derived from the side of representation, but who had most pronounced idea concerning the authority received from the god in whose service the man enlisted, or was placed. And, rationally, however, much we may see a power derived from that position of representation, yet we are driven to recognize an authority given, or assumed to be given, from above, as reaching its claims into the very heart of the situation.

Coming to consider the authority for Rule, we see that ultimately it too must rest on the god as its source. Rule grows, as we have before noted, out of both prophecy and ministry, and attaches itself more particularly to ministry, because that is most capable of holding and exercising it; but, it requires for its effectiveness and security, to be based on an authority at least equal to that of prophecy or ministration. If it fall below these it will mar, instead of helping them, for it has ever a special battle to fight. But, both of the others reach up to the god for their efficiency, and so it must also be with this third function of religious office.

How does the Christian system agree with these general features of ministration?

We find, of course, the threefold division into prophecy, ministration and rule. Christ is Prophet, Priest and King. His

Apostles were told to preach, to baptize and to bless and break the bread in memorial rite, and to organize and govern the church. The divisions are as plain here as anywhere. There are no more and no less than elsewhere. But they are all concentrated in one and the same persons. The prophetic and ministrant offices are blended, and the ruling powers natural to both functions confirmed to the combination. It is of marked significance too, that the choice of names for the offices should so largely lean to the functions of Rule, as we see in the Biblical *Episcopos*, and *Presbuteros*, and even *Apostolos* (Delegate), rather than to those of preaching and ministration. The term *Diaconos* falls in line with ministration, and *Apostolos* (taken as—Herald) looks to the side of preaching.

The status of authority for the various powers is similar also to our former conclusions. The prophetic office is said distinctly to be the office of an ambassador. The baptizer is directed to say, "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;" and the place of the blessing and breaker of the bread, held by the Master at the Last Supper, is by himself directly assigned to the future ministrants of that Memorial. Finally, the powers of rule are bestowed in set terms, and made to depend on the Fathers gift of them to the Son. So that, as far as authority that reaches Heavenwards is concerned, the universal rule here holds in full power. But the representative character of the ministry is not denied, but asserted, and the ministry for all its dignity and authority is clearly stated to be the servant of the people, who are all to be workers, priests and proclaimers of the self same message; and who are to have powers of election and powers of council.

As to the agreement in functions of the threefold office with the functions of the same offices in all religions, it will be well to run through the discussion of the point.

The Prophetic office is more clearly defined in the Christian system because of there being a Book of Revelation. Oracles, dreams, etc., are cast aside. The Book is full of all necessary message. The insight of the seer, and the wisdom of a

then, with the Book in hand, the data for a very real and effectual prophecy are exhibited.

The offices of Ministration in the system of the Master have in general the same functions we find elsewhere. There is prayer, and rite, and blessing in it, as in all. Differences there must be, but the sphere filled is very much the same, reaching up from leading in prayer, or praying as the spokesman of many, through the reception, or, it may be, the offering of alms, to the standing in Christ's former place in breaking the bread memorially, or the laying on of hands for God and man in the rite of ordination.

The main point presenting itself for discussion is that of the offering of sacrifice. This was the most typical function of ministry under all the systems that went before. Now, the word Priest has been used so much, in the English language, to describe the minister of sacrifice, that the use of it to describe a minister under the Christian dispensation is very objectionable to some, so let us get it out of the way. It is harmless of itself, being presbyter written short (which word Presbyter comes over from the side of Rule, and is not taken from that of ministration), but if it be loaded with ideas not proper to it, there can be great confusion produced. The word *hiereus* is another loaded word, and in the combination Hierarchy, or Hieratical, etc., stands with some for great execution. So, too, the word *Sacerdos* has imported meanings. All of them mean simply—The religious official on the side of Ministration—a “Minister of Sacred things.” These things were so often bloody sacrifices that it is hard to keep the idea of “Sacrificer” out of mind, when any one of them is used. Even the innocent—Priest, having been used for an Old Testament priest, can not be kept innocent. Of course, the offence enters because of the dispute over the nature of the Lord's Supper, as to whether it has the nature of sacrifice. To use the word, Priest, is to seem to teach that it has: but, as it is in no wise necessary to discuss the nature of the Lord's Supper here; let us dismiss the whole use of the word, priest. Minister is just as good (except, of course, it does not expressly indicate the order of Presbyter), and it comes to us with clear meaning, and unloaded with disputed ideas.

When, therefore, the offering of bloody sacrifice ceased, what effect did it have on ministration? It did not cause it to cease. Bloody sacrifice was only one function of the ministrant or minister. He did not cease to be a minister as long as the other functions remained. Then, too, the blessing of bread and wine, and giving it to be eaten in memory of the death of Christ stands on the ministrant side of things as clearly as the offering of an animal to prefigure that death. If this took the place of the other (calling one a memorial, and the other a sacrifice, if we please), then the gap seems filled. But, whether filled or not, the analysis is the same, which is to the effect that the passing of a sacrificer of animals did not blot out ministration. In Heathen, Jewish and Christian ministries there was common to all, the performing of initiatory rites, offering prayers, reception of alms or gifts (and often offering them), conduct of worship, blessing, ordaining or setting apart for office, and the performance of a symbolical rite which in the one case was an animal sacrifice, and in the other was a memorial of the death of the *Lamb* of God.

When we come to the function of Rule, we find no great differences. The whole field of religious government is covered by all systems, as far as circumstances allow. It embraces regulation of worship and ecclesiastical order, stretches somewhat into social and economical life, and trenches narrowly upon civil rule, by force of the confusion of the spheres. The changes that our Lord made are very noteworthy. He did not decrease power or sphere; He rather increased both. But He changed the atmosphere. It were too much now to go into the proof of this, but any one taking the gifts of powers to the Apostles, on the one hand, on the other, reading into them His words on their personal bearing and the manner of their service, can see for himself. In a word, He used stupendous phrases concerning their "binding and loosing," etc., but surrounded all with an atmosphere of meekness and humility that strikes at the root of the old ideas of ecclesiastical rule.

The object of all this analysis has been to detach the function of ministration proper from those of prophecy and rule, so as to exhibit it by itself, and discuss it in relation to the Christian Ministry; and then, when its powers, and sources of authority

for those powers are plainly recognized, to show how, when such office of ministration, with its natural tendency to preparatory, regular and special grades, is combined with prophecy and rule in one ministry, the dominance of ministration will naturally control both of the others. Thus there is, as we have seen, a tendency exhibited by the Prophetical office to cause parity in the ministry; while, in the case of Rule, there is a power of accommodation and a waiting on circumstances and conditions; but as to Ministration, its divisions are so natural as almost to be of necessity. And so, therefore, when all were combined, we would look for the Christian ministry to exhibit the full effects of this element in its construction, overruling the tendency of Prophecy, and shaping pliable Rule. (But it must not be forgotten, that Rule itself had tendencies towards the same divisions as those we have traced in Ministration).

It was also of importance to see that the different kinds of ministrations in the Christian worship did not differ from those common to all worship as much as we might think without taking care to analyze the two.

We read in History how Turanian worship, in the region of the Euphrates, prepared the way for Cushite and Semitic, which in turn fallowed the ground for the very similar usages of the Mosaic, and how this latter made the matrix for that established by Christ and His Apostles. It all hangs together like a line of evolution—old skeletons modified, and clothed upon, and gifted with ampler life, but to the utmost reach revealing old origin, and gradual passage from low to high. It may at first seem strange that Melchizedech, of the time of Abraham, so much resembled Gudea of Nergulla, living some thousand years before him, and that Christ came to a ministry “after the order of Melchizedech” who lived so long previous to His own advent, but these reflections are not strange to the thinker. Ministration is like the order of vertebrates that adapts the same general type of structure to life in air, or earth, or water.

CHAPTER V

Official Authority by Law that is Known

We have now seen something of a ministry of Grace and Authority, and something of the powerful function of Consent dependent on God's workings in the sphere of Faith. We have also seen how each and every function of religious office becomes apportioned in accordance with the natural orders or degrees existent in ministration proper. And, finally, we have seen that behind all ministry, whether of prophecy, ministration or rule, there is claimed the authority, of God. We come naturally, then, in this chapter, to reflect upon the nature of Authority, and its passage to those holding it as delegates.

In the chapter on Authority and Consent we endeavored to show how Authority in the Church was the presence of God, which presence also assured Grace. And, certainly, that analysis is true, when we consider, as we ought, the deepest essence of these matters. But Authority often appears in ordinary garb as simply personal authorization, *i. e.*, having the substance of a word, rather than that of a thing. The human conditions and earthly methods impress us more than the Divine. Let us take, for instance, the sentence which our Lord spake—"Go ye therefore * * * * Lo! I am with you always." It is easy to carry in our mind the authority conferred by the words, "Go etc.," but the authority of that "constant presence" is not so easily realized, although from God's side, that must be the very substance of the authorization.

Now, then, if we can see the truth of the Presence, it may be safe to follow the easier way and run along the line of verbal commission, but certainly we ought to see that, though verbal commission may be more analogous to earthly affairs, yet the gracious reality of the Presence is peculiarly of God.

However, in either case, it is equally plain that the commission must have God as its content. God could simply say, "Go," but every one else must say—God says, "Go." How to carry this personality of God through all commissions for ministry is the problem.

It is very easy then to see that there will appear some law (by which the gift will not only be bestowed, but by which it will be guarded); for the very nature of the case demands a law, and furthermore God always works by law, not only because of something special in the case before Him, but simply because of His own nature, which is the nature of law and order. It would be another matter to say how far the details of the law must originate with God, for He is known to adapt His gifts to earthly conditions and powers of reception; but of this we may be sure—the path of God, or of His Authority will be orderly and regular. Nothing is plainer in Nature than both the flexibility and inflexibility of God's workings. Having given man a field of action, He adapts His own working in that field to the liberty bestowed on man; but, on the other hand, if man does not have respect unto certain workings of God surrounding and running in and out all through that field—certain inflexible laws conditioning the whole, he will altogether fail. Because, then, it is plain that there must be a law, it does not follow that a certain liberty of action, within this sphere of man's life and interests, is not freely granted. The point cannot be that we must look for a law, every detail of which originates with God, but that there must be within the region a law of God conditioning the whole.

Let us take an illustration. God creates man and woman and says simply—"Be fruitful and multiply." Here under the bestowal of greatest liberty, we have a reality of under-running law that of necessity conditions the whole. Vitality is of God only, and is by law and order, but the marriage laws that men have made have been very various, and all of them have, for a while at least, carried the vitality which is of God along with them. Yet, after all, is not the test of every custom of man in this field the original laws of God concerning vitality. Polygamy, polyandry, concubinage, free-love, divorce—all stand in the way of fruitfulness, and the possession of the earth. The great law hedges around the field, and runs all through it. The details will, through experience, settle to the law. God will go with man in the details, as man arranges them, for the very purpose ultimately bringing those details to settle to the law underlying all.

So, in Church Government—in the law concerning Ministration, Prophecy, Ruling, God may only give by His own law the vitality, and leave man to the experiments of details, going with them, of course, in their region of liberty, until they, having tried all, settle down to such details as are most in accord with the fundamental principles. Nevertheless, even as in the case of marriage, there are, likely enough, witnesses all along the line, even from the beginning, to a certain train of details most harmonious to the underlying laws of vitality. But woe unto the ones who in their liberty concerning details actually break the law of vitality (or authority) itself.

With these ideas kept in view, we can go back to the conclusion reached awhile back, that, since God works by law, and the case demands a law, there must, therefore, be a law; with minds guarded against thinking that such a law must be one extending to the uttermost limit of detail. It is true that it might be the simple fact that, in Church Government, God determined, and revealed the whole entire "Form of the Christian Temple," but it is not needful to contend for so much. If God only gave Authority (or let us call it Vitality), that is enough. The Church needs to experiment somewhat, for experience settles to the law in the end. It is good too for men to have a part with God, and even to be creators in their sphere. It does us good to see the Apostles stumbling, as it were, upon the need of deacons, and making deacons, not because of any pattern in the Mount that we know of, but through prayerful judgment. And again, Authority has its own principles as much as Vitality. It will make itself felt. Its lack can only be death. Its violation must become disease. The weakening of it tend to impotence.

So then, whether either view should be taken, viz: that the entire form is prescribed (or for that matter a part), or that simply, Authority is so given as to become the basis of all, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there is a law attaching to this Authority and its gift. Afterward can come discussion of how far God's law enters into details; it is enough now to see that official Authority is by law.

The matter must now be carried further. The law must be known. The nature of the acts to be done in accordance with the law absolutely demand this. There are some laws known

only to God, and some only discovered to man by intricate research, but there are others so essential to primary forms of conduct that it can not be thought that they could lie concealed from man, who is compelled to act under them, or to put them into effect. It can well be that not all the law is requisite to the knowledge man must possess, and it may also be, as in the case of gravitation, that practical knowledge rather than formal is required, but certain it is, that in such a case as that of Ministerial Authority, it is a primary necessity that man know how to obtain God's grant. This can not be a case where it suffices that God works by a law known to Himself. It is man that must seek and obtain authority for acts bound up with the life and even welfare of the world. He must know how to obtain, and also the fact, when it occurs, that he has obtained, and now possesses God's Authority. And, furthermore, others must know, as well as he, the fact of his authorization. There is no more chance to avoid the conclusion that the law is known than there is to deny that there is a law.

When, now, it is added that the law if known at all by man, must be known by the Church, *i. e.*, the Society that occupies the field where this Authority is to be exercised, the position is but planted on a truism. Given the world to convert by word and ministration, in the name of God, and by His grace and authority, She could not move a step for baptism or instruction without Authority, and needing to send out thousands of tongues and hands in God's own name, she would be powerless for her work, did she not know how to commission them, or, to put it differently, enable them to be commissioned.

All of this is very comforting. A law? A law that is known? A law that is known by the Church? Yes! This much is certain. And, therefore, the task of men is not the hopeless task of ascending into Heaven for its secrets, but rather that of brushing away obscurities raised like dust in the course of repeated plowing over the ground. And, in fact, our satisfaction can be still greater, as will be seen from the following consideration.

The practical demands of each age for the gift by God of His Authority for the work of prophecy, ministration and ruling

are the same. Each age must know how to obtain authority for the work lying before it. It is not enough, then, to say the law of its gift was once known, but it must be insisted that each age must know. If Authority was only once given, succeeding ages might well forget how it came, but if it must be always given, then each age must know the law of its granting. Continuity of law and continuity of knowledge are alike to be predicated. Only on the supposition that the authority was given in one way and continued in another, can it be admissible to allow that each succeeding age could lose sight of the law by which it first came. But, it is worth remark, the dispute of different Christian bodies is not concerning the original grant as much as concerning the manner of its continuance. However, if there was a change, that change must be known as well as the law, as it was; and the law as it came to be. The continuity of the same, one and only law may be questioned, but surely not the continuity of knowledge. The simple necessity that in each age the Church must send out men in God's name cuts off all thought of ignorance concerning the way to send them. Of course, knowledge does not prevent dispute. Some would have it, that for ages the Church did not know how to initiate a member. We can not prevent such fatuity among men, but we can certainly draw back to the citadel of reason and proper modesty. The burden of knowing may not rest upon us or any other one man, but the Church of God would be lost if She did not know how to make members and officers. God set Her a task and gave Her grace for it. To err would be but natural for human nature, but to lose knowledge in such matters as the initiation of members and the making of officers would strike at the root of Her very life. It is pre-eminently safe to say the law of God is known in every age. Continuity of any one law may be a proper matter for discussion, but continuity of knowledge no more so than the necessity of knowledge.

Taking up, now, the question of the continuity of the law, it can be shown to rest on very sure foundations.

First; on the character of God. If it were that part of the subject which concerns the details, there might be room for local or age-adapted changes, but it is the part concerning the passage

of authority, in the first stages of that passage, that is before us. Not laws and conditions, to recur again to our illustration before used, of marriage, but laws of vitality, as it were. In fact, this grant of authority from God carries us to God's consistency, and away from earth's changeability. He adopts a method for *Himself*.

Second; on the inclination to perpetuity of all things given in that age of perpetual gifts. Even though it might be wise that some things be left for local and time adaptation, there would be other things too fundamental not to belong to the class of things granted to be unchangeable.

Third; change would involve notification of change—a new revelation. Either this, or, along with the law, an intimation of its variability.

Fourth; on the absence in Scripture and History of confusion incident to change.

After all, however, the simple position, that the law must be always known, carries with it the corollary that changes must be known also. Violations are, of course, different (they would be subject to detection according to the acumen of men), but God-made changes, if such there be, would start a new order of things, and it is of these we speak.

These reflections bring into view a most important deduction. Once grant that Authority comes by law, and that that law is known to the Church, and that there can be no authoritative changes that are not also known, and the mind is driven to estimate at a very high value all expressions by the Church of Her convictions concerning the law. Of course, if it is impossible to find the Church, there would be no help from that source, but if there be any age in which this institution of God—which, because of Her ministry of word and grace, is altogether dependent on God for Her Authority—can be found, and found bearing Her witnesses, then there can be no reason for any man to refuse to listen. Let him set all possible value on every other source of information, yet, if here be one who professes to know, and is compelled to know, that one we can hardly turn away. Of course there is much to be considered in the matter of the particular age or ages, and the particular expressions of Her knowledge,

questions concerning Her agreement with the other sources of knowledge, and Her agreement with Her own self, but these would all be things among which men are wont to find their way. The important thing is to note the glad tidings, that, out of the necessity for knowledge, one arises who is able to greatly help us in the solution of an intricate question. The importance of this help is best seen when the nature of the other great source of information to the present age on this question is considered, viz: the New Testament—a book so *universally* true as to need all the light that God has given in other ways for its true interpretation, and which, very especially, from the very manner of its growth, demands the antecedent and parallel growth of the Church for its understanding. Growing side by side, and both of them the work of God, and the Book the ripest fruit of the Divine life working in the Church, it is but simple common sense to question both about this matter of common knowledge.

While, however, the Church is obliged to know, the Scriptures are not required to make plain the law. It is most likely that they would do so, to some extent at least, but not requisite—as happens to be the case of the Church, concerning knowledge. The Apostles could know, and act under the law, and yet in all their writings never state it plainly enough for future generations to be sure of it. Certainly Christendom has disputed over such revelation of it as is given there until libraries have been created by equally cock-sure scholars on very different sides. Just as other great subjects are treated with brilliant flashes of heavenly light, yet never bathed in perpetual day, so it could well be with this. But the Church took Her way very calmly, and for centuries had less trouble on this line than on almost any other.

If there were a question about a preference, as between these two, it might well disconcert the mind, should it regard the Scriptures as vague upon this subject, but there can be no such question at all. The knowledge of the Church and the true interpretation of the Scriptures must accord naturally. The value of the knowledge is that of a help towards the reading of the word of God.

If the law were plainly in the Bible, there would be no dispute on such a scale as that which now besets the world. If it were there, but so as to require care in exegesis, this outside help

from such a source could not but be welcome. If it were not there at all, then the Church in Her knowledge would become the sole dependence as an authority on the subject.

Suppose, however, it should be insisted that it is plainly there, and yet totally different from the Church's practice and expression, then in addition to accounting for the great disputes since the Reformation, there would also be present for explanation the error of the Church in the face of the plain revelation of Scripture, as well as a negation of the Church's right to knowledge and necessity for knowledge.

Under the force of all these considerations, it is very difficult to see why there should not be an eager turning to a full discussion of Church History, as well as Scripture, provided all due safeguards be thrown around the investigation. But also, it is so well known how a perfect cloud of dust rises in such a study, that, it must be born in mind, precautions of a very severe nature ought in all justice to be taken. Such severity can only help the final conclusion to be abiding. There can be no possible objection made to a rigid strictness—as much so as the nature of the case allows.

CHAPTER VI

Various Considerations of Importance

I—SCRIPTURE AND HISTORY

If it be granted that we are to examine rigidly both Scripture and Church History, it is important to know something of the fields in which the search is conducted, in their relation to the matter in hand.

Let us first take Scripture:

All study of the Scriptures is filled with difficulty because of these prime considerations, among others.

First: The inter-relation of all the Scriptures. There can be no taking of any text by itself. Not only may it happen, that in an altogether different book the key to the interpretation may occur (note how the Epistles of St. Paul depend on the Book of Acts, or the Gospels); or, some supplemental truth be set forth; but texts should not be taken from their context, or the context from its chapter, the chapter from the book, the book from the Testament, the Testament from its fellow. Incalculable harm has been done by violating this principle, as the whole range of religious controversy testifies.

Secondly: The inter-relation of the Bible to the other books of God, that of Nature and that of Man's Nature—where a Revelation is given, in both cases, into the heart of which the Bible is intended to fit. There can be no hope of finality of religious thought until all the books of God are read, and read harmoniously. It may be that light would come from the first reading of the Word, but the light will grow as knowledge of the other books increases, and the full truth only shine at the last.

Thirdly: The disconnected form of the various books, arising out of the difference of aims and purposes of each.

Fourthly: The desultory nature of the narratives and histories, due to the subordination of these to the higher spiritual purpose, and requiring the setting of secular history for their plain reading.

Fifthly: The difference in the matter of time when each book was written. For the successive books looked upon a rapidly developing growth of the Church, and took count of different stages in that growth. This has special bearing on a matter like the polity of an ever widening government.

Sixthly: The apparently set purpose to eschew the giving of knowledge that could be supplied from other sources, and to confine itself to moral and spiritual revelation. After the period of ignorance and darkness in the middle ages, when the world came to open the Scriptures once more, so wonderful a vision of the things of God lay spread before men that it was perfectly natural to think every thing was there independently of all other sources, but the continued study for centuries has universally modified this view of the scope of the Bible. It is still supreme where it speaks, but, if men go to it to learn whether the Philippian jailer had any children at the time St. Paul baptized his household, there must be disappointment. Nor is it only along such lines as the precise nature of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Garden of Eden, that the Bible seems to refuse to answer, but even in such matters as the scope and limits of the work of the Deacons, or Deaconesses, and even of the Presbyters, men are balked of the settlement they crave.

On the other hand, after all is said, the Bible is the plainest of the three books of God, and even if its interpretation be difficult, yet it must ever be the supreme authority, and test of truth, even where there are other sources for gaining knowledge of things in common with it.

Secondly; it is the only book, written in words, that is, *per se*, the book of God. It is no less than the book of Nature, or the book of Human Nature, even though it expressly has the stamp of man's hand also upon it.

Thirdly: The Bible has some territory that is exclusive, and in that it remains the sole source of information. This is notably the case in the all important matter of the Apostles' commission from Christ, as well as His own commission from God.

Fourthly: The Bible is exceedingly clear on some points. So much so that it is said of it, that he that runs may read. For instance, this example may be taken as illustrating both the difficulty and the ease attending Bible interpretation. It is said in

St. Matthew 18:18, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven." Now, however men may, and probably will, dispute, till the end of the world, as to the limits of power thus bestowed, there can be none to doubt that these words separated the Apostles, into a class, order, or, at the least, a company, gifted with unique authority. It may be necessary to range through many volumes in order to settle one's own mind concerning the first point, but as to the other, the single passage suffices.

Who, then, would be the wisest and safest interpreter of Scripture? He who, falling heir to the sifted conclusions of Metaphysics, Science, History and Language, could bring, together with these, the spirit of consecration to God's truth, determinedly separated from prejudices. This only in passing. And it may be said too, in just the same way, that no one man has ever appeared to fill the conditions, but, in each age, the Church has best attained to the first four conditions, and even to the last, although both the lack of consecration, and the existence of prejudice has been great. In saying—the Church, no thought of its inclusive or exclusive definition here enters, but the thought of its collective, attentive, authoritative and consecrated nature is in mind.

If any one man should undertake to interpret the Scriptures, he would naturally suffice for himself, since his modicum of knowledge forms a mold quite sufficient to his mind for the Biblical texts to be tested for his own understanding; the Scripture just must seem to him to say thus and so, but the question is, can one man interpret for another? The right of private interpretation and the responsibility of teaching are altogether different. No fool even can be denied the first. But the interpretation that *counts*, is the one that must be put before the world for its acceptance. Such an acceptance may depend primarily on the prestige of a name, but must, ultimately, depend on its setting in the midst of correlated truths. It is the easiest thing in the world to say—"We go by the Bible, but, if the Bible "goes" by other things, as well as itself, it is folly to ignore these other things. Consequently the art of Biblical interpretation is to be as deep as the Bible is deep.

There are few regions in the realm of Biblical interpreta-

tion so hard to map as that of Church Government. We have a wealth of incident, and even of detail, but at every point knowledge is taken for granted—the knowledge very familiar to the people of those days, but to us, only to be obtained from many sources, even if these be open to us. Every incident seems to modify conclusions before reached. The very number of them renders it hard to weave them all in consistently. St. Stephen and St. Philip are chosen to serve tables, but the record of their work is preaching or baptizing. St. Paul is an Apostle not through men, and yet we find Simeon and others laying hands upon him. Titus' authority in Crete looms up so nearly like an autocracy as to confound ideas formed concerning the democratic level suggested by the Council of Jerusalem, where even St. Paul seems to lose stature. A mighty question turns upon whether James of Jerusalem was James the son of Alphaeus (the Apostle) or not; and, if not, then surprise literally smites us to see him almost over-ranking St. Peter and St. John and the rest of the twelve. These plain parts of the narrative (plain in one way), and many other passages presuppose a knowledge we may like to invent, but which we do not possess from the record, and can only pretend to gain from that source by broad inferences, seldom acceded to by opponents. But the people of that day had facts into which the Scripture narratives fit without trouble, and which it is the part of learning and investigation to restore.

Now, then, as far as the case of Biblical interpretation is concerned, we must conclude—First, that an empty uninformed mind can never find all he wants in Scripture; Second, that an ill informed mind will be apt to arrange the statements, and still more the doctrines of Scripture, on the thread of his previous knowledge, falsely so-called; Third, that Scripture demands and fits into correct knowledge, and that only. But, furthermore, it is to be recognized that the harmony of God is in the Scriptures, and all else is to be attuned to that note, naturally and exquisitely; and the test will be when, without any changing of that, the whole instrument is harmonized.

In the next place, the nature of the field of History is to be examined, and, as in the case of the Scriptures, the difficulties will be first considered.

First: While the Scriptures are known definitely, and all their words are bound up together in one book, the field of History is immense, vague and complex.

Secondly: The fountainheads are often beyond the reach of investigation, however trustworthy the surface may appear.

Thirdly: Tradition has large room in History, and while tradition may be true enough, its title is at best cloudy.

Fourthly: Developments, accretions and corruptions are easily put forward as origins or fundamentals.

Fifthly: Forgeries are encountered, and interpolations abound.

Sixthly: The bias of authors is constantly to be reckoned with.

Seventhly: Original documents are rare, and the texts which we have, scantily vouched for.

Eighthly: The information is, even after all the sifting, fragmentary, and often doubtfully relevant. Furthermore, it is quite frequently contradictory within itself.

Ninthly: After human effort has exhausted itself in getting at the results of historical study, they may be found to be of little account because of the material upon which they depend.

On the other hand, it is to be said.

First: That History alone can give us the other facts we need for the setting of the facts of Scripture—those other facts to which Scripture really appeals.

Secondly: That facts are facts, however ascertained, and must be treated as such if once they are so established.

Thirdly: That there are some things which it is perfectly possible to establish as facts, in spite of all the above difficulties. Monuments exist, documents have been preserved in perfectly credible form, evidence of events is plentiful, laws have descended unchanged, traditions were crystalized at once, or, owing to a force of cumulative testimony, come to us too well authenticated to be set aside.

Fourthly: That the appeal to History is universal, necessary and unavoidable, wherever its field marches with that of any other division of man's knowledge, and its position is of pre-eminent importance, by reason of its own peculiar forces.

Fifthly: That God is in the History of events, deeds, laws, and institutions, as well as in those things themselves, and there is a harmony and philosophy of History second only in vividness to that of the Scriptures, which themselves, in fact, form a part of the larger, if vaguer, whole we know as History.

Sixthly: That Church History is only a part of the larger whole of History, and is in very little degree marked by more difficulties of interpretation; while there are even some things to make it less so. If, on the one hand, forgeries, and bias, and tradition have their greater play there, on the other, documents are more numerous, and dependence on historians whose sources of information are unavailable for us, is markedly less. In fact, the theological treatises coming down in good state of preservation are a boon to workers in the religious field greatly envied by those starving for documents of such value in other parts of the work.

Two things may now be said. One is—that if any one should try to exalt History as an authority equal to Scripture, he must fail. The other is—that if any one should seek to cast away History because Scripture transcends it in value, he can be no guide for men in the solving of many perplexing matters.

That the Church is specially of God, as well as is Scripture, goes without saying, but, in the case of the Church, the battle within and without is still going on, and Her acts are the acts of one unsettled and fighting Her way. When, then, we come to Church History, we not only have the difficulties of interpretation, but the questions arising out of the unsettled conditions of the Church Herself. The Church's motion is in great contrast to the Bible's fixedness. How impossible, therefore, to get out of History values equal to those derived from the Bible.

But, on the other hand, to have a source of testimony, and ignore it, is to remain ignorant. One goes to History, not to confront the Bible, but to confront certain interpretations of the Bible. For such a purpose, History can not but be useful. The Bible gives the origin of a stream; History gives its further course. If that be the simple fact, it would be stupid not to study both, and, in case there were doubts raised in the study of one, might they not be solved in the study of the other, not

by confusion or substitution of facts, but by the light of facts?

It is the facts that History presents that give it power in all discussions of Biblical interpretation, but especially so in matters of order, government, institution, custom and the like. Facts are facts wherever found. They must be accounted for, they bear testimony, they refuse to move. Where, as in the case before us—the law governing the appointment of ministers, or, to put it differently, the acquisition by men of ministerial authority—there is no formally written law, but it is knowable by us of these days, only as it can be deduced from ascertained facts, they become all important, if indeed they be facts.

It ought to be insisted, then, that, when any one goes to History for help, he should go for facts. Many opinions are found given in History, and opinions have a certain weight, but they are not facts. Church History is written largely with the theological treatises of the Fathers as the basis, and these treatises abound with opinions of more or less value, but still only opinions. The utmost care should be used to thread ones way through these opinions, etc., to the facts themselves.

If one's study of History could be successfully directed to this one purpose, and a large number of actual facts in the early life of the Church be gathered and placed beyond cavil or dispute, it is difficult to see how minds of the intelligent could resist the due consideration of them as elements helping to the solution of the problem. It would only be possible to avoid such a course by the theory of corrupt change, or a refusal to take note of anything springing from such a source as the early Church. It is well known that the respect of some for the early Church is about at Zero point, and that any source seems preferred to such a course, but such a condition of mind is not that of the scholar in any wise, but that of crass bigotry. The wholesale quotation of anything and everything, really, or alleged to be, in the Fathers, and other early writers, has much to do with this condition of mind, and just because of it, it is now necessary that strictness be increased, and care taken to get at the facts, with full faith that, if this be done, the facts will be accorded the just weight of facts.

The bearing of Scripture and History upon matters touched

upon in both, and which need both in order that clear vision may be had, is indeed more happily and admirably illustrated in the case of Church polity than any other possible to mention. The terms *Apostolos*, *Episcopos*, *Presbuteros*, *Diaconos*, are all peculiar terms, used for the first time in the world as including all the older terms of ministration in religious matters. The necessity of definition which shall be both inclusive and exclusive is perfectly patent. Now, if we add the other terms, Evangelists, Teachers, Prophets, Interpreters, Helps, Governments, Deaconesses, etc., there comes before us a very large number of terms to be filled out into life, or consolidated, or cast away as redundant or temporal. It is well known how, to the end of Scripture, the word *Apostolos* is used with possible general sense only, as well as with the more technical meaning (the case of Epaphroditus, notably), and the word *Diaconos* is to larger degree still used generally, *Episcopos* and *Presbuteros* are interchangeable and within the term *Presbuteros* itself we have the questions raised by such texts as that in the Epistle to Timothy, which speaks of "The elders who rule well," and those "who labor in the word and doctrine." In fact it may be said that Scripture shows us that new molds were made, and all the old historical, well defined divisions of ministerial office broken up, and the powers of all the functions of religious office poured into the new molds, whose names even confuse all effort at definition of authority as thus distributed. Furthermore, that Scripture, so far from prescribing the limits and distinctions of the new molds, assumes that these are well known, and so treats them, leaving us allusions, and provoking from us inferences, (which we have been little loath to make) over a range as wide as East and West.

And yet there was a fact, or rather an actual condition, created at that time, with which all Scripture is consonant, and which passed into History—a solid rock of organization, standing to the then world as the visible side of the new life and power that had arisen, and begun its strenuous warfare. But, if this actual condition be there, then it is specifically the function of History to tell us about it, as it appeared in solidarity as fashioned in Biblical times, or in its various stages of growth, if growth were left for its historical period. And, moreover,

from the natures of both History and this "Rock of Organization," we would expect peculiarly abundant light, and testimony of exceptional value. One has only to consider, in order to see how much easier it would be for History to leave hint, and plainer word, and even clear definition about this representative, conspicuous backbone of the worlds greatest movement, than about matters of doctrine, or a hundred other things; and, on the other hand, how much harder to misrepresent the part set on a hill than those less noticeable.

It is always hard to refuse a witness a hearing. Even if there be one supreme witness that both sides rely on, yet if a witness have testimony to offer, and proposes to go on the stand, it would take extremely excellent reasons to make him stand aside. No one has ever yet thrust History to one side with impunity. The only way to treat History is to satisfy the mind that it is indeed History. If ever it should be the case that History should become the foe of the Bible, then indeed there would be an enemy to dread. The historical proof of the Scriptures is a sheet anchor for Scripture. Each book holds its place as its present value dependent on History. There is no fear of History, therefore, not being listened to. The question will come up as to its proper place, but place it has, by its own right. Let us then ask, whether it would be better to hear History, and then turn to the Bible; or, to hear the Bible, and then turn to History? It is easy to answer. The Bible gives plain facts, and as such is History; and besides these facts, there are other parts either treating, or treating of, these facts. The plain facts of the Bible we can deal with as perfectly vouched for. Then, from History proper other facts are to be sought, and arranged according to their reliability and their weight. The mind should know all the facts first, however derived, before it attempts the interpretation of the other parts of Scripture. It need not be that he must exalt any facts to a place with those read in the Bible (for, will he have anything like as good authority for them?); or, be ready to warp simple interpretation out of its way so as to include them; but the broad principle is there, that all facts ought to be in hand before interpretation begins. The informed mind is better than the empty. Facts

are always to be reckoned with before conclusions. To go to History first, interpret it, and then come to Scripture, would be apt to prejudice the interpretation of Scripture—tune it to another note. On the other hand, to interpret all we have in Scripture, and then go to History would be to interpret Scripture with ignorant minds, and make useless the going to History. But to make long the line of facts, by adding to those so surely given in the Scripture, those gathered in History (some on indisputable evidence, and some less certainly established, as the case may be), and then approach the task of making the allusions of Scripture as plain to us as they were to the Corinthians or Philippians of those early days, or placing our inference upon a broader basis—this could not possibly lead us as far astray as either of the other courses. To say Tradition or History says thus and so, and, therefore, Scripture must say so too, is to open floodgates. To say Scripture says thus and so, and it does not matter what Tradition or History says, is to arm an opponent, who in the company of scholars can laugh at us. But, to value facts, wherever found, and to attempt the harmony of all Scripture and all the facts at hand, would be pre-eminently rational.

The proper treatment of the Fathers is one of the most difficult of problems. That they are in some respects most valuable, and in other respects most misleading, has become plain to all who have followed in the wake of controversies, where they are appealed to in full measure. But, after all is said against them, there remains just this plain, undeniable position, capable of being held against all assaults—that as witnesses they can not be ruled out; but, on the other hand, on being admitted, must be subjected to all the tests that witnesses usually receive. On matters within range of their knowledge; and out of range of their interests; where their testimony is given clearly and to the point; without pressure; and the character of the witness commands confidence—who could forbear to weigh the testimony. Let us take an example, which is selected because it is in fact really conclusive of nothing in question, but comes very near to having determinate influence in another controversy. Justin Martyr (110-165) in his "Apology," addressed to Emperor, Sen-

ate and Roman People, arguing for Christianity, and not thinking of any issue about Baptism, mentions that "Many, both men and women, who have been Christ's disciples from childhood, remain pure, at the age of sixty or seventy years." (1 Apology Chap. XV). Now, if we look over this testimony, we will see clearly that it is absolutely worthy of confidence. Only direct contradiction by preponderant testimony could possibly upset it. Justin Martyr is fully worthy of confidence; he speaks most clearly; it is a matter within his knowledge; he is entirely disinterested and under no compulsion whatever. On the strength of this statement, we fully accept the conclusion that children were admitted to discipleship. What now if Justin had said 'infancy' instead of the more ambiguous 'childhood,' could we rule out Justin as a witness? Even if we became more critical, could we reject the witness?

And so it must be all the way through. When we find a record—a document, whether letter, treatise, history, collection of laws, and decrees, liturgy, or anything else, it becomes a source of information, and however sifted and weighed beforehand, takes a place of right on the witness stand.

Furthermore, just as in law, experts can testify from opinion so even the opinions of men who rise to the dignity of Authorities, on account of position, learning, travel, special means of knowledge, etc., ought, of right, to be heard, but the degree of caution concerning all this class of testimony should be excessive, after all the experience the world has had of expert opinion on dark subjects. It is needless almost to say, that though useful for clinching convictions otherwise formed, they can not be used for foundations. Their great value is that they give us the atmosphere of those early days.

III—ESSENTIALS AND NON-ESSENTIALS

In every department of Religion, there is an essential to be looked for. Everything that lies in the region of Faith is not to be required. Everything in the region of action is not to be insisted on. All conclusions are not worked out in Scripture, nor customs settled; and organization there is conspicuously un-

crystalized. Any discussion, that ignores the distinction between essentials and non-essentials, will surely be untrustworthy. It can hardly be possible that we must be tied to any system in its entirety, never minding changes of races, times and conditions. Some leeway is certainly expected, and allowed for. A change in a minor function of a minor office can not be of the same gravity as a change at the fountain head of administration. The least breaking of the moral law is a breaking of the whole, but administration has, as its field, different conditions, and, as its wisdom, adaptation to those conditions. Some principles must guide, but some details must be adventitious.

In each department we find essentials. There is the Creed, which embodies the essentials of the faith that is Christian. It is reasonable to demand conformity with its statements, but to incorporate all doctrine in a creed would be to exact too much in the way of conformity. There too, in the field of worship, is the Lord's Supper, which is a necessity to all worship that would differentiate itself from all other modes that the world has seen set forth—the very heart and essence of Christian worship. Again, with floods of light from God, pouring into men's minds from all sides, fraught with revelation, there are the Scriptures, constituting essentially that Revelation which can not be dispensed with, or disregarded. Even in the realm of morals, though, because perfection is demanded, everything is of great importance, yet there is that plain setting forth of the Ten Commandments as the central and essential law of righteousness, just as, in the higher spiritual region, the Sermon on the Mount enunciates the principles which ramify in all directions. Therefore, we might expect to find, in the department of Government, something at the center so governing and controlling authority and office as to constitute a life principle or essential; for an essential does not mean merely a more important part, but a source, or a stem, or a seed from which the rest can always spring.

Now, then, just that we might range over the ground with a view to the possibilities, and by no means in order, as yet, to express preference, or begin the construction of the position hereafter to be taken, let us look at some of the theories that might

arise concerning the essentials of Church Government. It could be said, we can easily suppose, that the Scriptures give a complete system, with every office and every power of each office named and set forth, and all things necessary to the setting up, and induction into those offices declared; and that, this being the case, the system in its entirety, just as given, is the essential.

On the other hand, that the minor offices are not at all of the essence, but that one chief office, from which minor offices can be at any time derived, according to need and circumstances, is all that is essential; and that the Scriptures are purposely clear on the subject of the fact and powers of that chief office, and vague concerning the minor offices, from this very cause.

Between these two extremes a number of positions are possible, even if not all actual.

On another line again, it could be said, that the essential is—the gift of Power to the Church; and that it is given to Her to be exercised by (a) the totality; or, (b) the official part of Her.

And, supposing either one of these be true, there are still the two positions possible, that, in this exercise of power, there be (a) freedom in the arrangement and settlement of all things according to needs and circumstances, as they arise, and (b) restrictions, that come with the gift of power, and form a part of the Essential—in other words, necessary conditions.

Thus, the Essential may concern office, or power; methods, and forms; and even lie so far back as to involve the seat of power (*i. e.*, apart from and behind the offices).

It is easily seen, therefore, that it can hardly be possible that everything related to any specified practical system must be regarded as essential. It is necessary to choose what ought to be so regarded, and what can be looked upon as changeable. Above all, to try to determine what is so essential as to involve life itself—"being" as well as "well being." There might well be a hesitancy in every mind to depart at all from what it regards as found in Scripture, but, apart from the question as to whether Scripture means that all shall be taken as unchangeable, we are often confronted with what we believe to be distinct departures from Scripture, exhibited as accomplished realities, and it then

concerns us very nearly to know, not the wrong, but the full wrong of it—the effect on the very life. Has there been in such and such a case a sacrifice of essentials?

Is there, in fact, however, it may be asked, any essential in the strictest sense? In much that has been said, it might be thought that there is rather an effort to discriminate between the very important and the less important, but does any absolute essential exist—any *seed*, *source*, or *stem*, as was said above, out of which the rest could rise again as it has arisen before, just in the way that Doctrine could spring from the Creed, Worship from the Lord's Supper, or Spiritual Teaching from the Sermon on the Mount? As, then, we glanced over the possibilities above, did there loom out an idea that some seed principle did in fact exist, which could constitute an essential in the strictest sense? Was there, for instance, in the suggestion of a gift of Power to the Church, constituting it either in its totality, or through a part, a source of all office and method, a road opened, down which we could see an important part grown or erected into an essential in the strictest sense? Whether that particular instance be the correct, or the wrong selection for the actual essential, it is easy to see that, if such a gift be decided on as the actual one, it would fill the condition of the seed or source. The actual essential may, indeed, be much larger in its content, and reach even as far as the first of the instances taken as possibilities, viz.: that all the system set forth in Scripture constitutes the unchangeable source of whatever else may be added (as, for instance, the counciliar, synodical or association system; or the various methods of localizing and dividing up religious work). The point to be noted is, that it is inherent in the nature of Church Government that there can exist an essential of the strictest kind, and that it is not idle to ask that, in the arguing for various positions in the matter of Ecclesiastical Polity, each contending side should try to reduce its ideas concerning essentials and non-essentials to clear statement, so that, not only some-things might be spared attack and counter attack, but the whole conflict might be more about principles than forms. For while it is hardly to be doubted that Scripture settles principles, and does not leave them for History to reveal, it is much more to

be questioned whether Scripture does not deliberately leave forms to be judged of on the spot, as they actually become manifest in life and motion.

If, now, we should be convinced, that essentials of the nature of seed can be, and ought to be sought, then it ought also to be borne in mind that the essential must be capable of providing for the continuation, as well as first existence, of the machinery of government, and forever guarding all the functions properly inherent in it. This indeed goes without saying, but it is important that it be kept in sight, and not forgotten or ignored.

If, in order to get out of the range of our possible prejudices, we should take another system, and make an application to it of the principles suggested by this discussion of essentials and non-essentials, a clear idea of the points involved might be had. Therefore, let an analysis of the Jewish system be made.

That system is clearly outlined in Scripture, even to the small details, and it is the most familiar of all to every reader. We find there that Aaron was made High-Priest, and that the whole priesthood consisted of his descendants, and since Aaron himself was a Levite, and all his descendents, therefore, Levites, the whole body of those ministrants could have been replaced at any time from the descendants of Aaron. The perpetuation of the whole system depended on the God-guarded principle of natural birth. There could be, and often was, more than one High-Priest (who were called chief priests generally), so far as capacity to minister in the Temple in the functions of that office, even though only one was regarded as the real Head of the Hierarchy. It is easy, therefore, to mark out the essentials of the Jewish ecclesiastical system. An original gift of authority to the highest officer, which gift could flow from him to all the rest, in whole to some, in part to others, and sustain the whole weight and efficiency of the system in perfect lines throughout the ages. Given at any time, but one male descendant of Aaron, and the whole system could be started anew. As was said above, the power flowed according to the line of natural descent. This law of birth, then, and the one original office constitute a sufficient seed or source to be regarded as the essentials; Nor can we find any thing else to be added, unless we say that formal

consecration was necessary to bring the latent powers, derived in birth, into the effectual stage for use. Since, too, the higher office included the lower ones, those offices were even always in existence, as long as one of the house of Aaron remained.

The selection of essentials, in the case of the system which succeeded—the Christian, may not be as simple as this, but it may be equally possible to arrive at a separation of the seed principle, upon which God has founded the life of His Church, by sufficient care in the discussion.

III—VISION, EVIDENCE, AND PROOF

A few remarks ought to be made upon the above heads, because of the great misapprehensions that are manifest in all the discussions of the subject of Church Government.

In all the realms of Religion we find an appeal made to Faith. There always seems to be a gap between the point up to which proof reaches and the position we are called upon to occupy. The conclusions of Faith are not left without the support of evidence, but knowledge is not substituted for Faith. Evidence can give us the range; but Faith must carry us to the mark. Nor is the conclusion to be a mere balance of probabilities. *There is such a thing as Vision*, and it springs out of evidence, but reaches beyond it. In other words, conclusions in the religious field can seldom be necessary conclusions, and certainly not dependant on the fluctuation of probabilities. Whatever evidence is to be had must be embraced and included, and the conclusion must flow from the evidence, but not as the only conclusion. In other spheres it is the same. If the Poet, Prophet or Philosopher were tied like the Mathematician, it would be a lesser world than this we know. Mounted on the evidence, the eye sweeps byond. There is a judgment of the mind and a judgment of the entire man—one into which the whole nature enters and approves. St. Paul speaks of the judgment *Kata Epignosei*, and the judgment *Kata aisthēsei*, which is translated—"according to knowledge and all judgment." The mind must never be repelled, but often it can not lead all the way. The moral and aesthetic parts of our nature have their

judgments, as well as the mental. Again, there is always a region above us into which we would reach, and our beliefs and convictions must harmonize there, as well as with the things upon which we stand. The Statesman must make his course agree with the future as well as with the past. The Prophet and Poet, too, must be logical to the greater glory of truth as yet impossible of proof. Let minds be logical to syllogisms, but let Vision and Faith be logical to God.

The interpretation of the Scriptures is not a mere matter of the logic of the mind, an effort to be syllogistic. Suffice it (we are tempted to say) if we do not run contrary to syllogisms. We must somehow "apprehend that, for which we are apprehended." We must believe that which is offered to Faith, not Knowledge.

It is hardly to be expected that any system of Church Government can be completely proved out of the Scriptures, but one is there in germ, or in developed form, and the evidences of Scripture are not against it, even if they do not distinctly reveal it. In all search we must look at all the evidence, and bring Vision to bear—mounted upon the evidence, but logical to the upper realm, as well as to that on which it stands.

It is customary to say of another's conclusions—"That does not necessarily follow," and to be satisfied, in our own case, if it follows at all. It is well to remember that, in the field we are working, we can not talk too much about the "necessary" conclusion. If we can get one supported by all the evidence, and logical to Faith and Grace, to Government with its dual principle of Authority and Consent, to Ministerial office and function, to the Church's clearly expressed knowledge and custom, it may be that Vision, or the judgment of the entire man will decide for it as proper for our faith and conviction.

Proof is a boon not to be looked for, unless the wranglings or four hundred years have been baseless, but evidence must be examined as strictly as if it led to proof. Faith can never dispense with it. Vision is but Fancy, if it fly in the face of it. As far as it goes it controls the logic of the mind, and it is only where it stops that flight can be taken with other wings.

CHAPTER VII

Historical Types of Government

The task we now have before us is as follows:

Not hoping for anything so decisive as proof, we are, nevertheless, to look at the evidence which lies at hand, from whatever source it comes, weigh it for what it is worth, and use it as a starting point, from which we can gain a *Vision* of that or those *Essential* principle or principles which formed the *Seed*, or *Stem*, or *Spring* which was to grow into the system of Church Government designed of God to embody *Authority* and *Consent*, with such arrangement of *Ministerial Office* and *Function* that Church Government should be a pathway for Himself to accomplish, by *Grace*, and through *Faith*, the righteousness of men.

But, manifestly, we can not start to examine a system as it arose and grew, without having in our minds the proper background and surroundings. This new polity was not the first, and the past systems prepared conditions for it, and, to some extent certainly, were gathered up and perfected in it. Moreover, it was to go forth quickly into all the surrounding world, and there stand in the midst of highly organized polities, both civil and religious. Therefore, before we begin to read our evidence, we must read our conditions, studying especially the background. When it is said in the Scriptures, that Christ was a High-Priest, after the order of Melchizedech, and we are now able, through better knowledge of the times and customs of the age of Melchizedech, to understand such a statement, it is plain that to ignore that ancient past would be wrong. And there are numerous other points that need the past for the elucidation.

The fact of the matter is, that for all their great divergencies, there is a great unity underlying the manners, customs, religions and polities of the whole ancient civilized world. Each succeeding people that rose to greatness, but carried to greater development ideas and principles that began long before their day, and owed to some former people the height of the previous tide. The special genius of a new people was needed, not to

begin a new system, but to perfect the one that had already run through several stages. For instance, could a man have lived, continuously, in Syria, from the time of King Sargon of Accad, who flourished almost four thousand years before our era, on through the years when, in succession, Chedorlaomer the Elamite, Khammurabi of the Arabian dynasty of Babylon, Shalmaneser the Assyrian, Nebuchadnezzar the Chaldean, Xerxes the Persian, Alexander the Greek, Mithridates the Parthian, and Octavius the Roman came to their power, he would have seen a continuous development and consolidation of organized polity in that region, in civil affairs, that would have shown all the signs of an evolution. Through the Phoenicians, and other traders, and the conquest of kings, the world that was then called, and believed to be, the World, was bound together in a way, the degree of which we are just coming to realize. Not only alphabets and literary forms, arts, styles, utensils, garments, weapons, coins, seals, legal customs, contracts and many other things; but gods, and rights, ceremonies, systems, doctrines, and all things pertaining to religion were grouped in unity, as well as difference, throughout all the region Eastward, from Spain to the mountains beyond Persia. Modifications were great, but something in common to be modified was unquestionably there. When we come to account for all this, we find the following facts.

Previous to the opening of History, the inferior races had been driven beyond the bounds of the regions that were to constitute the scene of the growth of civilization, and were only left in traces here and there. They had carried civilization, as far as they could, but the more intellectual division of the human family alone could carry it on. This division was itself widely scattered, and that which was developed at the centre would only reach the remote subdivisions after a long period. But these very remote peoples were essentially of the stock that was capable of the progress yet to come. The limit set to the lower races, in the line of original development, was no limit for them. When their time should come, and the seed be planted, they could grow the crop, and bear the fruit for which they were destined. It is to be noted that the races previously on the ground were to

furnish in large measure the thing to be developed, and the higher races, entering into a ready made civilization of some, even if small, degree, were to supply the genius (though also adding their own ideas) for further growth, for which the lower were unfitted.

Previous also to Historic times, we have the initial movements by which the favored ones gained possession of the inheritance they were to increase. The Valley of the Nile, and the Valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, were to be twin and rival centres of growth, and on the old inhabitants of these two regions came the invading tide of the people who would take up the task of greater things. They came from Arabia. Those who invaded Egypt, from the Red Sea coast; and those invading the Euphrates valley, from the eastern regions; and both had earlier issued out of interior valleys of that country which has given birth to so many migrations—Arabia Felix. That the ancient Egyptians of History were of Arabia origin, who crossed at the straits and moved down the Nile valley, seems pretty clear, and that wave after wave of Arabian peoples invaded the Euphrates valley is undoubted. Now these Semitic peoples were nomadic at first, and afterwards became settled in part, and in part continued nomadic. This feature, their nomadic life, points out that their first offerings in religious worship would be the fruits of their flocks, not fields. In other words, the wide spread custom of sacrificial blood-shedding is to be traced, naturally and simply, to the Semitic Arabians, who, breaking into the worlds centres of civilization, took up the task, for the world, of carrying civilization to the point where European races could find it ready for their genius to push further. The fact that Phœnicians, Aramaeans, Assyrians, large parts of the Babylonian population, and almost the entire group of tribes along the western bank of the Euphrates, besides many other peoples, were Arabian in origin, reveals the secret of the tremendous scope of sacrifice in religious worship in the ancient world. But if the nomad, with his gift from his flocks, brought on the world's stage the sacrificial element of worship, so also must be due to him the corollary of that position, that the sacrificer also is of his institution. In the Bible account of Cain and Abel, it is the flock-minding

Abel who pleases God by the offering of a victim; and the nomadic Arab played the same role on the large stage of the world's religious development. Priesthood would have existed just as truly without this element of blood-shedding (We have already seen in Chap. IV that *Hiereus* means only "one in sacred office"), even if not as fully, but whatever it was before, the bringer of a lamb to be offered and eaten by the offerer, gave a coloring to all the future character of the ministrant of worship.

Many other things were due to these Arabic Nomads, both in the general field, and in the more special one of religion. In Babylonia they possibly found fetichism, etc., already passed into Prophecy and Ministration, with priestly Rule strongly developed, (though the first migrations may have been during the infancy of this development), but their contribution to the system, afterwards so fully developed, must have been the offering of animal life.

The Hebrew was thoroughly of the Arabian stock, but from a branch that had lived on the western bank of the Euphrates, and very near the mouth of that river. By the time of Abram's migration, the principle of Priestly rule was highly developed, whole colleges of Prophets existed, and Ministration was become very elaborate. He passed into a land where the Babylonian system was in full vogue, and Melchizedech was the Priest-King, or Patesi of Salem; or, as it is called in the Tel-el-Amarna tablets soon after, Urusalem. Then his descendants went into Egypt, where priest-craft, elaborate ritual, animal sacrifices, as well as offerings of incense, spices and fruits marked the worship. After long sojourn there, they passed into the desert, and the leader and law-giver, the establisher of all their future system, was the one who had been for forty years in the schools of the Egyptians, and becoming the son-in-law of the High-Priest of that Arabian people who lived in the northern trade-cities and settlements of a great South-Arabian nation, had become imbued with the system of Midian. Like all the others, this Arabic people had the threefold idea of Prophet, Priest and Ruler, but the latter was evidently not carried to the Egyptian or Babylonian extreme. There the Hebrew came also upon an altar of incense.

Now, Moses had this problem before him. Aaron was to be priest, and there was to be no King in real sense. The Priest-King idea of Melchizedech, and the system of Egypt and Babylonia, where the civil Ruler was supreme over religion (though the Patesi was an early Babylonian development), were not to be his choice for Israel, so that he could not magnify and extend the ruling power of the priesthood of Aaron, and he did not design for either himself, or his successor Joshua, great domination over it. He gave the priesthood, nevertheless, a great deal of power, and opened to them regions of the people's life that might have been used for great usurpations. Then, by the advice of Jethro, who was accustomed to Arabian ideas of tribal gatherings, he created the Council of Elders, with jurisdiction that, like his own, involved matters both civil and religious. Finally, he utilized the whole congregation as an assembly for ratification of matters of great moment.

Thus, at the beginning of Israel's life, there is to be seen an ordered priesthood (High-Priests, Priests and Levites) in charge of elaborate ceremonials of worship, embracing all the varieties of offerings that marked the most advanced systems of the world (even the human sacrifice being recognized by substitutes), which systems had grown and developed under Semitic influences in Egypt, Midian and Babylonia. This priesthood also had extensive powers of rule, but not those directly civil. Prophetical powers were not included, but these, exercised by Moses and Miriam, stood apart as personal gifts. Markedly Semitic and Arabian, indeed nomadic, are the two features, the Council and the Assembly.

When the children of Israel entered the Promised Land there was a very large Semitic element there. Hittites and Amorites could not have been, but the Caananites, Phoenicians, Moabites, Edomites and Ammonites were all of Arabian origin. These seemed to have furnished no temptation to the Israelites to break away from the Mosaic scheme of polity, however they did actually allure them, with great persuasiveness, to add gods to their theology, and all the practices of human sacrifices, unseemly rites, witchcraft, spiritualism, ancestor worship, fetichism and prophecy by signs and omens, etc., to their religious worship. Possibly

their strong Semiticism had saved them, in Babylonia and Egypt, from the elements there due to Turanian or Cushite influences, and here in Palestine the same prejudice by nature was continuously on their side, but, certain it is that, the form of their ecclesiasticism found greater enemies in outward difficulties, than in any attempts by the old people of the land. Thus, in the time of the Judges, conditions were not favourable to centralization of anything, and the Council, the Assembly, Prophecy, the Ministration of the Priesthood, Ecclesiastical and Civil Rule, all appear to have suffered accordingly, but to have revived under the coming of opportunity as naturally as indigenous institutions always do, just because indigenous. The perfect naturalness of Moses' system is made evident—naturalness to these Semitic people.

As time went on, and historical changes came, we find the modifications of conditions, as David and Solomon reigned, or Ahab and Athalia. Now the Prophet found his opportunity, now the Priesthood. At one time the Priesthood, of very necessity, grasp all powers of Rule, but, again, we see the Council vindicating its strength. At length the time of Christ is reached, and we find the condition of things pertaining to religious office and rule about as follows. Annas is legitimate High-Priest, debarred by the Romans from performing his office, which the chief-priest (whom, we have seen, the Jewish system provided in case of the High-Priests's disability), named Caiaphas, exercises. The functions have not changed but the whole round of sacrifices, offerings, incense, blessing, consecrating and ruling are all there, as at the first institution; and the same three orders—High-Priest, Priests and Levites. Some naturalness of Prophecy seems pertinent, if not of duty belonging to the office, for it is said of Caiaphas' prophecy, "being High-Priest that year, he prophesied." But the Prophet is existant, and is manifested in John the Baptist—not because of his right to priestly office, but by a personal grace and calling of God. There is no reason to see any change in the old order, so distinctly seen in the age of Kings, when the prophet might or might not be a Priest. The Council is existant also, and is a chief factor in the peoples' religious affairs. As to the Assembly, there are Synagogues which draw their charter, as it were,

out of the old prerogatives of the Assembly, even if their specific function is somewhat different; and the actual date of origin as late as the Captivity. Thus, we see that Moses has builded well, and his system has held until Messiah is on the mountains of Israel, and the Gentiles are gathering to the sacrifices in Jerusalem.

Compared with the system of Mechizedech, which was simply the old Babylonian system, we find that the general functions and orders of ministry were the same, the functions of priestly rule less and the *hereditary* principle of Arabian life had been brought into take the place of that freer Babylonian idea that refused to be bound by that narrowing law. The Babylonian system regarded the God as the Ruler, and the one who "took the hand" of the God as the ruler under Him—a kind of ordination (*cheiro-toncain*), it would seem. Even the Assyrian monarchs, supreme pontiffs over all, were wont to go to Babylon to "take the hand" of Bel. There was no obligation of inheritance, for that, under this system, gave opportunity rather than right. In the matter of Rule, it was only under the Maccabees that the High-Priest was also chief civil ruler. When our Lord is called a priest after the order of Melchizedech, we can see the references to His being Priest-King over (the new) Jerusalem, not by right of genealogy, but because of God, who said, "Thou art my Son." Babylonia was commercial, and an Empire, and it is well known how, when a system seeks to be world wide, it must be different from one devised for narrower field and conditions. As to Prophecy the status of it at Jerusalem under Melchizedech is not given, but in the valley of Euphrates and adjacent parts (as, for instance, Balaam's country) the prophets were an institution separate from, and yet connected with the elaborate system of Priest-craft, and, as among the Hebrews (and early Christians also), could be women as well as men, and laymen as well as priests.

Compared with the Roman system of our Lord's day, which had been the last building of the civilized world, we find in the Roman, as in the Greek, Phoenician, Egyptian and Babylonian, traces of those things from which the Hebrew system had freed itself, viz.: the union of the functions of the soothsayer, omen-reader, charm-worker, etc., with the functions of the Priest; and, also, the special Latin development of household worship. But,

in the main, the Prophet was a separate calling, and the Priesthood had more or less power of rule, and all the usual functions of ministration, and was divided into the three orders of High-Priest, or Pontiff, the general Priests and the Attendants. As in Babylon, the Emperor had seized the Ecclesiastical Power, and was Chief Pontiff, and also followed both Assyria and Egypt in allowing himself to be Deified, through association of ideas, but both of these positions were plainly seen to be the usurpations of the civil, not the growth of the religious idea.

There was in the case of Babylon, Egypt, Greece and Israel a growth parallel to the more specific ministry—that of the Doctrinal Teachers, who constituted the schools of the Magi, Philosophers and Scribes, which, beginning in Babylon and Egypt, very early reached their highest development, not long before the beginning of the Christian era. These schools concerned themselves greatly about Religion, and were more or less specifically connected with it, especially in the case of the Scribes, through the closeness of their sphere to those of Prophecy and Ministration. In the case of the Jews, the existance of Scriptures and Synagogues, and the peculiarly religious tone of all learning among that people, not only gave the Scribe his opportunity, but made his province essentially religious. It is almost needless to say, that this element of life, so close to religious ministry proper, could not but come under the observation and consideration of the founder of any new system, especialy one who aimed to gather up God's work in the world through the ages, rather than reject the good and bad alike. Now, to universalize Semiticisms, those already universalized would not be ignored, and it must be remembered that Egypt gave to Greece her Philosophers, and Babylon to Israel her Scribes; and Egypt and Babylon had owed the flower, if not the root, of their teaching-system to the progressive Semitic element in their population.

It will not be amiss now to look at the other organizations of the world's life, the civil rule, and the social guild, for much is made of these by some modern authors.

Nomadic life produced the tribal government, and the crowded and unprotected valley of the Euphrates, or Nile en-

forced that of the village or city. The one inclined to hereditary chieftainship, and the other, especially where trade instincts were strong, tended to create elective office and conciliar action. Enlargement and aggression calls for the ambitions of a single breast. When nomad and citizen united, the rise of kings came as naturally as the subjugation of one city by another brought the dreams of conquest. In the Euphrates' valley the dream of empire came soonest of all, for opportunity came earlier than elsewhere. Defense too in that region required centralization. In Egypt also, to some extent, but especially in Babylonia, were the problems of unification and civil organization worked out, and the Semitic proclivities were all along manifest, until the Semitic Assyrian brought the solution of the problem to high success. But the Aryan Persian carried it still further, and the Greek yet more advanced the standard. When the Roman came, the master of consolidated empire had arrived.

Now Rome had begun as a Republic, and cities trend to that form of government as often as opportunity allows. However, Republics find size a terrible drawback, and when Rome extended her citizenship to Italy she sealed the fate of her government. Up to that time Republics and similar forms had been confined to small territories. The Roman experiment emphasized the limits nature placed, in that age on the system, and Rome changed to that unique system admitting of Free Cities and Proconsular Provinces, side by side with those under direct Imperial control; which system was wonderfully evolutionary and as little revolutionary as any governmental change that has ever taken place. Republics and Satrapies, Despotisms and Independencies were all mixed together, but with so much order and system, and under such supreme imperial control, that the world still wonders at the Roman genius. Every elementary form seemed to be developed, and in full flower, under the domination of Rome, and chiefest of all lessons made manifest was this—the wisdom of allowing and not crushing the natural tendencies of the numerous peoples. The Consent of the governed was eagerly sought in certain ways, even if authority reigned over all. Had taxation, and the burden of government been mild, the

worlds admiration of the Roman Empire would be more profound.

Palestine had full experience with the various features of Roman government, just as nearly or quite all the previous systems had been exhibited within her borders. Republican forms of civil government had never invaded her territory, it is true, but when a province of the Republic, she had seen them at a distance, and felt some of their effects, and she had seen in the Greek cities of the Decapolis certain free institutions.

As to guilds: It must be to Babylonia also that we must look for the origin of these. If it be allowable to speculate in line with the meagre amount of positive evidence, we can see that two features, characteristic of that land, lead us to that conclusion. The first is the vast amount of brick building in that country, necessitating great throngs of masons. The other is, that slavery existed in the special form of using the inhabitants of adjoining cities, after any of the inter-urban wars that so marked that country before the consolidation of several cities into a kingdom, for domestic and public slaves. These would be just as skilled as any in the art of brick making and building. The wage question became therefore, an acute one, and the walled cities, great numbers of masons, and slave competition were as much calculated to force free citizens into combinations to keep up wages as any conditions we can imagine. The civilization of those days was quite equal to the production of organizations of workmen. Such things would not arise except out of necessity, and it is the necessity that we see in that land first of all lands. As between Egypt and Babylonia, we see the climate of Babylonia, with its rains and cold, the great number of cities that contended for precedence, the long postponement of consolidated power, and the character of the slaves taken from warring peoples, all stand in favor of the need for organization arising first in Babylonia. From there the seed was sown, and, probably long ere the evidence of it comes to light, sprang up in all lands that offered possibilities. We have evidence that when iron came on the scene, the secret of its extraction from mere red and heavy rock, and of its working, was retained in families and

tribes for a long time, and possibly in passing beyond, it did so under the guard of secret association. But iron was a late discovery, and in as much as it is well known that Guilds, etc., did exist among the Babylonians amid many trades that long antedated iron working, we need not hesitate to place the formation of associations to the credit of the social and protective impulses, rather than to the secret-guarding motives of prudence. If iron making secrets had caused the beginning of these bodies, the elements of secrecy, more or less developed in all of them, would be perfectly accounted for, but this seems to be the addition that came after the social and protective features had called them into existence. It is the craft of masonry more than all other crafts or trades that seems to suggest the principles that pervaded these Guilds. The cement that bound together heterogeneous elements into one harmonious whole, the level, square, and plumb, the one architect, the definite plan on the trestle board, and the orders and degrees arising out of classification and superintendence, are all eloquent symbols of the principles these societies inculcated and exacted. At any rate, they were organized on broad democratic principles corresponding very closely to the symbolism of the masonic craft. As to secrecy, there were trade secrets on every side, and, doubtless, the possibility of guarding these secrets was proved long before that peculiarly valuable secret of iron making put so great a premium on such an object. These Guilds could ramify over the earth in the midst of civil governments of all types, and could be guided and controlled from one center with great precision. The elective, autocratic and conciliar features of government all had place and play in their practical workings.

Finally, there was in Palestine, at the beginning of our era, a type of religious organization that, doubtless, had its lessons. There must have been many sectarian organizations in the ancient world—organizations intended to isolate certain aspects or views of life, morals, doctrines, or worship; or, to regroup the same. Such bodies always arise from the strong flow of one current, but always are compelled to resist the strong flow of others. They must break the dam, but are compelled themselves

to build dams to restrain the waters they draw off. Hence they present a view of devices designed to check the working of the very principle to which they owe their existence. They must advocate great freedom in order to win, but use strong restraint in order to keep. Thus the Essenes of Palestine presented very democratic ideas, and that, too, in the essential sphere of religion, but a centralization of power that fell with irresistible force on the member in every department of his life. The elective principle was carried even to the election of priests, but they had courts of Justice (which, under their system, would include under their jurisdiction about everything in the life of the people) of no less than one hundred members, whose decisions were immutable. Democratic provision for a Tyranny is very old indeed.

Thus, in the time of our Lord, there was, on the worlds stage, an exhibition of the ways of men, in the matter of government, that ranged through all the forms except the modern Constitutional. The Roman, indeed, had the beginnings of that, and, doubtless, there was much in the Guild system that came very near to it. Now, the ways of men would have value to the Divine Organizer, as well as to the human, for His purpose must be the selection of Principles not only conformable to other considerations, but also to the material upon which He has to impose it, not by violence, but by nature, as it were.

The course of Ecclesiastical things, and their present stage, could not be ignored, to say the least. Why had they come thus far, if not to bring certain things to His hand on their current? Semitic genius had wrought in order to turn over its work, and its work was not to be set aside. But these currents of government parallel to that of the ecclesiastical, what is their meaning?

It is common to urge that Christianity borrowed certain features from this or that source, but this view is short sighted. Certainly there are principles that run through certain phases ere Christianity arrived, but that system would come, not as an eclectic borrower, but as a gatherer of things prepared for it, by development in broad tracts, and whose existance was only more or less testified to by this or that institution. Thus the

popular side of government, with its elective and conciliar features, had its roots in all government, and only more conspicuous illustrations in the case of Guilds, or Sects, or Colleges, or Roman Institutions. If Christianity were going to take, in part, that element, She could find it in tribal and city polity, in trade guild, in sect enclosures, in the schools, in Mosaic economy and in the civil polity of great States. And because it is found in all, we are sure it is not lacking in the Church of Christ. It was not that She spied a likely feature here or there and took it, but that She looked through all systems to basic principles of life and found them. She would have Her own arrangements, but She was not going to invent or borrow Her principles. They would be Universal principles, testified to by growth and fruit after ages of existence.

In the pre-existing systems She saw Prophecy, Ministration, Rule and Teaching growing up side by side—universal needs, and, somehow or other, always supplied. She, too, would supply them.

In preexisting systems She saw Authority concentrated, nevermind howsoever derived, so as to move swiftly, with dignity and effectively; as irreversible even when exercised by the Essenes' Council of One Hundred, as when issuing from a Persian or Median King. She, too, would give Authority the seat of dignity and efficiency, and enable it to act with readiness.

In all systems She saw the people striving for utterance, seeking an organ for pent up feelings. She, too, would enable the vox populi to proclaim itself.

In preexisting systems She saw counsel as much needed as decision, and the counsel (or Consent) of the masses who might be under the decision the desire of all upon whom rested the burden of Authority.

In all government, of every kind whatsoever, She saw results obtained by battle of contending forces, and issuing according to the plans of neither contestant, but according to a higher mind and wisdom.

As to forms, none had been permanent so far, or tested on a world scale. Their very adaptation to necessary changes would

make them all over into something very different. What particular form can we take from those days as the everlastingly permanent? Could any of the old bottles hold the new wine? The Roman government was a new experiment itself—an experiment in the effort to bind together old forms. It could hardly give a pattern in forms. The Jewish Church was organized for a small country, and on tribal and hereditary principles, so that, while a feature here or there might remain, the system could not. The Schools of those ages are out of the question, as to forms. The Sects were altogether too narrow for world conditions. The Guilds were far from having an organization that was suited to bear the weight of a religious system. Their officials had never had the duties of Ministration or Pophecy in conjunction with their own special functions. Finally, there was no one which altogether gathered up the past in the manner that it would become incumbent on the new creation to do. Beyond question, the very forms existent would help to illustrate the principles that had been developed, and some would do so better than others, each one serving for some separate point better than the others, but none was fitted to be the pattern, and the beginner of a new system would have more to hope from a discriminating faculty than an imitative one.

Yet, is not this very plain? That the world's experimentations along religious lines would be of more service than those along lines where the ends in view would be so diffuse. If the latter would have value from the fact of their breadth, would not the former gain from specific directness? The great Semitic genius had culminated in its contribution of the Mosaic system, which lasted through desert life, the unsettled conditions of the Judges, the stress of Israel's concentration into nationality, the disruption of the Kingdom, the Captivity, Restoration, periods of subjection to foreign domination, the Maccabee exaltation of the Priesthood, and, finally the Roman interference; and it delivered to the age of Christ its original treasures practically unscathed. It seemed to claim attention from every standpoint; and even if it could not claim to be the final word to the world in the line of ecclesiastical arrangement, yet it could speak for both God and man with a voice likely to be heard and heeded.

First: It could exhibit the Aaronic settlement of the large question of the amount and sphere of Rule that should belong to the Priesthood, and the manner in which this ideal could be held to through the ages of trial.

Secondly: It could show that powers of Ministration, Prophecy, Rule and Teaching could all be combined acceptably and naturally.

Thirdly: That representative and popular elements like the Assembly and Synagogue could be of great Strength to the ruling Priesthood.

Fourthly: That worship, as in the Synagogue, could proceed along lines other than that of sacrifice without harming, but, much rather, helping that principle.

When we remember that the Master first founded His kingdom before He appointed officers, and distinctly separated that kingdom from the world and its kingdoms, before He gave the officers any power in that kingdom, the careful isolation of Aaron's sphere by Moses is recalled.

At any rate, we now have the various contributory lines of development, in the matter of government, before our view, and they form important conditions that must be kept in sight when we come to see the new system projected on the proper background. Some things must have led up to the Christian system. Some things must be different from all that went before. Some principles must run through both the past and that which was to succeed. Government, as well as Ecclesiastical Government would have its lessons, but Ecclesiastical Government can not but be regarded as specially preparatory.

We ought now to be ready to plunge into the midst of the direct examination of what was really done in the way of giving to the World an Ecclesiastical Government, adapted as well to it as to the great cause of Righteousness.

Part II

Evidence and Structure

CHAPTER I

The Master's Own Acts

Doubtless, the rest of Scripture, and History also, might throw some light upon the Acts of the Master, but, in the main, the clear and simple accounts of the Gospels, in their fourfold form, set forth some things too plainly for questioning; and it is the purpose of this chapter to deal with the indubitable acts of the Founder of the Church, as there presented, by way of gaining a first definite shaping of the positive side of this discussion. Hitherto nothing has been adduced as fitting the conditions of the long analysis, and it is time we were beginning to put forward the synthesis, for which this analysis ought to have prepared. And yet our analysis is far from being over; the analytical method must still guide us, only it is time to gain a view of the positive things to be tested.

Now, when the Master came on the World's stage as one about to become a founder of the world's system of government, there would naturally arise the question of the relation of his organization to those already existing. These were on the ground, both the civil and the religious, and they had to be dealt with. He was born a member of an organization which claimed God as its author, and in its subtility, and beauty of lines and harmonies, and in its strength and endurance, as declared after long existance, supported the claim. What now would He do with this Church of God? And as touching the old and ever-to-be-new question of sphere—as between the civil and religious contentions over predominance, how would He mark out the scope of His Kingdom? Before the lines of inward polity could be laid down there were these questions needing solution.

Therefore, it is important to note in connection with the first of these questions that He declared Himself in no uncertain way. There can be no question at all that He decided the fate of the Jewish system by two acts. He was of the tribe of Judah, not Levy, and yet He was Himself to be the first in the

line of the ministry of the new order. He thus rooted up the hereditary principle of Moses with most significant change. He did not merely transfer the priestly line to another tribe, but made the whole principle of heredity null and void. His other procedure, indicative of His purpose, was to constitute Himself the Victim of Sacrifice (which could only once be offered), and thus abolish any further offering of blood. When then He ended the work of the High Priest (for that official's great office and duty was the sacrifice on the day of Atonement) and struck down the principle of heredity, He clearly showed that He designed not the continuance of the Mosaic system but the end. There was still room for the carrying over into the new much that glorified the old, but the sign was given that the new would be new indeed. Whatever, therefore, of the old might be found in the new would be there not of law or its own force, but because adopted and instituted afresh.

Thus did the Master gain free room for establishing His own, unhampered by the bonds of a past system. It is needless to say to Christians that He fulfilled the old before He instituted the new.

On the other point, that concerning His dealings with the possible trammels of entanglement with the civil side of government, He gained freedom with equal hand.

He was of the Royal line, and took the Priestly office into that of the Kingly; which would look like the renewal of the old system of the union of Church and State, with the State as the dominant side, but His declaration "My kingdom is not of this world," sets His purpose fully in view. Nothing indeed could more completely show the flight of the Church away from the entanglements with the Civil power of Earth than the course of the founder. If the kingdom and its King is not in conflict or alliance, but utterly separate, and of another sphere of life, certainly no officer can be. Undoubtedly it is true that the taking of the Priestly into the Kingly shows the subordination of the Priestly, but it is to the Divine King; and this union with kingship in the Divine order precludes most effectually the union with it in the worldly. Judaic Theocracy is fulfilled by this means as well, but especially is the Civil power of earth kept at

a distance. There can be no manner of doubt that the placing of two kingdoms side by side in a world like this, the kingdom of Christ and the civil power of the day and hour, leaves room for many a conflict still, but these must occur simply in the course of the adjustment of affairs of mutual concern, and it is a wonderful gain to have the religious power checked at every turn by the very terms of its only charter. The civil power must needs be tyrannous, but the master commanded tribute to be paid, and forbade all those ways of the world by which alone the civil power can be met. And, it is to be observed, not only are these forbidden in any struggle with the civil power, but as well in all internal matters the essential nature of the Divine Kingdom must direct the means and methods.

Here, then, are three acts, by which the Prince of Wisdom settled for all time and beyond all question the matter of the bondage of His Church, and gained its perfect freedom. It is not by word, but by act. He made Himself the source of the Priestly line; He took the Priestly office into the Kingly; He offered Himself as the victim under the old Judaic system. Thereby we see settled the relations of His new Institution to all the powers that then existed. The way was perfectly clear, after this farewell to what barriers beset Him from the past, to begin the actual carrying out of His own ideals. Yet He had broken with nothing. He attacked nothing. He was at enmity with nothing. He was free to use all, to gather from all, to fulfill all. No man was ever so wise even after a human way. Having fulfilled both letter and ideal of the Mosaic it could not reproach Him; having placed His kingdom and its sphere out of all rivalry with the kingdoms of the world, they could only marvel at their deliverance from the old terrible enemy, and bless Him.

It is not then to the structure of His after-building that we need look for the things that separate the system that He founded from any and all others, but to these fundamentals of His life. He differentiated the foundations and felt the freedom during all the after courses. Anything that might be used would come into such relation that it would lose nothing by re-

semblance to parts of other structures. The kingdom not of this world must needs use everything after a heavenly manner, or lose its glory.

After this leave-taking of these preliminary problems we see the Founder arranging certain details of His system. Not that in point of time there was sequence as above, but the logic of His adjustments was based upon the preliminaries of the settlements which were all the time in His mind.

He began His ministry by giving signs of His authority and power, and necessarily gathered around Himself those that believed in Him. Some of these, or perhaps all, were baptized (by particular ones whom He had selected for His ultimate purposes, ordained (*epoiēse*), and named Apostles,) with a baptism which we presume was similar to John's, and only symbolical—not at all equivalent to that afterwards instituted in the name of the Trinity. They constituted the mass of His followers. From these He selected twelve, whom we see were afterwards endowed with much greater functions of office than at first. At first, just as His own work was preliminary, so too was theirs. They baptized in the way mentioned, and preached the limited Gospel that the Kingdom was "at hand" and all must repent. Besides these functions of office they had *personal* gifts of signs and miracles, etc. In as much as to these men were spoken, afterwards, words which conveyed a much higher function of office, we are compelled to discriminate between their first work and function and that to which they afterwards fell heir; though there is no great point to be made about that in this discussion. There were also seventy others sent out to do exactly as these Twelve, but we are not told that they baptized. Their message was the same simple one, and their powers of signs and miracles identical. These returned, and we do not read of them being again sent, or of further bestowal of the high powers afterwards given the Twelve, so that we are left to inference—very imaginative inference at that—if we should attempt to say what further use was made of them.

This whole stage of the Master's work seems, however, to be put preparatory; whether we judge by what is written of His

own part, or that of the Twelve, or that of the Seventy. Even His ministry had to have its stages, and they are evident to the reader. The Twelve seem at this stage to act as assistants, whereas, afterwards, they fall heir to His position at the head of the work; and the work itself is changed. The whole organization of the Church is inchoate, and postponed to the day when, after the sifting of the times of doubt, there would be as a nucleus that small body gathered with the Twelve in the "one place," and the Holy Ghost would come upon them.

All of this is recounted so as not to be left out. Nothing hinges on it, but it is to be kept separate in the mind from what is to follow. It had to be treated, and its place assigned. It leads up historically to those other acts of the Lord which develop the inchoate, unformed mass of material He had gathered, and more or less prepared for final action.

When we come to those supreme acts of organization, we find ourselves face to face with a remarkable condition. The official part is in full evidence, but the membership part only constructively present; and words are directed to official authority, and there is an absence of notice of membership prerogative that we are far from expecting. It happens so, and therefore must be noted, whatever lessons are to be drawn from the fact, if any. There, in every Gospel narrative, we see the officers called, separated, trained and endowed with powers, while there is no attempt at all to separate a membership from the masses of the people around. In the group of officers the membership exists constructively, but the whole separation of a membership as such, at once distinct from the world and the official circle, is left to be accomplished after the day of Pentecost.

There had been on the one side the attachment of a number of personal followers, and there was on the other a gathering and training of the special Twelve—a leaving of the many unorganized, and a dealing with the Twelve as the nucleus of organization. It was very near the Ascension and almost as His last word that He said, "Go ye, disciple, teach, baptize" i. e., form a membership. The Twelve were a unit, but the membership an inchoate, scattered, following yet to be gathered and compacted. So it was to the Twelve He spoke not as constituting

a compacted membership, however small, but as the officers who would perform in His stead the work of collecting and organizing the body of members, after He was taken from them.

If, now, we will take our records, the four Gospels, and gather thence the distinct gifts of power and function, as made to the Twelve, we will gain an insight into that marvellous and astounding wisdom that makes the Son of Man seem to us none other than the Son of God. He stands forth as the Organizer—about to do constructive work on ground and foundations prepared, as we have seen, with truly Divine prescience and sagacity. He is to grapple with all the problems which we have analysed—Grace and Faith; Authority and Consent; the distribution of Functions; essentials and non-essentials; historic systems and forms of Government; past accomplishments, natural proclivities, and the genius of people yet to come; these and many more. He is about to build that which must last till the end of the world, and be thoroughly adaptive to each and every age of men. He is about to make a home for every race and every class. The unity of the Heavens and the diversity of the Earth must equally be stamped upon it. The most stupendous task of statesmanship demands accomplishment to the finest degree of perfection.

There are a number of words that our Lord spoke to these Twelve which, when grouped together in connection with the subject in hand, tell a very plain story for themselves, and reveal almost as plainly as we could desire the mind of the Master.

In St. Matthew's Gospel, first in the sixteenth and then in the eighteenth chapter, He tells St. Peter and then all the Twelve of certain strange powers of binding and loosing that He will give to them. St. Matthew's Gospel is written along after St. Matthew has been exercising without question the full powers of an apostle, so that these words are not set forth in his narrative to vindicate the extent of his authority, but rather given as one of the prominent and important sayings of our Lord that should not be lost to posterity. Both promises of power are spoken about the time of His Transfiguration, at the time when

He began to prepare the Twelve for His end, and their beginning of work in His place. In speaking to St. Peter He uses the future, "I will give to Thee," and in speaking to all together, He still uses the future, saying "ye shall bind," but the passage does not come to the issue as to whether there is a present actual bestowal of that authority, or just an indication of what will be when their time comes to act. However, in St. John's Gospel, when the risen Lord comes into the chamber where they (but not all—Judas was dead and Thomas absent) were gathered, He breathes on them, and gives them the Holy Ghost (to be manifested later at Pentecost), and speaks the words in the present tense, "whose soever sins ye remit they are remitted," and uses the restricted form "sins" instead of the broader "whatsoever" (ye shall bind). The change to the present tense agrees with his prefatory announcement. "As my Father hath sent Me, even so send I you," as though the time had come for actual bestowal. As to the change of expression, from "binding" to "remitting sins," they can not be very far apart, however thankful we must be to have the explicit statement as to the matter of sins. The difference we will see later on.

If we regard the two passages in St. Matthew, as promises and not gifts, then and there completed, we will find that all the words of scripture that set forth the powers of the apostles belong to the time between the Last Supper and a time near the Ascension. There seems no good reason for objecting to such a view.

Let us now group together the positive commissions which Jesus gave His twelve Apostles.

First of all in point of time, He celebrates the passover, and taking the Bread and Cup He institutes His own Memorial Feast. It was to be perpetual, and just as He then blessed and break and gave, so, afterwards, they were to *bless* and *break* and *give* the two elements of the feast, bread and wine, in His name. "Do this" may or may not mean "sacrifice this," but it certainly does mean and must of necessity mean that, He being gone, they were to bless, break, give, and themselves eat and drink the bread and wine in memory of Him. The supper was to be re-

peated as a memorial with all the acts above named involved in the repetition. There could be no eating without blessing and breaking. His own place as the blesser, the breaker and distributor was to be taken by them, and the authority for so doing would rest upon His command, "Do this." We will afterwards see the bearing of "bless" and "break" and "give," performed in memorial rite; it is enough here to merely note the bestowal of the right to occupy His place at the Feast. This most significant gift is not made to one, but to each. Nor can we say it is made to each as simple member, not officer, without great assumptions. The plain indications of the opposite are these, that He rose from the table, girded Himself, washed their feet and delivered His plain words concerning those "that exercise *authority*," ending by saying, "I appoint unto you a kingdom as My Father appointed unto me."

These latter words convey another part of their commission. "I appoint unto you a kingdom," are words of the strongest kind of import in any case, but when taken in connection with all that our Lord revealed concerning His kingdom (in the world but not of the world), they almost amaze us. He goes on, "That ye might sit on thrones judging." Of course, they had yet that reward to win, and Judas failed then and there, but the gift of rule here afforded opportunity for winning larger rule there. The point is—the gift of rule over the affairs of the Kingdom here. The old Judges of Israel would rise to the mind of the men to whom this term was spoken as naturally as it flowed from that of the Master. They, the Judges, were men who were raised up through fitness, i. e., came to their power through merit. Gideon, we may remember, all but reached a throne.

Next we come to the passage in St. John's Gospel above mentioned. The Crucifixion is over, and the Lord is risen. He suddenly enters, breathes on them and speaks—"Receive ye the Holy Ghost; Whose soever sins ye remit they are remitted unto them." We have seen something already concerning this passage and those of St Matthew, and now further, while this text uses the word "sins," there is a force in the expressions in the others "bind on earth" and "be bound in Heaven" that ought

not to be missed. Taking the three passages together we gain a full view that no one of them taken alone gives. The term "earth" brings us to see that the apostles' power was intended to be exercised in the world. The term "sins" prevents us from shrinking from including even that limit in our mental conception. The term "bound in Heaven" carries the strange power fully as far as Judgment Day.

The meaning of the whole grant of authority has been much disputed because men have tried to say just what limits there are to the powers given, and to particularize about the specific contents, but this much is certain—there is a grant of great authority in the spiritual region, and Heaven will be behind them in its exercise. We can leave the question of what particular exercises are involved, and how far reaching they may be, if only we see that these men were not sent out to use their office on the strength of what they were as men, but that in authority, as in preaching, they would act ambassadorially. Even as far as the region of "sins" they would have this ambassadorial and not personal aspect. Specific exercise must be guided by the conditions imposed by many considerations. "Whatsoever" is a large word, but it could hardly reach out of the religious sphere in this case. Nor can we suppose that Heaven can be dragged into the judgments of men contrary to its own righteousness. Nevertheless there stand the words of the Master, and the very least meaning that can be given is that He sent them with an authority far transcending any that the world could give, or their own personalities warrant, even the authority of God. Their work and life would lead them to deal with the inner spiritual matters of men's lives, sins especially and Heaven would be behind them as they exercised their office.

St. John tells us of certain words spoken just before the Ascension to St. Peter alone—"Feed my lambs"—"Feed my sheep," and these texts seem to carry us straight into the Roman controversy while we are trying to avoid controversy. It may be enough to say that the powers we have seen bestowed, taken with those given about the same time, include every idea involved in *feeding* as a power bestowed or vested right located;

and that the force of the Master's words to St. Peter is tenfold more when they are taken as an exhortation than as a gift of power. Of course, if there was any way to allot "lambs" and "sheep" to different classes or orders, we might work in some idea of a special gift here intended, but interpretation can not reach as far as that. The ground is too indeterminate. A man might persuade *himself* that lambs meant this and sheep that, but the *scholar* has nothing to build on that even looks solid. To come before the world and dogmatize on such a point is not after the manner of scholars careful of their paths. On the other hand, it is the very quintessence of naturalness that the anxious Master, about to leave his flock, should turn to one or all of them and say with such intense accent "Feed my sheep." St Peter's sin, his position as natural leader, his former dispute for position (it was, probably, between himself and James and John), and the tendencies of his disposition drew to him the warning exhortation. "Simon, Son of Jonas, lovest thou me more than these?" Then, let this be the care of thy heart and life—the feeding of my sheep. This much is just must mean. If it goes any further, so as to become a grant of power it can reach no higher than the term "feeding" which, indeed, was common to them all, by the virtue of the other grants. That the sheep were the Apostles and the lambs the rest of the Master's following is a bare surmise so far as the context enables us to see.

We come to the last commission given to these men—that at His last talks with them, in Galilee, just before His Ascension. It was the commission to Preach, Teach and Baptize in all the world, and He said that in these works and functions of office they would have Heaven behind them. "Lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." It is to be observed that they were to preach the *Gospel*, and teach "all things whatsoever I have commanded you," i. e., His commandments. As Moses gave the law, moral and ceremonial, so He had given the exposition of the spiritual law, and they were to teach this to those they made disciples.

Here, then are the powers given the Twelve—to Preach, to Baptize, to Teach, to Bless, Break and Give the Memorial of His death (blood shedding), to exercise Rule outwardly over the af-

fairs of the Kingdom, and to Bind and Loose even in the spiritual matters of men's lives.

We might stop here, because the Gospels end here, but there is another power brought into isolated view in the book of Acts that probably ought also to be brought into separate notice here—the power of blessing people as well as the bread of the Memorial. The gift of the Holy Ghost through the laying on of hands, whether for ordination or Pentecostal blessings, shows that not only power of appointment vested in them, but also power of Blessing. The former we would naturally include in the right to govern the affairs of the Church, but the latter is distinct and refers back to the old Patriarchal regime, showing how even that system was gathered into the summarizing scope of our Lord's institutions.

Coming now to the putting of all these together, we find the Master taking twelve men and sending them forth with the world-old powers of Prophecy, Ministration and Rule concentrated. Prophet and Priest were united, and Ruling powers bestowed as well. Then the Teaching powers that more lately had been illustrated in the world by that separate order of—Magi in Babylon, Philosophers in Greece, Schoolmen in Egypt and Doctors and Scribes in Palestine were added. Finally, there was not only the Rule over the outward affairs, but there were powers bestowed reaching as far into the inner life of the members as sins.

Ministration would include Baptism, with its involved right of examination: Worship, with its prayers, hymn-singing (when they had sung an hymn), memorial offering, blessing and breaking of bread and blessing of wine, giving and eating these; and Blessing—both the simple blessing of the people and the more special Gift of the Holy Ghost.

Rule, as we have seen, had two sides—the care of outward things and the care of souls.

Prophecy was in its full degree as to preaching, and could reach even as far as writing Scripture, but was denuded of oracles, sooth saying and all fetich ways and doings.

Thus was all the past dealt with, and its treasures taken over, and its lessons gathered up. There was a concentration of

all into one. The Apostle was Priest-King, and Priest-Prophet, and Teacher. Later there might be a broadening and some separation into Prophets, Teachers, Helps, Governments, etc., but at the time of the Ascension these men stood possessed of all in concentration.

There was some change from older things of course, and this was notably the case in the matter of the passing, with Christ's death, of the Bloody-sacrifices. Those had been the engrossing acts of worship, and absorbed the work of the priests, but over against blessing, *killing*, giving and eating a Passover lamb, for instance, had come blessing, *breaking*, giving and eating the bread of the Memorial. The breaking in memorial rite was as priestly an act as the killing, and the rest are the same. It were vain to declare a function of priesthood abandoned by reason of this change, since the breaking refers so confessedly to Christ's death or killing. The old priest-king Melchizedech had brought forth bread and wine, which was a prophecy the Lord did not in His day disregard. Bread and wine could "shew forth the Lord's death," subsequently as well as lambs could typify it beforehand. It is the standing in acts of Ministration between God and Man, blessing and giving to Man, killing or breaking in typical act before God that priesthood essentially consists.

We have now seen the bestowal of all functions of religious office upon the Twelve, but it remains to be seen how the Master dealt with the problem of the type of government committed to them. The kingdom was not of this world, but it was nevertheless a "kingdom." The priestly office had been taken into the kingly, not the kingly added to that of priest. Judah's Son had taken to Himself the offices of Levy. In Christ all is clear, but when He passed the Kingdom to their hands, saying, "I appoint unto you a kingdom as my Father appointed unto Me," how did He adjust the matters plainly needing adjustment? There were *twelve* men to whom He spake. Again, we have seen how all types of administration had existed in the world—how did our Master select among them.

First of all: Let us run over the record. We have spread out already the various commissions of authority, and ought to

have no difficulty in seeing certain things. In the first place, the promise to St. Peter and to the Twelve (about the same time) wait for consummation till after the Resurrection when He enters, breathes upon them and commissions them all. The difference in words, to the extent that He says in the promise to St Peter, "I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom," has not engaged us hitherto, but may now. The powers of preaching, baptizing, binding and loosing, and governing the earthly affairs cover so much ground that it is hard to see where anything more can come in. This first promise of keys is amply fulfilled when these various powers are bestowed; for what power in the promise is left ungiven, when we have told the full tale of gifts. There is no matter of words to quibble over here. It is after translation of words into powers that we see no room left for the powers of the keys to differ from the powers involved in the other gifts. The keys have something to do, we must suppose, with opening and locking the door of the kingdom in its earthly life, and all of this, whatever it be, must surely be found between the limits of preaching and baptizing, exercising control of affairs, and that care of souls involved in remitting and retaining sins. At any rate, our Lord waits till the very last to actually commission, and then He commissions *all*. It is noteworthy that He must appoint to the duties and glories of the Last Supper at the time of its celebration, and so also His appointment to the kingdom takes place when yet He can gird Himself and wash their feet without unseemliness, to teach the lesson of their *mode* of Rule, but the rest is all left until He has risen and the time is at hand for them to act.

Secondly: It is very plain that it is not to the Twelve in any collective capacity that the gifts are made. It is not a body which is given powers that no one of the body wholly possesses, but it is a gift to each personally (and entailing personal risk of a "throne") that we behold. When they shall meet in a body, it will be a body in possession of its powers, because its component parts have those powers, but each one apart from the body possesses them as well. It is not of course, denied that *weight* is gained by concert of action. The point is that the

powers are not given to the body of men, but to each member of the body. If it were given to the body, then each one would, apart from the body, be without power. If it be given to each, then, in their coming together to form a body, they would bring into that body all the power each possessed, and also the weight of common action. That then the body would transcend any one member would be true enough, but it is plain that this is due to weight of units and not to separate and transcendent powers.

To the body of Apostles—the college, our Lord gave nothing. No questions were reserved for such a body, no amenableness of members alluded to, no functions created. What powers He gave He gave to each of the Twelve. And yet by this very course, He made collegiate action most acceptable. If men having authority meet together to consult about the wisdom of common action already within their power, such conciliar action is admirable. But, if men having authority are going to meet in a body clothed with authority greater than any of them, then they must also find an executive for that authority. A decree is only a decree: without an executive it is nothing. If none of them equal the Council in the one power, none can equal it in the other, except as an agent of it. Our Lord certainly did not make them agents of a Council, but agents of Himself. If they should set aside this role, and play the other, only harm could result, because their highest powers would then rest on a commission from a Council, and their lower on that from Christ. The Conciliar system must ever encounter the difficulty of a commensurate Executive. The only proper sphere for a Council is to determine on action already within the sphere of its component parts to execute. It is a device for gaining wisdom and dignity, not for acquisition of unusual powers.

Then again, a council is not amenable to punishment. It is unreachable—an aggregation not an organism. The Master gave authority, but held His *Judgment* up to view over those to whom He committed the kingdom. The sense of responsibility is absolutely essential in the sphere of government. Personality reaches to a point where a transient, collective, dispersable,

unpunishable mass can never attain. The Master's choice for highest powers was undoubtedly on lines of responsibility. It is only necessary to let the informed mind rest meditatively on this line of thought concerning responsibility in order to see the utter incongruity of such a *Judge* as Jesus Christ lodging responsibility where there could be no personality to rise at the Last Day for His sentence of reward or punishment.

Thus it ought to be clear that, while the tremendous powers enumerated were distinctly bestowed on twelve men, no one of them received more than another, and, furthermore, that there was no bestowal of any power whatever on the college as a college. It is a wonderfully interesting condition. Prophecy, Teaching, Ministration and Rule all concentrated and the full powers in each sphere equally bestowed on twelve men. None others are present. Every power enumerated is given to each. Nothing is given to them *in collegia* but all so personally that they are pointed to Judgment Day for their reward for faithful execution. Such was the building of the Master after He had ended the Judaic system and separated His kingdom from the world. How does it sum up the past, and how does it conform to the systems at various times regnant, or at least visible, in the world, ecclesiastical or civil?

Let us see on the one hand what was precluded, and, secondly, what was allowed for under this settlement, and then we can tell better what was accomplished.

Preclusions. Since the power involved every function of Ministration, Teaching, Preaching and Rule and was given to twelve equally it is clear that the old autocracy of Egypt, Babylon and Persia was set aside; and just as fully the Roman Emperor. The monarchical principles inferred from the use of the word "kingdom" were certainly not to extend that far. Even if there were any powers above theirs to bestow, the Twelve could not give more than they possessed, and to strip themselves by the rest taking a lower plane while one of their number retained in fullness the powers designated, would have been a violation of Christ's settlement just accomplished. They must retain their Rule and that left no place for any one over them.

Since the College of the Apostles did not exist as a body with

designated powers, but could only come into being by virtue of the powers each Apostle contributed, the ideas of the Roman Senate, the Essenic Council of One Hundred, the Jewish Sanhedrim in its day of exaltation, and all similar ideas of government by a body possessed of powers all its own, is completely negatived.

Since their powers had come to them before there was any such thing as a membership organized, the idea of Rule electively bestowed is impossible; and thus there had been no adoption of the Guild system, or the old tribal occasional custom—no acceptance of the membership as the source of authority.

Allowances. Since each Apostle had received appointment to a kingdom, the monarchical principle must be able to find some sphere for its action. There could not be one ruler for the whole, for twelve men were given it, but provided the others were given their rights a way might be found for the exercise of kingly rule by each one. That most excellent feature of kingly rule—single responsibility could certainly find place. Autocracy, Imperialism, Absolutism could be barred without the destruction of Thrones and Principalities.

Since, even though no body was called into existence and endowed with power, yet the Apostles were accustomed to work together, and therefore nothing would be more natural than united action as far as circumstances should allow; and since no word of the Master would stand in the way of this, it seems plain that conciliar action was deemed fully admissible, and was provided for even though not enjoined.

Since only the Apostles were given authority, and would be the only source from which it could flow, no harm could be done the appointive principle by any arrangements as to the selective. Thus no door was closed against elections within their sphere. Certainly the right of the Apostles to appoint would not be in any way abridged by the adoption of the elective method of finding the suitable men. They might not shut themselves up to it, but they might use it without hurt to any principles of appointment. Unless it were in fact an inherent right, the appointing power could never come to the people, or any but themselves, unless given. Up to the Master's ascension it had not been given. It certainly was not inherent, since it is the preeminent sign of

sovereignty. So, with the appointing power vesting in the Apostles, no preclusion of the elective methods was made.

Thus, then, in connection with the past and present principles and forms of government up to His day did our Lord deal. He shut off absolutism, but left the door open to kingly rule. He shut out the irresponsible rule of a body of men, but admitted the conciliar principle. He made the appointment System secure without injury to the elective. He judged every system and found its strength and weakness. They had grown up because they satisfied *needs*. They were failing because they lacked *balance*. The people for practical knowledge, the many for wisdom, the single ruler for responsibility. He opened the way for all and He completely prevented each of the three from having power to cast down the others. Perhaps it ought to be pointed out at once, before the prejudices against kingly rule in the minds of so many rise against the conclusions in that direction, that the words of the Master teaching the nature of His kingdom must be ever present. "The kings of the Gentiles exercise Lordship over them but ye shall not be so." Concentration of function, dignity, responsibility, swiftness, facility, etc., commend wonderfully the kingly office, and if it be stripped of the rights of inheritance, pomp, lordship and autocracy, and held by many equally, who are obliged to find some accommodation of sphere, etc., we can really find no parallel for judgment among the earthly exhibitions of kings. Our prejudices are against the earthly type which these of Christ's appointment should in no wise resemble. The prophet who must teach and minister as His employment and work may have ruling powers both in Church government and the care of souls, but he can hardly resemble the potentates of earth. What is a fact though, undoubtedly is, that, in the sphere of his rule, his authority comes and issues along lines of the kingly type and not the autocratic, synodical or popular. The prophet—priest—teacher—king in a sphere like Christ's kingdom can only by perversion of every lineament of the original become the thing of our prejudice; and the safe-guard against extravagant prelacy is not the synod or the people, but the assertion of the manifold work and the nature of Christ's kingdom. Indeed the term Shepherd best expresses the whole office on all sides of authority, and work, and life. Which leads us to the thought of the ancient

choice of the word *episcopos* for a shepherd of human beings. However, say what anyone will, the flow of authority in the Ministry that Christ chose is along kingly lines—swift, facile, concentrated, dignified and responsible. Elections, councils, constitutions can not change this utterly. They were doubtless all contemplated as inevitable growths under the exigencies of life in the world, but the nature of the current is that of kingly authority, not popular or synodical or autocratic.

There remains another point to see in its bearings, and it is this. There were twelve men to whom the kingdom was appointed. This precise number could hardly have been chosen for reasons from the side of governmental requirements. We can not settle on any direct *raison d'être*, but it had reference to appropriateness not necessity, evidently. But now there being twelve, we have all these men endowed equally with fullest authority in the spheres of rule, ministration, prophecy and teaching. How were they to manage between them the question of rule? Certainly none of them could abrogate his functions even by surrender, for they came as duties as well as privileges. To have elevated one of their number over them would have been an act reaching to that Judgment Day when they looked to sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes. This much is to be drawn out of the texts, but beyond it we can evolve little or nothing. The Lord did not say how they were to adjust the exercise of their office. Apparently He left them to find a way. Geographical and race distinctions abounded in a world all too large for twelve men to teach, and preach and minister to, and exercise rule over. The world and future times would furnish the conditions anyhow. Was it necessary to settle the problem from the first? Would not conditions change too greatly? If the principle was settled that each was equal in function, and invested with the fullest powers, could not these men be left to adjust for themselves their own arrangements. Earthly adjustments, when heavenly principles are clearly established, are by no means impossible—often very simple. There was nothing to prevent these men from taking for their sphere of work different races, or different countries, or groups of cities (or even a single city). Equality of territory was not involved. They were equals in functions. The multiplication of their number could not change principles, nor could re-

duction. It makes no difference, for instance, whether St. James died before St. Paul's apostolate or after it. The increase or deficit from the number twelve does not affect the authority of the rest at all, and St. Paul did not succeed to St. James' work in any event. Provided these Apostles kept their own functions and recognized those of each other in their fullness, all sought for was accomplished, and the circumstances allowed for various ways of accomplishing this. At one time all are in Jerusalem. At another St. Paul goes to the Gentiles and St. Peter to the Jews. St. James the Just seems localized at Jerusalem. In short, adjustments must needs flow from earthly conditions as they should arise. The thing to be adjusted was the thing settled in the grant.

The sum total of the Master's own acts can now be very plainly stated.

He called into being not a central seat of authority but a plurality of equal centres, movable, adjustable, personal, responsible.

He precluded no principle of the governmental forms that had risen to usefulness among men from some manifestation, but He so ordered His own form that each of these principles could find play, according to needs and conditions, without power to eradicate or strangle the others.

He concentrated every conceivable power of religious office, and bestowed them "*in lump sum*" on each of His appointees to office, giving all to each and none to any others.

By these measures He both made occasion for battle, and armed His Church for that battle; and the wisdom of His plan is to be judged along just those lines, for, after all, governments are instituted of God for instruments of His battle. And none are so especially for that purpose as that of His Church.

This uncrushable, most adaptable, all powerful concentration of religious energies stands, as it came from the hands of the Lord Jesus, the master creation of that divine mind—and it was indeed a creation through the processes of evolution. The gates of Hell can not prevail against it, not only because of Divine guarding, but because it was in its very founding made so admirable in its correspondence to all its possible environments that it has been and will be proven equal to every stress. Any other form would

have been an exaltation of some form already existing. This was to be a new creation, and it was. No such combination of principles had ever been dreamed of on earth. It could, amœba like, reach out a suddenly formed arm of monarchical, conciliar, or popular power just as occasion should demand; and History actually shows the Church, in its dealing with heresy, secular tyranny and internal usurpations using each and all these adaptions of internal possibilities to accomplish its ends. A veritable fighting machine is the Church of the Living God, and this is due to the fact that Christ did not bestow His grants of power on a man, or a council, or the mass, but called the Twelve around Him and said, "I appoint unto you a kingdom as my Father appointed unto Me," making it possible for them to meet all conditions in the appropriate way.

CHAPTER II

Apostolical Acts

When the wonderful organizer left the scene of His labor, the eleven men now living to whom all this power and responsibility had come, must have been utterly bewildered. It may be that they had been directed what to do, for the Lord had talked with them during the forty days about His kingdom, but nothing with the Master was cut and dried. Principles He gave in plenty always, but it was the application of these to ever changing conditions that He seems always to have made the duty of those concerned. We have no record of directions, and the Apostles seem all along to have felt their way as men fully aware of principles to be applied, but as yet uninformed as to conditions continually springing up. There was to be given them moreover a special Guide in the form of the Holy Spirit, whose very mode of work would be the bringing to mind principles, and the giving of vision as to conditions. The Eleven found themselves both the officers and members—the only officers and possibly the only members, under strict construction. But there were about one hundred and twenty followers present in the city (probably more in Galilee and the country about Jerusalem), whose membership there can be no great reason to question. Probably the only test at this stage that could practically be applied was the fellowship of the Apostles. In old days they had baptized large numbers—many more than were now with them. They had not yet begun to baptize in the new sense of that rite. We may even regard the whole status of the Church at this stage as unformed, and even their office as in need of complete bestowal. They and the “women and His brethren” specifically, but certainly also some others whom they address as “men and brethren” seem to have formed, as was in their power to do something very like a synagogue, but possibly it was more informal than that, something attaining a similar purpose but not regularly organized. They prayed together, and on one of these days St. Peter brought forward the need of filling the place of Judas.

There seems little or nothing to comment upon in our connection as regards the account in the Book of Acts of their doings in general during these few days, except that we may note that James, son of Alphæus, and Judas, brother of James, are mentioned as separate from His brethren—"These (eleven) continued, etc., with the women and Mary, the Mother of Jesus, and with His brethren;" which mention may help us to say which James it was that was head of the Church at Jerusalem afterwards, in St. Paul's day. But this selection of an Apostle in Judas' place might be expected to let in much light upon Apostolical understanding of their powers and the proper modes of procedure. The language is very singular. St. Peter says that Judas was numbered with us and had "obtained by lot" (*elachen*) part of this *diakonias*. St. Luke's account leads us to think, as do other passages also, that our Lord *selected* the twelve, but this passage, also by St. Luke, about the lot being cast for Matthias speaks as though Judas also had originally been chosen by lot (at least the word *elachen* has this force, and with *ton kleron* the idea seems stressed), thus supplying a precedent. Possibly exegesis can be pushed too far but it is singular to say the least that the verb *lagchano* is the word used concerning Judas. Let us note also the word *diakonias* as here used meaning ministration. When stress is laid upon the office of apostle as witness and herald this use of an word suggesting ministration is not to be ignored, for it helps to a full rounding of our view of an apostle's work. Returning to St. Peter's address, let us next note that while it is translated "must one be ordained" the Greek merely uses the word *genesthai*. In a land where Priests, Scribes, Rulers of Synagogues, and every ministrant about Holy things were "ordained" to their office it may be useless to call up the matter, but, nevertheless, the words do not specifically go as far as "ordination." Still, when our Lord chose the Twelve, St. Mark says, "He made twelve"—*epoiēsen*, so that evidently the Greek language had not settled to any set phrase for the usual Hebrew form—the laying on of hands in blessing as the ceremony of setting apart to sacred work. Finally, when it is said of Matthias, "And he was numbered with the eleven Apostles," the Greek says "he was voted down with." Evidently the whole idea in St. Luke's mind, as he writes of St. Peter's address, is the proper selection of a man, and not any matter at all of the method

by which the person selected was inducted into the office; and throughout, we see in the terms used about Judas and Matthias, and the incident of the ballot between two, that voting, lot, election was resorted to by the Apostles in the very highest matter that could at this time come before them.

At the very threshold, then, we see the people of the infant Church appealed to—by those whose powers as we have noted reached beyond anything yet seen on the earth (embracing every realm of religious life)—and, guided by certain decisions of Authority, balloting, and selecting a holder of the transcendent office of Apostle. It would not do to ignore those decisions of Authority. The right to make them implies that the Apostles voluntarily came out from the ramparts of power and recognized a something in the people that ought to have been recognized. It was not that they had no power to do the whole, but that there was this other claim to a share of power. Their office lacked nothing for the enablement of the whole business to be begun, continued and completed by themselves. What they saw was that there was power for something existing elsewhere, and that they could wisely recognize it. It was no small power by any means as we shall see.

Could we take the view that they here *bestowed* power on the laity? Or, was it in fact a recognition of what was there already? Unquestionably there was a power already there that without usurping anything could reach as far as the performance of the functions here mentioned. Of course if the Apostles had sole power they could delegate parts of it, and thus bestow on the laity certain functions, just as afterwards they bestowed on deacons, etc., part of their functions; but if the people already possessed the powers we could hardly call it a bestowal. In fact, they did possess the powers, and so it was a recognition and not a bestowal.

What were the powers and how derived?

The Apostles appealed to the people. The people balloted. Matthias was "voted down with the eleven apostles" (*sunkatēpsē phisthē*), causing his being numbered with them. It is clearly then a recognition of the powers of Consent, and an effort to secure that consent beforehand. Furthermore, it is a submission of *persons* to the judgment of the people, and if *persons* then, why

not measures? If even the Apostle can be chosen what measure is beyond this power of Consent? If the Eleven had been seeking to grasp power this would have been a fatal blunder, for after the power of Consent in such an instance is allowed, the precedent would stand for all instances—in that sphere of course. In this connection let us reflect that the words, “Ye take too much upon you, ye sons of Levy,” were said by Moses not because they claimed powers of Consent, but powers of Office. It was Moses himself who called Assemblies and created Councils of Princes or Elders, for all that he held Authority to be so sacred. But to cut the matter short, once the principle of Selection is allowed Consent has already been exalted.

The derivation is from Nature. Our Lord did not bestow power on the people, because they already had all that was necessary to His system. He bestowed power on the officers who could not otherwise obtain His authority. What they needed was His authority, not just plain simple authority. Plenty of that might come from world sources, but His authority is quite a different matter. A people might say “Come and rule over us,” and the man so constituted ruler would be in possession of large authority, but they could then unmake as well as make. What the Master sought was authority above such changes. Therefore He carefully made distinct bestowal of powers on the Twelve, and, just as distinctly none on the people. He recognized it, however, by leaving wide the door for Councils and Elections, etc. The powers He bestowed in no wise trenched on natural powers. He deprived others of nothing in order that He might give to His Apostles. He simply left the whole field of natural powers as He found it. The Arab tribes had recognized the powers of the tribe as well as those of the chief. Moses had recognized the people as well as the Priesthood and Judgship. So also Christ. The power of Consent is the power of self defense, the power of numbers, the power of humanity. It is not of nature for the people to be the source of Authority. If it is, then it must be said frankly that our Lord went directly contrary to that principle. As was said in a former chapter, the right of self government (a thing only possible among very enlightened peoples) is utterly distinct from the principle of the Consent of the governed. Our Lord appointed rulers, but left untouched the

powers of Consent, and here in the acts of the Apostles we have those powers recognized by the authorities He appointed.

We find, then, that before the day of Pentecost had come, all things were ready, Authority was seated above all chance of being cast down, and that authority had in the plainest way recognized Consent. From that day to this, warfare between the two has been constant and violent, but neither has been dethroned, and through their constant attrition, great truths have been rubbed out as the wheat for the needy world. Not all authority has been as prudent as the Apostles were. Sometimes it has gone ahead and demanded the people to follow; which procedure is often against the pride or conscience of that powerful body. Sometimes, on the other hand, the people have been too stupid or too distrustful to accede to the leadership of Authority. So must it ever be. By warfare is the peace of this world sought for and obtained, and there is a God above who ever supplieth Grace to Authority and Faith to Consent.

In truth the people need no more than this one power, and since the Apostles sanctioned it, and the Holy Ghost set His seal upon the action, it seems irrevocable; but there can not be detected in all the subsequent acts of that glorious band of men any effort either to extend or diminish this power of the people. If, instead of allowing the vast range of discussion, Scholars could just fight this one battle, so much would be gained. Wherein, it is here asked, has the Bible given an instance where the power of Consent has been abridged or increased by any of the Apostles?

In order to lay proper emphasis on the point, let it be said most emphatically that the Master's plan was to institute Authority and leave Consent with all its natural powers. He made Authority immensely strong, but Consent was immensely strong already. He left the earth with Authority fully in evidence and Consent apparently ignored. But it was not so in fact. Consent needed only to have its field left open, and that He was careful to do. Now, then, in the very first step taken by the very Authority He had so endowed, and that too, in the very vital matter of filling the vacancy in the place of Authority itself, this same all powerful Authority recognizes the place and power of Consent too plainly for any subsequent question. Thus it is Authority

that emphasizes Consent. This is better than that the Master should have formally drawn the distinction. The whole condition of things is sealed as complete and right by the Holy Spirit.

Furthermore, the powers of consent remain the same all through the life of these Apostles. Every one recalls the words of the Apostles when the Seven are chosen—"Look ye out among you seven men, etc., whom we may appoint over this business." Again, when in the Church of Antioch question arose over Mosaic ordinances, which led to a Council at Jerusalem, the language used concerning that council seems very strong along lines of Authority until the conclusion of the deliberations is reached, which is so stated in the words—"Then pleased it the Apostles and Elders, with the whole Church," as to leave no doubt that the approval of all was sought and obtained. It matters not whether in or out of the Council, the Consent of the whole Church was secured. The passage may be of very little help in establishing the precise position of the "brethren" in the council (and the possible range is large), but even though not in it at all yet their agreement is somehow secured. That councils had yet passed into their legal stage is more than doubtful, but in this very practical beginning, why could not Consent have gathered with Authority for convenience sake even if nothing more? When Councils became law-making bodies instead of judicial settlers of vexed questions, the power status of the powers of Consent could become a large question, but this Council is manifestly a deliberative gathering of all available interests for judgment of a pressing matter. In such gatherings how can the admission of the side of Consent do harm? Even typical legal councils can find a place for Consent without Consent rising out of its proper function. However, here in this case, the only thing made clear as to the status of "the whole Church" was that they were asked to act with the Apostles and Elders. They certainly did that, and it stands as a conspicuous example of the Apostles' regard for a power that stood over against their own.

It can not be proved, but it is assuredly granted by all, that when St Paul "ordained for them Elders in every city," he followed the line of the Apostles, and ordained those selected by the people according to certain precautions of his own establishment.

For the rest it may be said, that we must appeal to the tone and spirit of the Epistles rather than to any definite events or practices to show how the relations between Authority and Consent were regarded. Such things may only enable one to judge for himself, but certainly there is no arrogance even on the part of St. Paul, who could "come with a rod," nor is there any sharing of his authority with any one. The whole impression is that of Authority separate and above the mass, and yet ever seeking to have the mass act with it.

It is well known that many minds have looked to find in the specific *form* of Church Government the essential of it, but truly there is more in the fact that the powers of Authority and Consent are so clearly set opposite each other, and so clearly hedged off from each other's spheres than in anything else. It is true that our Lord made careful choice of a form for Authority, but the wisdom of that comes after the great line of demarkation He made around Authority, and the care He showed to leave untouched those natural powers of Consent that will not suffer themselves to be entrenched upon. After He had ended the Jewish Polity, and settled the lines between His Kingdom and those of the world, this exaltation of Authority to every function of service and control, while recognizing all the fundamental power of the people, marks His genius as the towering one of all the ages in the sphere of government as well as so much else. And it seems to stand out very plainly that the means by which He accomplished it was to make the sphere of Authority so completely full that it included every particle there could be of that gift of God. *To the bounds of the world and the end of time, every nation and every creature, for retaining and remitting sins, binding and loosing whatsoever fell in the limits of the Kingdom, the Authority He instituted was to exercise every power of religious ministry.* His Spirit-guided Apostles took up the wonderful commission, and while fully illustrating all the great powers given them, left the record of their acts so simple a seeming story that it reads like an every day record of easily lived lives and very naturally borne burdens.

We pass on to consider some other matters involved—the matters of their own and, also, the lower orders.

Twelve men could not suffice for the work. Conditions soon poured their necessities upon them. Could they enlarge their number? Must every new worker be given full share with them in every respect? Was the possession of their own full power to end with them? This form of the problem would not arise at first at any rate. The problem would first be, could they give part of their authority to others while exclusively retaining the rest, for the present at least? We are not told when Elders were first appointed, but so far as the narrative is concerned it could well have been before the account of the "deaconship of tables" is given in the record, which was some five years after Pentecost. Whether before or after that event, they were appointed, and we also read of an order below them called Deacons. We will not stop here to lose ourselves in a discussion of the appointment of the "Seven," it is enough that ultimately we find Elders and Deacons, the limits of whose functions can only be surmised from the narrative, but who plainly did not share the full powers of the Apostles. There may have been other distinctions as well, along lines of prophecy, rule, evangelical work, etc. Certainly the Apostles bestowed some of their powers on others without giving other powers generally esteemed the highest. This was only following the universal custom of mankind and regular trend of things. As we have seen, Ministration always became divided into the special, the regular, and the assisting. These divisions came about from the nature of things, not any formal plan. Our Lord had apparently not even considered them. He had given Authority. That gift must be from Heaven. Its divisions for its work could be of earth. The Apostles would have power to make them, and precedent as well as conditions to guide them. There have always been three orders of ministrants in the world, and this is evident not only to those "reading Holy Scriptures and Ancient Authors," but must be evident to all who consider the nature of the case. Where it might be supposed there were less it would be the highest that would be omitted, and then a council put in its place lest the units of the great body should become too numerous for any action in common involving strain.

While thus there is a natural division into three orders,

the special, the regular and the assisting, there can be also others along different lines. Peculiar fitness for certain lines of work, because of gifts, might lead to the divisions of prophets, teachers, helps, governments, etc., but when it came to the equipment of these with the authority needed for the work, doubtless it became very hard to deny to each of them, especially the Evangelists, the same amount given to a regular Pastor or Ministrant to a congregation. Little by little, possibly, the cleavage along the line of the degree of Authority overcame that along the line of special work. An Apostle could be an Evangelist or a Prophet; so too, could an Elder, and so, perhaps also, a Deacon (Philip was one of the Seven, and is called, as we know, Philip the Evangelist). And so matters settled into orders—Orders of Authority and not classes of works. All of which shows us that it was not that our Lord devised a system in its entirety, but a force of conditions that molded His gift into natural and oft repeated shapes. Had all the details of Church offices been new, probably the Scriptures might have been fuller in their account, but because they were so natural and regular, their life was assured.

But sooner or later the Apostles would have the other question to face—that of the continuance of their own order. Even before that, the question of its enlargement might come.

The remark above, about the naturalness and regularity of the threefold division ensuring life, can in this instance also account for the vagueness of Scripture. If one has followed the efforts of the last chapters, he will hardly dream of such a thing as the passing away of the first order, but it is our work to go into the question analytically and see it to the end.

St. James died in 44; St. Paul was converted as far back as 37, and began his first journey in 45. Certainly by the time of St. James' death the problem was faced. God had thrust St. Paul forward and removed St. James, and by one or the other process forced the Apostles to face the issue of doing something about their own order. When St. Paul became an Apostle we don't know. If we should say it was when he began his first journey then we would be confronted with the claims of St. Barnabas also. If the laying on of hands at Antioch was for

the one the beginning of Apostleship what was it for the other? Here was the same ceremony, the same work, the same degree of Authority, both when together, and when St. Barnabas went to Cyprus, taking St. Mark with him. If, on the other hand, it was before that, then it was before St. James' death. Either then St. Paul and St. Barnabas raised the number to thirteen, or St. Paul made that number while St. James yet lived. This increase to thirteen happened beyond all questioning, and it means something.

When St. James died the whole face of the work had changed. Jerusalem had been occupied, and the work had reached to Antioch and Tarsus as well as Samaria. If then there was no reason for the number to remain twelve, here was a condition that called for an increase. God had called St. Paul. The Holy Spirit said separate Paul and Barnabas. Conditions and Providences both rushed upon the Disciples and they woke up, as it were, to find thirteen men of their own rank. And why should there be only twelve? No new territorial room would have to be made with corresponding diminishment of that of those already holding office. Their office could be territorial but could also be racial beyond all question. It was in fact an office marked by degree of authority independently of all else. Besides, this much was plain—either their office must die when the last of the Twelve should die, or it must be extended. Had not God extended it? The conception of St. Barnabas as a deputy of St. Paul won't stand a moment, and the idea of his independent work in Cyprus being without the powers he had been accustomed to, is violative of all consonance. But to him is applied the very name Apostle. And, even if St. Barnabas was possessed of only a part of their powers, here was St. Paul not a whit behind the very chiefest of them.

If it should die what then? Why the entire plan of Christ would be altered. Authority must find another seat. This could only be a Council or councils, liable to the preventions of world powers, broken into by intervals, without eyes, without personality, without adequate executive and without responsibility. And the Master had not chosen the conciliar form, although it had long been tested as a form of government, but had chosen

the plan of units, each endowed with equal and highest powers. Or, it could be a single man—a theory never broached. (The Papal theory is of course—that Christ originally appointed one as head, and not that one became head as heir to what was first given to twelve). Or, again, the seat could be the vast number of units engaged in the local work, who had hitherto had a partial authority only. Or, yet again, The whole Church could become the repository of a lapsed authority to be by it redistributed—but, since the first order had become extinct, distributed along new lines. It is to be noted that it could not pass to the laity unless the power of the second order did so also. It must be the whole Church embracing both remaining ministry and laity.

If their office should be extended, and their order preserved, what would ensue? Why the great balance between high Authority and broad Consent would be maintained—the very essence of the Master's plan.

It was natural that in a subsequent age, when temporarily Authority sought to strangle Consent, that blindness to the balance of these world forces should come, and issue in counter violence on the part of Consent against Authority, especially as Authority was then appearing in a form of concentration terribly severe. Suffice it to say, that Consent then and there vindicated its power. Giant powers indeed wrestled. Authority was humbled, and under the circumstances that was a great gain; but what if there were no Authority to humble Consent when in popular fury or arrogance it might need its turn at the lesson book?

Thus the question that the Apostles must face would be, a change of the Master's plan, or the continuation of it.

As to vesting their authority in a Council or councils, the Apostles made very little use of councils, so far as the record goes. They called but one. It was a possible part of the machinery, but an extra part, so to speak, not a regular working part. They "came together to consider" a question. Physical conditions began soon to set limits to such emergency machinery, and increased the difficulty as time went on. No Council fell heir to their authority. Their recognition of them is most important, but their place is equally well marked.

And, as to the second order, to the end of the Bible it remained under authority, and not a sign is given that this condition was ever to change. Their number was too vast and their work too contracted to allow them to be the units of the system where such vast power existed. They would need oversight themselves from the very nature of their work. The Apostles had supplied this, and the need of it (As we see in Crete and Ephesus) was one of the forces demanding an extension of the apostolic staff.

As we have seen, if the Apostolic order was not extended, and if their office passed away, it might be that the Authority that they held did not cease to be, but the whole Church became the residuary legatee, so to speak, of all authority, and could redistribute it. But if the Great Organizer had at all settled His Kingdom, why, and indeed when, came this new arranging of its forces, and what took the place of the only order that Christ ordained? If it was extinct, did councils or did the old second order—that of Elders acquire new functions? What we do see as a fact is—that the high order of Apostles, the order Christ ordained, and vested with so great authority, continues until the last word of Revelation is written. The Bible ends before the order ends. As a matter of fact, neither the Scriptures nor History tell us of any redistribution of authority. Apostolic functions were not bestowed by any act of the Church as a whole or part at any time or place. It may be a possible theory that the authority before exhibited by the Apostles became vested in the whole, but no exploitation of it or bestowal of it appears in early history. Is it still there, latent?

We are shut up to the view that the first order became extinct, and its functions ceased, or that the Apostles extended their order, and their functions still live. It is, in fact, a very common view, that with the Apostles passed away the Apostolic office.

And, doubtless, it was to the Apostles that the outlook also appeared—whether to extend their order, or to let both it and its powers fade forever from the earth. While to some men now it appears, that only men who were Christ-chosen could possibly be trusted with such power, to the Apostles it may have seemed

impossible to vest them in councils, or the vast numbers of the second order, or in the Church at large.

The argument for believing that they extended their own order may be stated as follows:

The powers of their order, as given them at the first constituted a rounded whole that they could hardly be suffered to cast away, or allow to become extinct in any of its functions. Rule, Ministration, Prophecy, Teaching and the Care of souls were all bound up in one ministry, and in one office by the Master Himself. What function could be allowed to cease? But, if no *function* could lapse is it that in degree some of them became lessened? Now to the end of Scripture, as was said, there was a second order that confessedly did not attain in degree to that of the first, and since nothing was vested in councils, the failure of this order to acquire the authority of the first must reveal a distinct loss for the whole. It is exactly this loss of its great inheritance in entirety that is to be combatted. If there is any theory that holds that there was no loss, it would be acceptable, and if there are any facts that look in that direction, they would be of greatest interest. To sit down calmly to the fact that a part of its glory of heritage, and an arc of the great circle that the Master drew was lost, is almost impossible. It is a beautiful and wonderful whole that is contended for—where each part and its very degree seemed necessary to the completeness of entirety; where each power was held in supreme degree without limitation, and the harmony seemed to depend on this supremacy; where, if one power sank below the level at which it was bestowed, vital consequences must follow; where Preaching and Teaching depended on the very degree of authority in Rule (To “speak and exhort, and rebuke with all authority” was a principle with St. Paul); where all the past was summed up; where all the future seemed to be commanded by this new artillery seeking the demolition of the strongholds of unrighteousness. Why, it is almost inconceivable that this marvel of symmetry became mutilated! Are there, then, any facts which might show its continuance? Yes, there are.

First: Scripture ends before the Apostles all die. That is

to say, if the Apostolate passed away, History and not Scripture recounts the end. It may be that it can be said that in Scripture it can be seen diminishing, and no distinct provisions for its continuance declared, but that would not preclude the last survivors from acting, as would be most natural, when the bridge to be crossed was actually reached. St. John himself, is the last. However, it is a fact, and it has a bearing, that the Bible does not record the end of Christ's institution—an office superbly complete. To see that end we must look to History.

Secondly: History contradicts the idea that the order which held the powers in highest degree passed. St. Ignatius is only some fifty years from St. Barnabas in work at Antioch, even if that. History can not be robbed of a voice in such an issue, where by the very terms the appeal to her must of necessity be made.

Thirdly: There is in Scripture a whole set of men, hitherto unexamined as to their functions and degree of power, whose actions are so singular as to compel attention. No one can help being struck by the difference manifested between the powers of Timothy or Titus and those of the Elders over whom they were appointed. St. Barnabas and Silas and St. Luke as companions of St. Paul, St. Mark as companion of St. Barnabas, seem to join in the very powers of their chiefs (though in the case of St. Barnabas and St. Paul there never is given a sign of either being first and the other second). Apollos, too, presents a novel case. St. James at Jerusalem stands boldly out as another instance. There are even others who seem to rise above the regular order of Presbyters, over whom they seem to be placed. Now this whole number of men seem to offer a solution of the problem. With History demanding an origin for whole lines of men in many different churches, who exercised just the functions, in kind and degree, given by our Lord to His Apostles; and with the office, as it came from His hands, demanding a permanent repository for its functions, the very fact that there is a set of men mentioned in Scripture seeming to be the link we seek holds out a hope that we can find in them an extension of the Apostolate. Certainly until we examine their claims we can not accept the extinction of the light that came with so much glory at the first. Christ lavished His care on but one office, and it is hard to be-

lieve that it died with its first holders. If the principle of monarchy be taken out of His system it falls. There is nothing left to hold balance with those others which He combined with it in His great settlement.

The Apostolical acts then which we have reviewed are:

The recognition of Consent.

The recognition of Council.

The bestowal of a part of their powers on lower orders.

The bestowal on a few men of peculiar powers seemingly different from those given the mass of local workers, which powers we are next to investigate.

CHAPTER III

Discussion of the Difference Between Apostles and Elders

Undoubtedly the proper step now is to discuss, in all fulness, the powers of the Apostles in comparison with the powers of the order of regular workers, so as to see just where the difference between them lies, and then to take up the powers of these special men in order to find the proper niche into which they best fit.

As we have seen, the Apostles were given powers to Baptize, Teach, Preach, Minister, Care for souls, and Govern in all fulness the Church of Christ. Which of these powers—and to what degree as well—were bestowed upon the regular workers under them?

Of course, we can see from Scripture that the Elders were to baptize; and also the teaching powers, to be theirs at all, would be theirs in fulness. The offices of teaching and preaching are ones of parity, and could hardly be given in part. The fulness of the Gospel and of Christ's commands and doctrine were equally within the range of the whole body of teachers and preachers. Some men may have had greater gifts, which thus caused them to labor specially in the word, but we see no division between the Apostolic order and that of Elders along the lines of teaching and preaching any more than along that of baptizing—apart from territorial distinctions, of course. When we come to Ministration, Care of souls and Rule, there is room for distinctions from the nature of things; and it is along these lines that we look for the divergence of the degrees of office. Some ministration, some care of souls, and some powers of rule must have been given, and we know were given, to the order of Elders, whose work essentially involved these things, but it does not follow that, because they had some power therefore they had all. For instance, there was a rule *over* Elders to be considered. And, moreover, certain powers of Ministration could well be reserved. Also, in the Care of souls, the question of *final* settlement of cases opened the way for distinctions. It will, therefore, be along these three

lines that we will look for clear distinctions to be made, in the Bible.

The Elders were undoubtedly given the right to baptize, teach, preach, care for souls, conduct public worship, minister the word and the memorial of Christ's death, and exercise control or rule over the congregation to some extent (though it is not clear how far this was to be, or in conjunction with what other forces).

The Apostles were unquestionably in possession of—appointment of officers, rule over Elders, the hearing of appeals, the care of many churches and even groups of churches, and seem to have retained the exclusive right to the laying on of hands for that Gift of the Holy Ghost which was the wonderful sign and mark of this the world's new institution. All of these, of course, in addition to all the powers to which they admitted the order of Elders.

It is clearly the old customary line between the Special and the General, between functions of occasional demand and those of continual necessity, with the usual provision for the rule over the local rulers. But if it is indeed a fact that they reserved to their own order the giving of the Holy Ghost—both for ordination and the purpose which we see illustrated at Samaria and Ephesus, whatever that be, then we have a most remarkable difference indeed; which is so exclusively Christian, so essentially peculiar to the Church of Christ as to be compulsory of study.

But let us take in order the differences in each division and satisfy our minds about their existence and extent. We have the spheres of Ministration, Rule and the Care of souls. Let us begin with the last and discuss the problem.

There are quite a number of remarkable passages in the Scriptures where the Apostles, or some one of them, rise to the very highest degree of authority that seems possible in the matter of dealing with souls. The first is that of Ananias and Saphira; then that of Simon Magus; the case of Elymas the sorcerer; Hymenaeus and Alexander; lastly, the instance of the incestuous man in the Corinthian Church. The striking thing about them is the instantaneous action of the Apostle concerned. There seems such an assurance of confidence, such an undoubted sense of power and right. There was no doubt about retaining and re-

mitting sins here. The thunderbolt of Heaven seemed to fall in each case. "When ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ," says St. Paul, and he prefaces it thus—"I have judged already as though I were present," to "deliver such an one to Satan." How this comports with the other four cases! The extremity of power in all these cases seems amply to cover all power up to that high point.

Now did any authority of the elders reach as high? Of course the territorial question is left out and only the matter of degree considered. The territorial difference, however, has its own importance also. It is needless to say, there is no instance given. We see a certain sharing in the Apostles' action on the part of the Corinthian Church, and think a legitimate conclusion would be, that there was no appeal from St. Paul, while there might well have been from them.

We may consider the council at Jerusalem also called to consider a case under the head of the care of souls; and a matter which might have been settled by St. Barnabas and St. Paul (at Antioch this might have been the order of the names) was referred to the "Apostles and Elders" at Jerusalem, because the ones who came to raise the question *claimed to come from the Apostles*. The judicial Council illustrates how the Elders possessed a voice in matters of such Character; nevertheless the Apostles lose nothing of place or authority in the account of that council. It is very much to be doubted whether Elders of the Jerusalem Church could have had any voice at all in the affairs of Antioch and elsewhere outside of Jerusalem except as counselors of the Apostles, whose jurisdiction clearly reached the whole Church. The case was common to all, and the Apostles' clear jurisdiction made a satisfaction of conditions that would meet all objectors.

But if St. Paul went up to get a Council to determine this particular case, in the matter of the care of souls, he did not always take such a course by any means. In much the same line, he met much the same men in his own way, and by his own authority. The Judaizers dogged his steps, but the whole Church became indebted to him for settling the whole range of questions

in the realm of the Law, not by appeal back to this or any other Council, but by his authority as Apostle.

Even the limited data at our command makes it easy to see the fact that great pre-eminence belonged to the Apostolic order in the whole region of the Care of souls, but it does not allow us to set off each sphere with the exactness we would like. The vagueness is not however about the Apostolic office, but is as to the precise share falling to the second order. The participation in the council allows the *assertion* of more lee-way than would otherwise be possible, even though it should really be mere *assertion*.

In the matter of Rule we have a plain straight course. Territorially, and in degree, the rule of the Apostles was much larger. Their rule included that over the Elders. They appointed them; they could remove them; they assigned them their work and stations. Doubtless they more and more followed regulations agreed to by all, so that all would be done acceptably and in order, but the order of the Eldership was of their appointment and sustenance. Furthermore, the people under the Elders were under them also. They were chief pastors of all orders.

It is to be noted that there was no Council held over questions of Rule, or for the purposes of control. The matter that engrossed the only Council mentioned was a matter of conduct, of custom, of ceremonial. As Rulers the Apostles simply went about setting things in order. They had settled how it was to be done, and their work was to order all things either as they had agreed, or the occasion that was new in their own judgment demanded. Of a Council in control of *affairs* we have no instance at all. "Stewards, not Boards," is Biblical custom, if not Biblical law.

If any should argue that because the Apostles and Elders "came together to consider" the custom of Circumcision, that conciliar authority is thus biblically established over all departments, then the abstention of the Council from other things can well be argued in proof of the *wisdom* of men in biblical times. Councils about any matters were not precluded, but the Apostles ruled in a personal way. Doubtless had a Council been held on matters of rule, it would have been as representative as was the one called on the other line. If they are to be held, by all manner of means,

they ought to be representative, so as to gain counsel, i. e., be conciliar, but our consideration of rule is not beclouded by any such council, for the Apostles ruled without them, so far as a line of record exists. Even in the matter of local rule, we read of no Councils. A plurality of Elders, and a single congregation has been supposed to warrant the assumption of their being in all local Churches a definite council of Elders, but that is an inference of only some minds. However, this is a very proper place for the consideration of the point, and we will go into it.

It is argued by some, we say, that since we read of Elders (plural) being appointed in every Church, that, therefore, the way those several Elders governed that one Church was by a conciliar form of government. No evidence of Scripture is submitted (but from History, St. Jerome) for the Scriptures are silent, but the supposition is inferred. It is, however, just at this point that others come in to say, the facts are that the *membership* of the Church entered in too, and instead of there being a Council of Elders, there was a congregational gathering and each Church governed itself; and for this position the instance of the Corinthian Church, and the Council at Jerusalem are given.

But again, there is yet another position. When St. Paul calls the Elders of Ephesus to him, he says, "Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers," and this text brings out so clearly the element of personal responsibility over a flock, that it is not thought that either meeting in Council or in congregational assembly could be in such form as to change this. It is recalled that the Apostles were twelve, and the Church one, and yet that their government was personal (witness St. Paul) and while they made use of both Council and Congregation, yet that fact did not harm their personal authority. So, too, there is no reason to preclude the Elders from utilizing either Council or Congregational forms. If the twelve could do it, why could not they? But that they called into being a Council like the Roman Senate, —turned their *personal* responsibility over to an *It*, is another matter. The distinction must be kept in mind. The Jewish presbytery it is claimed was a type; but the Jewish presbytery

governed as an *It*. Authority lodged in the Council. It must decree and seek an executive for its decrees, and it avoided individual responsibility. The Ephesian Elders on the other hand were to "take heed to *yourselves*, and to *all the flock over which the Holy Ghost* (not a Council), *hath made you overseers*," so that any form of conciliar or Congregational action which safeguarded that principle, could well be used as both possible and natural, but not the other, for the very reason that it made the Elders *executive of a Council*, rather than *overseers*, by the appointment of the Holy Ghost, who must "take heed to themselves and to all the flock."

Thus the matter stands, that it is true that there would be several Elders in each place where apparently there was only one Church, but that such a condition does not warrant the passing of personal authority into conciliar, nor does it preclude the Congregation from a share. That Congregational authority ever rose to equality with that of the Elders is however another matter. The point is, that granting there to be many elders and only one Church, the influence of a transcendent Council is left—in the air.

In this connection, we must remember the two distinct heads—Rule and the Care of souls. Those who advocate Councils for rule, must consider also the Care of Souls. There is a shrinking inherent and great, from the judgment of the individual soul, by the many. It is true that it was in the sphere of Care of Souls rather than Rule, that the Council of Jerusalem was held, but it *was* a matter of public policy and not the personal affair of one lone poor soul. The tyranny of a Board comes from the hardness of a Board as well as its power. Now if the sight of several Elders to one Church should drive us to consider a Council taking the place of personal authority in Rule, does it also take it in the Care of souls? There being no account of any local Council, we are driven to inference. But such an inference carries us back to where our Lord, knowing all about the horror of the Jewish Sanhedrim, as well as the Synagogues and Essenic Council, gave to no Council, but to twelve persons the Care of Souls.

However, if a Council of Elders had more power (not weight, which is another matter) than a single Elder, we would have be-

tween the Elder and the Apostle (and their respective powers) the power of a local Council to consider, which has not so far been in our view; and too, the origin of this power, as well as its place, to discuss. So, then, by way of brief discussion, if the Apostles placed a Council in charge of each Church, then apart from the Council, there is nothing. If they, on the other hand, placed Elders in charge, then, even if they act together, the authority of such Council springs out of the authority of its members—and we have no more to discuss than what we had before, viz.: the authority of Elders—just as with the Apostles, they gained no powers from Councils, but possessed them individually. The fact that we do see the Apostles placing Elders as overseers in charge of flocks, and see no account or mention of any local Councils, settles the point, that the kind of local Councils that existed, if indeed any, were of the kind where authority rose out of that of the members; that is to say, they acted together or separately, as circumstances showed the way, and doubtless very often deliberated over and decided on measures before exercising their authority in either of the spheres of Rule, or Care of Souls.

Returning now to the starting point of this digression, we resume with the statement there made, that we read of no local Councils and we now add, that there certainly was nothing in the form of a Council between the order of Apostles, and regular workers, whose claims could come in to rival any that might be made for that special number of men whose status we have under consideration. Just as there was no Council above the Apostles, there was none between them and the next order. These Elders were overseers of the flocks, not compelled to rule or care for them by means of a Council, but doubtless, often making use of such expedients in order to win consent. They were territorially limited apparently. As for the Apostles, they were both over the flocks and the overseers, and the only authority above the latter, unless these special men came in between.

We come now to the difference between the Apostles and the Elders, in the matter of Ministration.

To Baptize, read, pray, marry, bury, bless, declare God's forgiveness to penitents, anoint and, most special of all their func-

tions, administer the Last Supper—these Ministerial powers of the Elders need not detain us. The discussion will occur over the Gift of the Holy Ghost. Unless the Apostles transcend the regulars in some such line there seems no special field reserved to them in the sphere of Ministration.

To every priesthood there had belonged nearly all the functions of ministration, but sometimes out of special function, and sometimes out of special occasion, which made the function special, there appeared the need of a higher ministrant than the regular. The Jewish High priest seems to have had a special function growing out of place and time—The Holy of Holies, and the day of Atonement. But, none the less, it was special, He alone could look upon the Shekinah above the Mercy-seat, which was the sign of the Holy Spirit of God, and bless them in His name, as he reappeared to the people. Now when the Mercy-seat and Holy of Holies and Temple all were destroyed, the Christians had a new temple, for each became the temple of the Holy Ghost, with the heart, as it were, the Holy of Holies, with its Mercy-seat. Such is the loving thought of all Christian people.

Now, if it be true that the Apostles alone could give the Gift of the Holy Ghost, we have a condition very remarkable. The Holy Ghost's descent upon men, is the very essence of the characteristic difference of the Church from all other institutions. That, just as that Shekinah could only be looked upon by the High priest, (who should then come out, and by blessing the people, enable them to share, as it were, the blessings just received by himself), so, too, the Apostles should be able to bless with the Holy Ghost in special way the people of God, is almost startling. Is it true?

Certainly there could not be a better choice of a function to make special. Its dignity, its character, as partaking of the very essence of the New Dispensation; its connection with the past not after the manner of a copy, but a growth,—a revelation of an esoteric principle; its closeness to both member and officer; its adaptability to general use while reserved for special occasion, and, finally, what is very important, its power for forcing the body of the Church to hold closely to the chief order of Authority (since its loss would be so great) witness to this.

Baptism, as *the door*, could hardly be selected, and the Lord's Supper growing out of the Passover, which had been so popular in its mode of celebration, seems also by no means, the proper function; while this, since the Lord, the Great High Priest, having offered the one sacrifice, had passed into the Holy of Holies in Heaven, to the glory of the great Shekinah, and from its portal was ever blessing the people with the Holy Ghost, appears to have the deepest appropriateness when made the special function of those Apostles to whom He said, "As my Father hath sent me, so send I you," and who must ever occupy an *ambassadorial* office before men.

As a matter of distinct statement, it is most certainly true that the Apostles did have the power of bestowing the Gift of the Holy Ghost, and it is also most reasonably plain that the regular order of Elder, did not have this power.

It is a power manifested in two ways—the gift to those ordained, and the gift to the members.

That the Gift of the Holy Ghost could be imparted by the Apostles is evident from the words, "And when Simon saw that through laying on of the Apostles' hands, the Holy Ghost was given, he offered them money"—and other passages well known. That this Gift was needed by, and was given to the many, is also proved abundantly in the above, and St. Paul's words "Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed?"

As to the Gift in Ordination, it will scarcely be denied by any, but it is distinctly asserted in the well known passages in the matter of Timothy, "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophesy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery," and "stir up the gift of God, which is in thee by the putting on of my hands."

The point that will come into dispute will be, as to whether it was the first order alone, that had this power as its peculiar function, in the line of Ministration. The point can be made very easily, because the passages of Scripture leave a certain vagueness hanging over the subject, so that if we rely on plain statement all difficulty cannot be removed. Nearly all Scripture needs a setting, however, for the clear view of its meaning.

That which first leads us to think of this function as exclu-

sive is, the passage which tells us how Philip, one of the seven, and afterwards called the Evangelist, goes on an Evangelizing mission to Samaria, and baptizes many; and that the Apostles then sent two of their numbers who laid their hands on them, so that they received the Holy Ghost. Now, if we know that Philip *was* an Elder, or as Evangelist had similar powers to those of the Elders, this passage would prove from both sides what we wish, but as we do not clearly know Philip's status, we can only be absolutely on sure ground from the Apostolic side, which is, that the Apostles sent two of their own number for the express purpose that the converts of Samaria might have the gift of the Holy Ghost. Yet in spite of the element of doubt, because of uncertainty concerning Philip's office, the passage in clear light gives the "vision" of the function as peculiarly Apostolic. Now, if the 'seven' were only Deacons, and if Deacons could not preach and baptize, then Philip who did both, had passed beyond that order, and the text, from his side, would be conclusive as well, but when some schools of Christian thought will neither allow that Deacons can preach and baptize, or that Philip was possessed of the functions of an Elder, the only way to *clinch* matters, would be to get at the difference between an Apostolic Evangelist, and the lower order of Evangelists—a subject too dark for elucidation, except as a corollary of other lines of argument.

Let us, however, look for a moment into the status of affairs in the Church at this period. The 'seven' are ordained apparently for the service of tables, five years after Pentecost. Barnabas has been all those years a member of the Church at Jerusalem. Immediately after Stephen's death there is a scattering of many "preaching the word," but the Apostles remained at Jerusalem. The chronology of these times indicates some two or three years for this period. Then the borders of the Church being enlarged and Saul converted, a new era dawns, in which for the first time, we read of Elders. It does not follow, of course, that they had not existed before. Barnabas, a Levite of the old system, who had given up all his property, had been long with the Apostles. And then, too, there was Barsabas, who had been ballotted for in the matter of the Apostolate. It is a scene in which many things can be surmised, and very little proved. But one of the

things apparently most clear is, that the power of bestowing the Gift of the Holy Ghost still remains vested in the Apostles. Philip's functions up to this time, are as high as any that have been mentioned, and he did not have the power. In a condition such as existed with many scattered preachers, and a concentration of Apostles at Jerusalem, who send out (in one case that we are told of, and presumably in others) two of their number to give this high gift, it is a most likely inference that they had such an object in view in remaining, at the central point. These things must go for what they are worth.

It is to be noted all through the accounts of the Acts and Epistles, that the Apostles tried to visit and keep in touch with all the Churches founded. We can allege several reasons—Supervision, Ordination and this Gift of the Holy Ghost. In the visitation of Samaria, we see the object which was made explicit was the 'Gift.' In St. Paul's visitations the two purposes of supervision and ordination are clear. But in the scene at Ephesus we also find him asking, "Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed?" Showing his care for this part of his office as well as the other two.

Finally, as we run over the Scriptures we do not find the order of Elders exercising the functions of the Gift. There is the case of Ananias and St. Paul, and there are the cases of the Certain Prophets, and Teachers at Antioch, and the Presbytery in the matter of Timothy, but unless these change the statement above, it is safe to say, that the Elders are not seen exercising the function.

Not every case of the "laying on of hands" must needs be taken as the 'Gift.' The form was the Jewish form of blessing and separation. The first Christians as Jews were accustomed to a broad use of it. The borrowing of it for special purposes did not preclude its still being used for more general ones. It was the Gift that was Christian, not the vehicle. This much it is but fair to say, but it plays a possible part only in the discussion of the case at Antioch.

As to the case of St. Paul, it must be confessed that there is nothing to lead the mind to the thought of Ananias being anything but a simple layman with the possible gifts of prophesy and

healing, except that St. Paul was baptized apparently by him. Ananias too, "put his hands on him" and said, "Jesus hath sent me, that thou mightest receive thy sight and be filled with the Holy Ghost." Yet it can well be, that, Ananias was more than a layman. Certainly, however, we have nothing to enable us to place him higher in respect to office. What is plain, is the special commission of Jesus for this act. It is noteworthy, that St. Paul touched the Apostles at no point; his conversion, baptism, ordination, Gospel, not one of them was derived through them; all was by *special Providences* through *irregular channels*. God seemed to set entirely aside the usual order, but to be careful to bring Himself into sight behind the extraordinary. Ananias could well have been a survival of the Universal order of Special Messengers for a Special work. Let those claim this instance who can make it fit into any system, or can tell just what Ananias was. Not only does it technically violate all the lines of all systems, but it does not even give us a "vision" of anything as existing in ordered state. Occurring when even in Samaria, the Church was inchoate, before we even know of there being any orders of Elders, and at Damascus, on the furthest border of the Church, far from the Apostles, who were centred in Jerusalem, it is, like the rest of St. Paul's strange calling and commission, an incident apart. As showing a possession of function by the order of Elders, it does not help us, and while it certainly seems to show, that at least, one person beside the Apostles could under special order by Christ, impart the Gift, yet it does not locate the function anywhere else.

The instance of the laying on of hands at Antioch, has long troubled the minds of men. St. Paul and St. Barnabas have already been exercising their Ministry, and St. Paul's Apostleship must be granted. These two were included in the direction of God, to separate for His work the two Missionaries. The task of deciding what this laying on of hands was, is very great. If St. Paul was made an Apostle by it, what was Barnabas made? If St. Paul was already an Apostle, what was this laying on of hands? The simplest supposition is, that there was a new *work*, a special departure to be solemnly consecrated for all time; and these men rising no higher in office, but broadening the scope

of their work, were sent forth with prayer and blessing. That St. Paul an Apostle should be present, would add nothing, because it was not an *official* rite, but a *religious* act, and the Holy Ghost was authority for all that was done. Every effort to read the passage along lines of official functions, is fraught with insoluble dilemma, and in a merely religious aspect, the story is so simple, that it is clearly better to read it in that way. At any rate there is no mention of the "Gift," and while there can be no denial of a blessing, yet St. Paul had already received the "Gift" according to the passage concerning Ananias, and being an Apostle, of course, had received it for his office besides (in case the former was the "Gift" to him as member). The use of the laying on of hands was too general for us to judge of the Gift, by the mention of the rite. It is true, its mention leads us to think of ordination, but we no sooner begin to discuss what these men were before this, and what they would become by means of ordination, than we are checked in our line of thought.

Then too, if it is an ordination, both St. Paul and Barnabas are mentioned as those to whom the message came saying, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul," and their share in an ordination shuts off the deductions apt to be made, if only Niger and Lucius and Manaen had been present. So then this passage while it leaves much in darkness, exhibits no more than that concerning Ananias, what the function of Elders were. Both are about St. Paul who so insistently claims no intervention of men for his office, and in both cases God Himself appears on the scene dictating the act, as a special thing apart from all else. What therefore at first sight seems to prepare us for a view of wide extension of the powers of ordination, becomes isolated even in respect to that conclusion, and in the matter of the point in hand, viz.: the possession of the function by the Order of Elders, by no means goes that far.

The case of Timothy, now remains; and the circumstances are these: On his second journey St. Paul travels by land, and reaches as his first objective point, the cities Derbe and Lystra, which were the last he had reached on his first journey. Here at Lystra he finds Timothy, who is called "a certain disciple," a term which conceals his status, though seeming to imply an ab-

sence of office, just as was the case of Ananias at Damascus. From Lystra, he carries Timothy with him, and only at Derbe, Lystra, Iconium, or Antioch was there any chance of finding any Elders, (the rest of his route being in a new country) so that if these had any part in the ordination of Timothy, it was at the beginning of the journey that he was ordained "to the presbyterate" or by the presbytery, as the words may be interpreted. Timothy is exercising a Ministry when the scene opens in Macedonia and Greece. When the 1st Epistle to the Thessalonians is written, Timothy is included with St. Paul and Silas as writing it, and some of the language used in that Epistle has the words "when we might have been burdensome, as the Apostles of Christ."

This Epistle was written from Corinth. Historically therefore, Timothy's elevation to office was directly under the eye of St. Paul, and it must also be allowed that a number of presbyters were plainly available, if it be taken that the words above, mean "by the presbytery." Since St. Paul says afterwards, "by the putting on of my hands," and we have, historically, this sight given us in Scripture, of the taking of Timothy at Lystra, and the using of him in the Macedonian and Grecian tour as a Minister, there can be no earthly reason to question St. Paul's part in any thing that was done about Timothy. The supposition of two ordinations, one by a presbytery and one by St. Paul, is left as a supposition incapable of settlement, but this presence of St. Paul as the agent in Timothy's entrance upon his work, is clear enough. It is of course possible that he was not present at a first putting on of hands though hardly likely, but there then must have been two occasions, which supposition carries consequences hardly to be admitted by those whose interests are in favor of one only.

"The laying on of the hands of the presbytery" seems the natural reading rather than "for the presbyterate." In the latter case all use of the passage to show that Elders possessed the power of ordination, would be at an end, so let the discussion proceed in the line that the hands "of the presbytery" is the true meaning. But if this be the meaning there is no use to object to it. The use of the word presbytery, speaking of the Elders collectively, casts no light on the powers of the Elders in a body as "joint powers" as distinguished from their powers separately—"several

powers." Should it be claimed that when St. Paul says "the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery," he meant not a number of officers of that order, but a definite body that held powers as body, which powers did not otherwise exist, there would be objection, for as was said above, that would mean that *between* Apostles and Elders, came a Council with definite and, as it were, constitutional powers, and would be a blow at the principle of personality. But on the understanding that no body with unique powers is referred to, the strongest advocate of Apostolic ordination would not object to Elders acting with the Apostles in any function whatsoever, short of ordination to the Apostolate. (It may be recalled how in ordination and confirmation, the order of Elders has been used both in East and West). Now, there is nothing in the passage to show that the "presbytery" was such a body endowed with powers as a body, beyond the mere use of the collective word "presbytery." Those who having a Jewish presbytery in mind argue for such a condition forget that a member of a Jewish presbytery had no function of office but that of sitting in Council. It was a governing body, and he a member. But in the Church it was not so. Functions of Ministry and rule and prophecy, and teaching were personal. The Council of Elders received its powers from its members and not the opposite. So, too, with the Roman Senate. A Senator was nothing outside the Senate. The body gave him power and opportunity. In the Church, an Elder was not a mere member of Council, but an officer entrusted with personal functions and responsibility in rule, teaching, preaching, and the care of Souls.

The simple interpretation of the situation is therefore that St. Paul took Timothy at Lystra and that he (and Silas perhaps) and the presbyters laid hand on him for sacred office of a degree which is not mentioned, but only to be surmised from other passages. It is distinctly apparent too, that by the laying on of hands, the "Gift" was given.

There are then three cases. That of Ananias is altogether apart—a something that fits into the other strange features of St. Paul's call and sending, but into nothing else that we know of. That of the Prophets and Teachers at Antioch shows us the presence of St. Paul, and the failure of the passage to mention the

Gift; while the fact of St. Paul, upon whom hands are there laid, being already an Apostle hems us around with dilemma and keeps us from conclusions. And, finally this case of Timothy is again one where an *Apostle* shares the function with lower officers.

So, to look over the whole field, we have several passages distinctly pointing to the "Gift" being exclusively a function of the Apostles, and one passage that sufficiently shows the order of Elders participating when an Apostle is present, while there is another where, if the function were an ordination, or in any sense the impartation of the "Gift," very much the same thing would be showed, except that it would be Prophets and Teachers ordaining, and *St. Paul* who is ordained. Lastly—we have one that apparently makes a simple layman impart the Gift. It is needless to say, that our whole conception of the "Gift" being the mark of the Apostolic office, as to functions of Ministry is shattered if the case of Ananias be not altogether a thing apart; but as for the rest, that conception can stand.

For, the powers of the Elders are delegated powers. The Apostles had all, and deliberately created a lower order that it might exercise some of their functions that were needed to be placed in more general use. The extent to which the lower, should share with them functions of office was to be determined by need and propriety. Something to be retained as special seems natural enough, but on the other hand, broad distribution of many powers had its advantages. Under such a view there could be just as well as not, an admission of the Elders to a share in an ordination to the presbyterial order, in connection with Apostles. To let them go higher and ordain to the predicated Apostolate would place the ordainers on the plane of the ordained (that is of course if present as a source of authority) and thus abolish any distinction they might wish to retain, but it would not be so in the case of the Eldership. Again, to allow the 2nd order to ordain by themselves with no Apostle present would be to make the 2nd order independent of the 1st, but if it must always be that a Saul (of Tarsus) be among the "Prophets and Teachers" and St. Paul among the presbyters at Lystra, that independence could not come. We have seen both in the matters of Rule and the Care of Souls, that the Apostles shared all things as much as they could, and

still retained enough to answer the demand of need and propriety; so, also here, they shared their functions to the very limit of rightfulness.

There remains one matter now to touch on before we close this chapter.

Because, when we read of the Holy Ghost being given, we read of certain miraculous outward manifestations of His presence, it might be thought that the laying on of hands (not in ordination but in the case of the general membership) was only for the sake of these outward signs. But a little reflection will show us how very much broader and deeper the purpose was. The Lord had promised to send the Comforter, that is to say, the Paraclete, or Ally, of whom the Bible speaks in the term of *perpetual* blessing, saying "The Communion (or Fellowship) of the Holy Ghost be with you all." And it was on the day of Pentecost, that St. Peter speaking to the multitudes said "Repent and be baptized every one of you * * * * and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise (our Lord's of course) is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call." Now, there is, of course, no limit of time any more than there is of space. "To all even as many as our Lord shall call" is about as broad as any promise of the Gospel. Then the Apostles went forth, and we read of the "Gift" being bestowed in Samaria, Ceasarea, and Ephesus; and as late as the end of St. Paul's life, he is writing to Timothy to "stir up the gift which is in thee by the laying on of my hands," which even though it be said of a Ministerial blessing, is capable of throwing light on the whole matter of the extent and meaning of the "Gift." The miraculous signs that accompanied the "Gift" were outward manifestations of a Divine Presence, but we can not forget that the Presence was for Comfort in the sense of strength—for fellowship, and that, long after miracles should cease, even to the end of the world, the Word of blessing would be "The fellowship of the Holy Ghost be with you all." So that we can not take the "signs" as the *limits* of the Gift, but as manifestations in measure of its reality.

To be sure, in a sense, when the Holy Ghost came on Pentecost, He came to the whole Church, but the fact that the Apostles

made the Gift special by a rite of laying on of hands, opens to us the view that each member could appropriate the blessing in a special way. Thus St. Paul thought the twelve at Ephesus had been baptized rightly, and so asked them about their reception of the "Gift." To his surprise, he learned of their knowing only John's baptism. Indeed, we can conceive of these three positions; the Holy Ghost being given to each one, as a gift to him separately; the Holy Ghost being given to the collective body, the whole church, and thus belonging to all who are members of the body; the Holy Ghost being given to the whole Church, and *then* to each one separately, so that he might come to the actual obtainment of his heritage.

Now the sight of the Apostles specially giving the Gift after the Spirit had come to the whole body on the day of Pentecost, shows us that this idea of a common heritage and an individual obtainment of a rightful portion, is the true conception. The first is precluded by the Pentecostal effusion and its appropriate thoughts. The second, by the acts of the Apostles on several occasions. The last, fits in with all the narrative, and the whole history and philosophy of Common gifts made special.

Thus then the order of Elders was local, and had Rule and Care of souls over *Congregations*, with functions of Preaching and Teaching limited in no way that we know of, while their functions of Ministration extended all through those of worship, baptizing, administering the Lord's Supper, and reached as far as joining with an Apostle in laying on of hands in ordination (presumably that of an Elder, not an Apostle) such as that of Timothy at Lystra. Rule over Elders, final settlement of causes, and ordination without an Apostle or ordination of an Apostle, seems to be the sphere from which they were excluded, and there is not a line to indicate that they, the Elders, gave the "Gift" to members just baptized whatever the "Gift" is taken to be.

The Apostles gave the "Gift," ordained separately, and too, all orders including Apostles, ruled over Elders, and had fullest powers in the care of Souls, including the power of appeal necessarily and specifically.

Councils were special machinery, in no wise like a Senate or Sanhedrim, but derived, and did not bestow powers. Only one is

mentioned as including Apostles; and Elders participated in that. As to local Councils, they are not mentioned, but no principle is encountered to preclude them.

As to Deacons, there is the mystery of mysteries. It may as well be said here as anywhere, that there was a "deaconship of tables" and a "deaconship of the Word" but as to whether the Deacon of Scripture participated in both services can not be determined without assumptions. There was no reason why they should not have preaching as one of their functions, and it looks as though they did. The Deacon was an assistant plainly, and having given his life to sacred things, the enjoyment and usefulness of preaching would have been only a gain, without drawback to the Church. If St. Philip and Stephen were true deacons, the question would be settled, but that is just where the *proof* halts. However being an assisting order, with no hint that any functions of Rule or Care of Souls belonged to them, their precise niche in the general scheme does not need further discussion here.

CHAPTER IV

Discussion of the Special Order

If the Apostolate passed away, what became of the Special Functions—the oversight of Elders, the powers of appellate jurisdiction, and the bestowal of the “Gift?”

They could not be lost. This is evident from the nature of these functions. It would be superfluous to attempt to give proof for so evident a truth. All that is needed is to call attention to the difference between *those apostolic characteristics which the men brought into the office, and those which the office bestowed on the men*. Matthias had been selected because he had “kept company” with the eleven from the first of the Lord’s Ministry, and was a witness of the Resurrection; but these things he brought into the office. What the office bestowed upon him, is the point. It cannot be contended of course for a moment, that after the death of the first Apostle other men could be found who could bring to the office these personal qualifications. If the Special functions could only be bestowed on men who had seen the Lord in the flesh, etc., then the time would inevitably come when the Special Functions must lapse. But why should this be the case? We can understand how it would enhance the functions to have the personal qualifications, but that they should be the ‘*sine qua non*’ is another matter.

In the first age, it was so entirely rational to secure this enhancement of prestige and value; in another, it was impossible. The fact that the Eleven made the point of finding a man who would bring to the office such a qualification can be interpreted, to be sure, to mean that the qualification was essential, but it need by no means be so interpreted. The functions that would come with the office can very easily be conceived as given to men who did not have such personal qualifications as that of knowing the Master. Again, there is no difficulty at all in understanding how such a qualification could apply to a choice between those present then, and yet not become a reason for the death of the office under other conditions. We can choose our interpretation

as we will, however, if only we see the distinction between the qualifications possessed before the office is given, and those powers which the office adds. The personal qualification must lapse and the Special Functions can not. We can not think of ordination, appeal, and supervision, lost to the Church because there could no longer be found men who had been with the Lord in all His work. If not bestowed on other men, they must yet exist somewhere.

If the Special Functions could not be lost, where are they located?

It is very easy to see that the following courses were open to adoption—theoretically at least.

To bestow the Special Functions on a Special Order above that of Elders, thus practically making their own order in regard to functions permanent, even though certain things other than functions could not be continued and other distinctions might come in.

To institute a *body* out of the officers already existing, which body would be the seat of the Special Functions.

To institute a *body* out of all elements both officers and members, which body would administer the Special Functions.

A little reflection will show us that these practically exhausted the possibilities: Others might be conceived, but not under the conditions in view. For instance anything like the papal theory negatives the whole condition of the Apostolic College that we have treated as existing. The papal theory posits a papacy from the *very first*. So while as a possibility the Apostles could in view of their death have bestowed the Special Functions on one man instead of on an order or a body, there is no use taking up time with such a mere and unalleged possibility.

Again, some arrangements of officers for the exercise of the Special Functions, different from that of the one we have supposed, might be conceived, but that too need not detain us.

The three courses in fact reveal two lines first, and then one of these divided into two making the three in all. For, the choice is first as to leaving the Special Functions to an order of officers higher than Elders, or to some *body* of men, as distinguished from an *order*. Then the component parts of said body can differ so

as to be either officers alone, or officers and members together. Thus the Episcopal, Presbyterian and Congregational theories spring out of the different conceptions as to the location of the Special Functions after the Apostles' death. But the Presbyterian and Congregational make common cause against the Episcopal in contending for a body as against an order, though, as we shall see, the Congregational greatly modifies the Special Functions.

Before going into the evidence, let the ideas that these words *order* and *body* stand for be made as explicit as possible. Enough has already perhaps been brought out, but the greatest clearness ought to be focussed at this particular point.

If the Special Functions are bestowed upon an order, it would mean that each member or unit of that order would possess them personally as much as if he were the only one. There being several or many entails the accommodating of his powers to their possession of equal powers, and all manner of adjustments and combinations can ensue, provided the powers of the order be secured to each one of the order. But if on the other hand, the Special Functions are bestowed upon a body (or set of bodies in fact), then it is the body that as a body possesses the powers. The members of the body only come into consideration as parts of a body, and however much possessed of other powers, are powerless in respect of these particular powers except in the body. Thus the *bodies* practically become an *order*. They have as units particular powers and that, too, in common with other units of the same class, and they must adjust their exercise of power to all the rest. They are built up units, and not personal units, but there comes into play an order of units just as much as when the units are personal. So then in our discussion we must bear in mind that after all the Special Functions are given to a Special Order—only in the Presbyterian theory the members or units of the order are bodies, not personalities—things made of men, not men in simplicity. The contest resolves itself into one as to personality and impersonality. If the Special Functions were given to the Elders personally, then by the fact of these powers, the Elders would have been raised above the general Elder-level. If given to certain of them, not all, then those certain ones would have

been raised above the rest. The Presbyterian solution therefore is the supposition of a set of bodies, receiving and exercising a power of ordination, appeal, and rule, over Elders, just as in the Episcopal theory there is a set of *men* equipped with these Special Functions. Thus we clearly see that the issue is, between personality and impersonality. Something above Elders there must be. With one theory it is men, with the other it is bodies of men. These bodies of men act like a Senate; until the decree is made up there is nothing; the act of the body alone possesses authority. The Congregational theory differs in that the bodies are differently constituted, and there is no attempt to organize bodies higher than the Congregation.

We come now to examine the evidence to see whether the Special Functions were given to an order of men, or an order of bodies, and whether these bodies were of the Presbyterian or Congregational character. The first to be taken for test is the Episcopal theory of a Special set of men.

There are no less than seventy-eight texts where the word "Apostle" occurs, and in seventy of these the meaning is undisputed, but in the remaining eight, there is less certainty. In seven of these eight, others than the great Apostles are called apostles, and such application of the word, at once calls for a study of the meaning, so that it might be seen whether they were called Apostles because possessed of the functions of that office, or whether the word is used in some other sense. The eighth text shows clearly that there can be a larger sense. It is the one in which the Master says at the time of the Last Supper, "The Servant is not greater than his Lord, neither he that is sent greater than he that sent him." Of course the pointed choice of the illustration is apparent, but yet the word still seems to have the use, others than the Master were wont to give it. In his mouth 'Apostle' might mean his chosen twelve, but to all the users of language, it had a general meaning (After all He doubtless used Aramean not Greek, but we are going by the Greek translation and presume it correct even in the matter of this shade of meaning), so that no one can shut it off from that idea. Nor is there any matter depending on it. Our study of the text allows the conclusion that there is a general meaning with

a pointed application due to the fact that the Lord had chosen the general word as a name for His special officials.

There now remains seven texts to be examined. There are two concerning Barnabas; two concerning false apostles; one concerning Silas and Timothy; one concerning the companions of Titus when he is sent to Corinth; one concerning Epaphroditus. In other words Barnabas, Silas, Timothy, Luke (not certainly but most probably) Epaphroditus and certain very powerful antagonists of St. Paul are called apostles, that is to say men who were in the very front rank as workers, the very chiefest of all that we know are so-called, and it is necessary to see if the word used to designate them be used generally or restrictedly. The very prominence of the men to whom the term is applied in every case leads directly to the initial thought that there was a rank of office as well as general suitability for the use of the word apostle, in their case.

The text in Corinthians concerning false apostles, throws a great deal of light, and we will discuss it first. It is in 2nd Corinthians, that St. Paul is driven to vindicate his own authority and assert in unqualified terms his full apostleship. This was, because of trouble made by certain ones, of whom he says "such are false apostles, deceitful workers transforming themselves into the apostles of Christ." Now, how could such a thing be? how are we to understand the rise of such a condition that St. Paul's apostleship must be asserted in order to meet the claim of apostleship on the part of others? A conflict in the region of apostleship drawing from St. Paul the words, "I am in nothing, behind the very chiefest apostles" seems very strange, but there cannot be the slightest doubt, let us remember, about the issue being one concerning *authority*, for the light is as full and clear as can be: St. Paul attacks them as "false apostles," and says that he himself is "in nothing behind the very chiefest apostles." The circumstances of all the situation were these. The Council of Jerusalem had been held, but its decrees had not become known. Some preachers and officers had gone from Jerusalem before the issue that led to the Council had developed. We read of how the Apostles "sent forth Barnabas to go as far as Antioch" and of a great scattering of the preachers of the Gospel on every

side. The letter of the Council says "That certain which went out from us." Some of these pressed too far towards Europe, to hear of the Council. It was at *Antioch* that the issue about the Jewish ceremonial laws arose, and it was these very laws of Judaism, that led to the trouble at Corinth, and elsewhere, but *Antioch* was near, and St. Paul was there to act. After the Council settled the question, it became impossible to reach all those who had scattered to do the work, consequently at many points St. Paul encountered men who preached a Gospel in the swathing bands of Jewish ceremonial. This much is very clear.

When we come to consider the rank of these men, we have as guiding points these considerations. The apostles sent out men to preach, but not as mere bearers of letters or tidings. The word emissaries is wholly misleading. What troubled St. Paul about these men was not a message from the apostles at Jerusalem but that these men laid claim to *office*, and to the same office that he himself held. If they had claimed a message, he could have answered with the decree of the Council and the words of the letter "to whom we gave no such commandment," but it was not a war of messages. Authority was at stake. They claimed an office "Apostles of Christ." He could only meet the issue by such an appeal to his history, his sufferings, his visions, his life, his own office that he must needs stand before the Corinthians unquestionable whatever these others might be. Now what were they? "False Apostles" might mean false messengers from the Apostles, but "Apostles of Christ" gives it another aspect. Preachers they must have been, and of such large authority, and of so great earnestness and ability, as to bring about the condition we see. They were officers, certainly, but most assuredly officers of larger scope of power than Elders, to have had such influence as to have raised issues at all with St. Paul, and to have become such serious obstacles in his path.

That they were false in that they had intruded into an office not theirs is not to be contemplated. Their falseness was in their Gospel, rather. Having come forth at the time that Barnabas, we will say, went to *Antioch* to go as far as opportunity allowed, establishing Churches and caring for them, they preached, as best they knew, the Gospel, and not knowing of the Council, and its

degrees, nor having the spirit of St. Paul, they warped it to Judaism. When they met St. Paul, they refused to change, and the issue came. Evangelists of high authority we might call them. At any rate there can be no mistaking them for Elders, or mere bearers of tidings, or impostors.

To be the last, would in fact imply opportunity to pose as an Apostle—would imply the very extension of the office, which is resisted by some. In the time of St. John's later life, he speaks of "them which say they are apostles, and are not," and here the natural interpretation is that he speaks of impostors to widespread office. St. Paul's manner of contention with his opponents precludes our thinking of them as out and out impostors, but there is nothing in the passage in Revelation to bar the idea. In the passage in Revelation we must either infer an apostolate widely existing, thus offering the chance for impostors, or translate the word "messengers." But it is hard to see how the idea of messengers would fit the facts. If the late date for the book be taken, the great Apostles are dead. If the earlier date even be taken, then Ephesus has had the long ministry of St. Paul, and the subsequent one of Timothy not very long before, and was surely fortified against those early preachers, who went out before the Council, or (if any insist upon the idea of emissary) those early messengers. To try these apostles and "find them liars" implies something more than the examination of a messenger; it rather seems to indicate testing by their fruit. The word apostle again seems to mean something like an Evangelist of high authority.

Undoubtedly if there was in the early Church an order of men who whatever their name, did the work of an Evangelist with powers higher than that of Elders, they must have caused trouble, if only because of imitation. Still the Master Himself had sent the Apostles into just such a work, and so it must have seemed natural to them to send men from place to place. The chance of imposture and wrong preaching, as time went on, must have been great. That there were Evangelists, we know as a fact, and it may be, they were called "apostles" when of a certain order.

Doubtless St. John like St. Paul judged these men who claimed apostleship by their message rather than by their ordina-

tion. Both these grand leaders were terribly severe against heresy. St. Paul fought Judaism, and St. John the Gnostic or Hellenizer to the death. It is in their writings that high officers are deemed false officers because preachers of heresy. But if the two texts above treating of false apostles suggests the condition of things in the period when the Church began to extend its work, just as well in the remaining five we see the same suggestion.

Let us take that concerning Epaphroditus for instance. "My companion in labor and fellow soldier but your apostle" are the words. The translation "messenger" fits admirably, but the circumstances and other words indicate that this "messenger" was so much more, that a higher meaning for the word apostle comes into view. For all that Timothy occupied such a high sphere of work in Ephesus, St. Paul called him back to be with him, to minister to him. Titus too, between Cretan and Dalmatian ministries seems to have been with him. So also Epaphroditus had gone to minister to St. Paul. He could well therefore be more than a messenger. And we read he was St. Paul's "companion in labor, and fellow soldier," and was high in the work at Philippi. We cannot drag the text by force into the higher meaning, but it may well mount there of its own accord. "Your apostle" may really be a term of adequate honor.

In the case of the companions of Titus, the word can again most naturally mean Messengers, but St. Paul's description of them shows them usually engaged in large and general work, and if the word apostle had technical application to men of this larger work, it could easily fit this case.

There were two of them. Of one, St. Paul says, "whose praise is in the Gospel throughout all the Churches" and this is thought to be St. Luke. Evidently he was not an Elder both from the view we gain from the words "all the Churches" and the circumstances surrounding St. Paul's work at this time. The other is described as one "whom we have oft-times proved diligent in many things" and gives us the idea that he was one of those travelling with St. Paul, as Silas, Timothy, Titus and Luke travelled with him. So while their work on this specific mission was the care of the Collection, there is no doubt that these "Apostles of the Churches, and glory of Christ" were important men

of large work. From one standpoint, simple "messengers," and from another, having rank and dignity.

The passage in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, speaks of St. Paul, Silas, and Timothy as Apostles, "When we might have been burdensome as the apostles of Christ," inclines us still more to the idea of some order of workers called apostles who transcended the Elders. The idea of Messenger sinks almost out of view in the passage, and with St. Paul known to be an Apostle in fullest sense, these others included with him must share to some extent the allusion to his office. The compulsive force of logic is hardly to be appealed to here, anymore than in many other places, for we are seeking clear vision, rather than logical compulsions, but certainly the passage does give us vision—we seem to see three men, far from the Twelve, whom the circumstances of their mission reveal as engaged in very large work, and on account of this dignity of functions called Apostles.

There remain only the two texts in the book of Acts, where St. Paul and St. Barnabas are called Apostles, and in these, even if we are able to lug in a sense of "messenger" or "sent men," yet the other more technical idea is the simple and natural meaning to a degree almost of certainty.

The eight texts that seem to differ from the other seventy are therefore seen to be quite capable of agreement. That is to say, they hold the word apostle to a technical meaning quite easily and naturally. To be sure they do not compel it to that technical content, but they by no means spill the technical. Even in the text "the servant is not greater than his Lord," nor the "apostle than he that sent him," the technical meaning gives the pith to the illustration. Of the seven others, those concerning false apostles and Silas, Timothy and Barnabas clearly lean to the side of the technical; and of the remaining two, the balance is about equal—at first flush, seemingly plainly to mean mere messenger, but on closer examination appearing quite to admit the higher idea.

Finally, it may be said, that the use of the word apostle had to be discussed, and while its application to so many others may at first surprise us, yet that may be because we had combined in our mind the personal qualities and official functions of the

twelve, and when the Scriptures in applying the word to others, had in view only the latter, we were not prepared for the change. It may be, that now we are ready to pass from the study of the *Word* Apostle to the study of the *Work* of certain men, so as to see if when we strip the word of the personal phase, we can yet find the official.

There can be no doubt but that in all study of Church Polity in the Scriptures themselves, there stands directly across the path, the rock of the Ministry of Timothy and Titus, in their respective temporary fields. St. Paul writes so explicitly about their work that when we have shadows elsewhere, we have broadest daylight thrown upon the page at this point.

Crete was a densely populous island, with upwards of a hundred cities, and Ephesus was a city with a highly developed Christian work, and many Elders. The fields were therefore very large. Their powers in these large fields was very great. Most explicitly we see these men given the functions of Rule over Elders, Appellate jurisdiction, and Ordination: We are compelled to see at once in them the very thing we are seeking—successors of the Apostles in regard to official functions, unless it be, that because their stay in these fields was temporary, or because they may have acted as deputies of St. Paul, they are not to be so classed. But even if these powers were temporary, yet their possession shows both the trend of the Apostle's mind, and the possibility of apostolic functions being bestowed on others.

If the possibility to give at all existed, the adoption of such a plan for permanence was only a question of wisdom. That tremendous bridge—the possibility, at any rate was crossed, for St. Paul gave. But the assertion of temporary functions in the realm of *Ministration* is the assertion of something new, in the world. It is no more a custom in religious matters, than in military, to make degrees of office temporary. A Captain may be given a Colonel's work temporarily, but if given a Colonel's commission it is by common custom a permanent elevation to that rank. And so too ever and everywhere the raising to highest functions of *Ministration* is by means of the bestowal of higher office. Deposition is of course admissible, but that is not in question here. *Degradation* is as injurious in one sphere of grades as

in another. Although extent of command or work may often be changed, the office itself is universally a permanent thing. And again, historically, Timothy's office is seen as far as the 2nd Epistle, written just before St. Paul's death, while of Titus it is said, in the same Epistle, that he had departed to Dalmatia, where his work could well be as large as in Crete.

If on the other hand, the work in their respective fields might be changed for work in other fields, yet a change in their functions of office in the other can in no wise be asserted, unless there were evidence of some positive nature.

Yet after all, the idea of temporary office in the case of these men rests upon the supposition that they only had these powers as deputies. St. Paul had said, "For this cause left I thee in Crete" and the whole tone of the three Epistles shows a sort of supremacy over them. And certainly, it may be granted that in a sense they were deputies of St. Paul, but let the analysis of their deputyship be made. Did St. Paul for instance take for deputy one who was equal in functions of office to the work, or did he take one whose office was unequal? The idea of deputyship in the sphere of *personal* Authority, and that of Authority of *office* is very different. The functions of *Ministration* require the office to be there. St. Paul would not take a mere layman and say "ordain Elders in every city" though he might well select one who had the right to ordain, and use him in his own stead for these functions in Crete, or raise him to the degree before he went. The very first thing we must posit in a case of deputy *Ministration* is, the sufficiency of the deputy in the matter of office. And in the case before us, we have only to ask ourselves if Timothy who at the time of the 2nd Epistle had these functions lost them on the death of St. Paul soon after, in order to see whether the deputyship of this officer was that of a man who did, or did not, possess the office which he exercised. Personal authority can be just dropped oftentimes, but official authority requires a consideration of the office on which it rests. Now St. Paul's mind was on "the Gift of God *which is in thee* by the putting on of my hand" and he bade Timothy "stir it up," so there is in the 2nd Epistle enough to negative both the idea of temporariness and function by deputy.

What we may well see in the case of Timothy and Titus is

this:—The Apostles unable to go everywhere at the time of need sent men in their stead, and gave them the necessary powers. These powers were functions of office; for the men must go in the name of Christ as well as of the particular apostle, or apostles, who sent them in his, or their, stead. Timothy, with the “Gift of God *in him* by the laying on of my hands” could be selected by St. Paul to go in his place.

Now the powers that Timothy could exercise at a distance from St. Paul, he could certainly exercise when by his side, so that we are brought to see the cases of Silas and Barnabas in this light also. Barnabas seems not to have had his authority in anywise as a deputy of St. Paul, (and it is not so asserted by anyone) but he had the same powers as Timothy at the very least. After we have seen Timothy and Titus at work, and read what is said of Silas as the companion of St. Paul, there seems no reason to deny to him functions equal to those of the other two. Why could there not be others also? See the number of men St. Paul gathered and used in large work, calling them to him, and sending them from him. Deputies they are, “companions in labor,” fellow soldiers,” men “whom we have oftentimes proved diligent in many things,” “whose praise is in the Churches.” We can only *infer* their powers, but when we find the conditions calling for work similar to that of Timothy and Titus, and we find these two with the powers which are specified, we can not shut ourselves up to a denial of a natural use of men after the pattern seen by express exposition: These men are not doing the work of Elders; that much is very plain. And they require large authority for the work in which they are engaged. Then too, they are associated with Timothy and Titus most intimately at this very period of St. Paul’s care of all the Churches.

One other man there is, whose work and name is that of an apostle, St. James the Just; but unfortunately it is disputed whether he was the same as St. James the Less, or different. If he, “the Lord’s brother” was a different man, then such havoc is played to two of the contending theories, that they would be almost or quite driven off the field. In early days, it was perfectly clear, who this James was. The Scriptures assume indeed that the description “The Lord’s brother” was sufficient. (And still

it is plain enough). But as long as there is a dispute about *identity* nothing can be done in an analysis like this without going into the merits of that dispute. This would take us far afield. If on the other hand, however, he is identical with St. James the Less, one of the twelve, there is another horn of the dilemma for those who oppose the Episcopal theory; which other horn again, it is not within our view to touch on here. It is sufficient to say here, that the *great* probability is that the two were different men, and St. James the Just, was one of the very first instances of men other than the Twelve being given functions of office similar to those of the twelve, viz.: Rule over Elders, Appellate Jurisdiction, and the Right of Ordination.

The strength of the position then is this—Having seen clearly the powers of the Elders and the Apostles and the difference of functions between them, we find in Scripture a number of men who after the Apostles bear the greatest names belonging to the early Church—James, Barnabas, Silas, Timothy, Titus, Luke, Epaphroditus and others, and these men have a work of such a general nature that it is impossible to see in them the class of workers known as Elders. The work of some of them is given so plainly, that we know just what it was. We would call these men, (all except James) Evangelists from their work, and supposing there could be Evangelists of two orders, as to their functions (a proposition all in the dark, however), we would call them Evangelists of the highest order. However that might be, when we come to look into the functions of these men we can not class them as Elders in functions, any more than Elders in work. The functions of some are clearly seen, and the association of these men in work with others and the similarity of conditions around all of them, obliges us to see men of a class to whom the denial of the same functions would be baseless (Silas and Timothy for instance; or Titus and Luke). To all of these men whom we have named, the term Apostle is given in Scripture, and while there *may be* a lesser meaning attached, yet even if the word be taken as of high sense it but describes the functions we see some of them exercising.

Taking both name and functions and studying the matter closely, we find that James, Barnabas, Timothy, Titus, and almost beyond doubt, Silas also have functions we have seen to be

apostolic, viz: Rule over Elders, Appeal, and Right of Ordination. (Silas and Timothy left in Macedonia, as Titus was afterwards left in Corinth—to *set in order*—is no stretch of imagination, but an inherent probability).

This coincidence of name and functions—but most emphatically the existence of the functions—gives us the plain sight of a class of men just filling the place in question. Besides these, we have in two places mention of false apostles, as though there were a wide field for men of that rank. From all this, we infer a set of men whose functions of office enabled them to act as deputies of the Apostles, or labor by their side in the same class of work (and Barnabas even leaves St. Paul and goes to Cyprus on his own evangelical mission). Evangelical in work and apostolical in function they are, and constitute a Special Order.

Nothing is more natural than that the Apostles should have provided for the great work by endowing men with adequate functions. Their own position was perfectly secure, and the class of local workers known as Elders could not possibly suffice for the task before the Church. When then we see St. Paul and all these others engaged in the larger work, and with the larger powers, it seems too natural to occasion any wonder. The seventy had gone out in our Lord's time with the very same powers as the Twelve, so there was even precedent for such a course. Furthermore, we have an insight into the position of St. Paul, who is not added to the Twelve, but is brought into this order of workers of apostolic functions, yet not as the rest were, by men, but by the direct commission of God, and in such wise that no thought of deputyship. (Even Barnabas was sent out by the Twelve to go as far as Antioch) could attach to him, but he was "not a whit behind the very chiefest apostles."

The next step is to examine the Scriptures to see what evidence there is for the view that the Special Functions—Rule over Elders, Appeal and Ordination, were bestowed on a body composed of the Officers.

The first thing of course, is to find the body, or bodies, and next to discuss their powers. In the very forefront, stands the Council of Jerusalem, and while this is a body much higher than any other likely to be alleged, from the fact that it contained the

Apostles, yet we could hardly pass, to consider others, until this had been discussed. We have already seen something about it.

This Council was composed of the Apostles, James the Just, and the Elders of the Jerusalem Church; and the commissioners of Antioch, St. Paul and St. Barnabas, had some kind of standing in it. Also it would seem, the brethren were involved to some extent. It was in all probability a Special Council; but the holding of this, somewhat inclines us to see a custom of which this is an instance. To go so far however in our inferences as to say that the Church of Jerusalem was regularly governed by such a body, and the decision of some such body was necessary, is to strike directly at the personal powers of the Apostles as well as to go far beyond Scripture. The first thing we must posit about the Church at Jerusalem is, that there was power there, adequate to all issues without any semblance of a Council. To find the existence of anything like a governing body at Jerusalem whose acts and decisions took the place of the personal authority there present in the Apostles, requires very different evidence. It is only an inference that there were any other meetings of a Council at all; and to infer their regular assembly with full control over all affairs is a great deal beyond warrant.

This Council has been always treated as a Special or Occasional Council because it considered affairs beyond the bounds of Jerusalem, and in that light it leaves untouched the question of the government of local matters.

When we ask if this Council had more power than an Apostle, we are obliged to say that since the Apostles personally received every power possible, it was impossible for the body to have more than they. As has been said, it was possible to gain weight by unanimity of action, but not power. If a Council had more power than the Apostles, then, if Civil conditions prevented a Council, power would be lost. St. Paul was soon cut off from Apostolic Councils, but never from apostolic powers. We are sooner or later obliged to face the question whether there was anything above the Apostles.

Of course it is somewhat of a mystery how the affairs of that tremendous Church at Jerusalem were administered. The Apostles were there for years, all together, and then they came and went, and then it seems as if James the Just, remained in charge. Of

any governing *body* we read not a word. As long as any Apostle was there, the Special Functions of Rule over Elders, Appeal, and Ordination, certainly were vested in him. We can easily infer any number of occasions when all orders came together "to consider of this matter" without ever thinking of the Special Function being lodged in such a body. And that, after all, is the question. When we have found even a governing body, we have yet to investigate it as to these functions. When too we have assumed a body clothed with such powers as Timothy and Titus had, we have to reconcile the possession of such powers at one and the same time both by a body and personally by men.

The Council at Jerusalem is the only instance of a body of officers considering Church affairs that we have specifically mentioned in Holy Writ, but as has once before been said, there were several Elders to one Church in a number of instances at the very least. No one dare go so far as to say in all, for not only is there no evidence, but such an abundance of fit material is contrary to natural conditions in that heathen world, and St. Paul is seen to be strict in his instructions to Timothy and Titus on this point. He ordained Elders in the Cities he passed through as many as he could, probably, and that is as far as we can go. But on the whole it may be said that the preliminary condition of numbers was present for the enablement of such a formation as a body of Elders to be made in very many Churches, even if not in all.

This being the case, the next step is to get sight of some such body, so that we can see upon what lines it is organized. The mere presence of several Elders throws very little light upon the nature of the manner in which they would organize a Council, even supposing they should organize one at all. There were several Apostles at Jerusalem, and yet we have no thought of their forming a Council with powers above those which each one had individually. So, it is of the utmost importance to examine some body that we have brought into view in the Scriptures, and study the principles of its organization. Did the body they organized, supposing they did form one, transcend the members in powers, or only have such as belonged already to the Elders? Of course if they themselves brought it into being, the powers of the creature could not transcend those of its creators, (except as born out of

consent, if not authority), but if the Apostles organized these bodies, they could give them powers above that of the component Elders. All these things we must try to see from some actual body. There is especially too, one power we must try to trace—the power of combining with other similar bodies, and producing thereby a body with yet higher powers than the first set, (Appeal for instance); for if there be no set of men, (after the Apostles died), above these local bodies, or no set of bodies, there would be only a type of Congregational Polity left.

It is thought that a view of such a body is given in the passage where St. Paul says to Timothy “Neglect not the gift—given thee—with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery.” We can not of course tell whether by “the presbytery” St. Paul alludes to the *order* of presbyters, or the *body* of presbyters; or the body of presbyters collectively but loosely, or as an organized *body* constituting a presbytery something like the Jewish Council or Sanhedrim which condemned our Lord, and commissioned Saul to make havoc of the Christians at Damascus (for the only three uses of the word *presbuterion* in the New Testament are in these passages), but we can take the last, and go upon that line as far as it will carry us.

It is a little appalling to find the Sanhedrim the type of Church Government—to think of the Master taking the very Council which condemned Him, as the model for His own institutions, but there is certainly room for differences. The Synagogues among the Gentiles were more or less on this pattern also. Let us suppose then, that the words of St. Paul “the presbytery” show us that in all these Churches where there were several Elders, there was an organized body called “the Presbytery.”

The points now to get at are these—whether, 1st, this body transcended its members in functions, and 2ndly, had the power of creating larger bodies who would be heirs of the Special Functions: in so far as these Presbyteries did not possess them.

This body, or order of presbyters at Lystra (presumably Lystra) ordained, but the element of uncertainty for us, is the presence of St. Paul; and also whether it was by right of the individual powers of the Elders, or by a power of the body alone. If St. Paul was present, the case falls. If the individual Elder had

the ordaining power, it only proves that Elders could ordain. It is only on the supposition that the body acted without St. Paul, and by powers vested in it as a body above its component parts, that this one of the Special Functions is seen possessed.

How to get at any indication of the right solution of the point is the trouble. The analogy of the Jewish Presbyteries will help us, but little, for the source of their authority was the people, and they confessedly are not an exact type.

When we come to Appeal it is appeal from just such a body as this presbytery, that is in question. When we investigate Rule over Elders we have to consider that if the Rule was only that of a presbytery over one of its members, we can get no further than Rule in the single Church, possibly single Congregation (Lystra hardly had more at this time). Even then though a presbytery be inferred from St. Paul's language, the Special Functions are not provided for.

As to the question raised by seeing Timothy and Titus equipped with these Special Functions while the Elders of Ephesus and of Crete are all there, little need be said except that it exists.

To conclude then, the presence of many Elders does not possibly mean any thing more than reason for consultation or division of work, but *may be* taken as indicative of consolidation. The mention of "the presbytery" may not mean more than an allusion to the rank of the men ordaining Timothy, but may be taken as speaking of a regular body called a Presbytery. The relation of members to the whole, and powers of the whole as compared to those of the members, is an unsolved problem. The vesting of the Special Functions in this body is unseen, and except in the case of Ordination, impossible. The existence of any bodies above a Presbytery, and the scheme of their powers is wholly dependent on some other line of proof than this text, in 1st Timothy.

The Council of Jerusalem might be thought to convey some ideas of such higher bodies, wherein representatives of the lower could form a body endowed with the Special Functions, but as we have seen, that Council was formed on other lines, and was typical of nothing that came after—formed a precedent for nothing save the right of Councils to exist.

Lastly:—If the ground of Authority were shifted so as to

spring out of the people, instead of from the Apostles the existence of a Presbytery would have more meaning, but our Analysis has seen Christ giving Authority to the Apostles, and up to the time of Lystra they had not yet given it away. And besides, we are seeking the seat of the Special Functions, which are the Apostolic functions, and they could hardly come to Apostles from above, and to others from below.

The Third proposition—a body composed of officers and members does not square with the Congregational actual theory, which in fact does not admit of the Special Functions, but there was no need to mar the logical idea by stating the actual at that time: It were logical to say the bodies could contain both members and officers as well as officers alone, but the Congregationalists contend for no bodies above the congregation, and that cuts off Appeal at once. Furthermore, Ordination changes its nature from being the conferring of an office (and the grace for its exercise) to being an invocation of blessing to one already *called* and *appointed*, so that as a function it is very little.

Only Rule over Elders is left, and that is no longer a function; but the inherent power residing in the congregation. The Congregational system asserts the absolute autonomy of each congregation; and absolute equality of each member. The principle of Association alone binds the congregations together in higher organization, and when once the Apostles were gone, there is no place for the general functions to lodge. What is left of them rests in the congregation, but how much is left? Ordination, not as a "Gift," but as a ratification; Appeal, in so far as allowed by conditions in which the first and last courts are identical and strange to say, Rule over Elders in the most absolute degree

The congregational position is taken from Scripture as follows: The Apostles die; no men are put in their place; no Presbyteries or larger bodies are put in their place; therefore nothing but the congregations are left.* These are seen in Scripture to be subject only to Apostles, so that with the Apostles dead, they are independent of all outside control. The Elders are "placed before" or given "oversight" only in the sense of leaders, and are therefore to be treated as any other member of the flock so far as control of the flock over them is concerned.

From this it is seen, that, unless one is prepared to prove the position as regards the Papal, Episcopal, or Presbyterian System, and show that something is left after the Apostles die, the argument goes by default. Each antagonist can be cheered on to victory and crowned, in so far as he demolishes the others, and when all are slain, the spoils are gathered in by the watchers. Each of the others has something positive to prove but this system remains just by the death of the rest. It is a residuum.

But at last, at least in this one particular, all the rest are found in solid array, and absolute agreement in line of battle against their sole and only antagonist, who is in this instance compelled to prove the positive. The whole world has taken the words, *episcopos*, *hēgoumenos*, *proistamenos*, *kubernētēs* and *poimēn*, as words expressing official authority. They are used in St. Paul's address to the Elders of Ephesus and Epistle to the Thessalonians, in his advice to Timothy, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and imply a very great deal. There are also words like *peithesthe*, and *hupekeite*. It is the Congregationalist who would strip them of their usual official sense.

Thus the question is: Are the Elders over the Congregation, or the Congregation over the Elders? Both of course can not stand unless the Rule in one instance is reduced to a mere nothing, while in the other magnified into strenuosity. In fact the Congregational system can not help admitting some official force to the words above, but makes it extremely slight, while the authority of the Congregation is of the most absolute sort possible, knowing no laws but those of its own recognition, and no appeal whatsoever.

Thus we have, laid bare, the point in this system for discussion from Scripture along the line of Special Functions. Did the Apostles give the Congregations Rule over Elders? And the issue is to be determined by the reinforcements which each side can bring to the Greek works of the class of *episcopos*, and *proistamenos*, etc.

It is enough to say, at present, that the location of the Special Functions in the Congregation practically destroys them, and not only these, the Apostolic Functions, but also the authority of Elders as well.

The seat of Consent is made the seat of authority also, and

what was at first made so distinct by the Lord, has become confused in a generation; and lines that it was so necessary should be kept distinct, have been obliterated. The Master gave the Apostles the authority (see St. Paul's boasting) to sustain the responsibilities of Teaching, Preaching, Ministration, Rule and Care of Souls. The Congregational theory leaves the burden and takes away the authority.

It is claimed that in those few years all the authority with which the Ministry among men started, was lost by it, and given to the very Congregations at first subject to it. We can hold no brief for that kind of thing. Even if Apostles died, the Ministry did not, and the Apostles' death did not deprive the Ministry of its all in all. We can not afford to find the Special and General Functions all in the self same grave—Consent usurper of all Authority.

CHAPTER V

Discussion of the Biblical System in Extenso

The discussion of the subject of the last chapter, ought now for the sake of continuity be carried into the succeeding age, so as to see by the light of the facts of that age, whether conclusions which we have tentatively reached, would meet with corroboration or contradictions, but, on the other hand, something will be gained by a more comprehensive view of the conditions during the Scriptural age than we have yet had. We will therefore linger awhile longer in that age, and afterwards view the facts of the next.

There are so many different kinds of workers mentioned in Scripture, and so many interlacings of the different workers, that we want to get a clear view of the whole system as it ~~was~~ in actual operation just as nearly as we can through the medium of the partial glimpses which are given us now and then. Then there are also one or two matters that need close discussion.

The Twelve Apostles had, as we have seen, every function and power in all the spheres of religious work, and a commission to go into all the world. Of course it is presumable that they reasonably did so, but, as far as we can trace their work, we find them executing their commission in a different way from what we would expect. For years, they remain in Jerusalem, and the first work in other places, is done by others. At last we find St. Peter "*passing* throughout all quarters," but quarters where the Church existed.

We know specifically that Christianity was established in Samaria, Antioch, Damascus, and Rome before any man of possibly Apostolic rank reached that far; and we ought also to add in all probability Tarsus and Alexandria. The account of the Apostles remaining while others were scattered abroad bearing the Gospel, and their going to Samaria after Philip had gotten things in readiness, and this passing of St. Peter throughout all quarters, gives us an insight into the fact which we might as well have suspected, that the ordering of all things—the care of all the Churches, was the great burden of the office, which precluded the

active dashing into unconverted parts for first planting. If they did not do it at first, did they afterwards do this kind of work? Later the work of caring for and confirming the Churches was still more insistent, and we expressly read how St. Peter when driven from Jerusalem took up his "abode" at Cesarea. St. Paul's work was at first of the dashing kind, but soon he too was by the force of needs, held down to the "Care of all the Churches" in a way that seemed to irk his great spirit. But a true view of St. Paul will not add him to the Twelve, but make him the first and greatest of a large number who were given the work of an Apostle, just as the Seventy had been given work similar to that of the Twelve, in the Lord's lifetime. He was given it by the Lord directly, and so too, it is thought, was James the Just.

St. Paul is the first of all these men of whom we read, and he is sent out to Tarsus. Then Barnabas is sent to Antioch, and next we read of James at Jerusalem in position of authority, while St. Peter goes to Caesarea, and presumably all the Apostles are scattered. James, of the lineage of David, is safer from the Sanhedrim and Herod than all the rest, and can remain. Here we have a brief view of a settled Apostolate if only temporarily so, with St. Peter at Caesarea, St. James at Jerusalem, St. Paul at Tarsus, (and then Antioch) and St. Barnabas at Antioch, *all at one and the same time*. But at once comes the sentence of God that changes this, and sends St. Paul and St. Barnabas on their journey to many lands to be the first planters of many Churches.

The men who at Corinth call themselves "Apostles of Christ" and whom St. Paul calls "false Apostles" because of their false teaching, now go forth. In a little while Silas and Mark are joined with St. Paul and St. Barnabas, in the larger work. Later, a large number are seen. And in them all we see just what we have before seen about the Twelve, that planting is a work that is impeded so largely by the "Care of all the Churches" that one after another they succumb, and are found "setting in order the things which are lacking." This view is borne out by what we know of St. John's life afterwards, and the tradition concerning St. Philip and St. Andrew that rests on good testimony.

The Apostolic men could only in rare instances be pioneers, so great was the need of supervisors and confirmers of the work.

Yet of course the commission to "go" is not violated. If we first caught at the idea of their being great travelers, we soon find that the way they adopted of sending men, and then coming themselves to order all things, was much better. St. Paul the seeming exception, is for all the seeming to the contrary, one who dwells in turn at Tarsus, Antioch, Corinth, Ephesus, and Rome for years at a time; and his second and third journeys are over the same ground, it being of the second journey that we find the fully expressed motive given in the phrases "Let us go again and visit our brethren in every city where we have preached the word, and see how they do," and "He went through Syria and Celicia, confirming the Churches." There is no effort to show by any accent laid on this phase of apostolic work that crystalization took place as early as these times; but only that the tendency of the work was to exalt care of the work planted at the expense of new undertakings in person. The great powers of their office were called fully into play. Ministration, Teaching, Rule of affairs and Care of Souls demanded in the end, even as fully as Preaching, the time of these chief officers. When Jerusalem was the field, they had given up tables, because of prayer and the word; and afterwards, when the Care of all the Churches came upon them daily, these wise men knew how to multiply their voices for their "deaconship of the Word." So, too, they stretched their hands, for the setting in order of Churches and the appointment of underworkers.

Thus then we conceive the Twelve and their work. They were not pioneers so much as the rulers and Orderers of the work. And of St. Paul and the others of apostolic degree and work, we would say, they were at first pioneers, but soon compelled to Care for the Churches as the principal part of their labors.

As to the general divisions of the workers, there were divisions along the line of *spheres*, i. e., into general and local workers; along the line of *kinds*, i. e., into Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Pastors, and Teachers Rulers, Helps, and Governments; along the line of degrees or *orders*, i. e., into Apostles, Elders, and Deacons.

The division into local and general workers, was one of the most natural in the world. It sprang out of the absolute necessity for the constant training and drilling of each congregation, and

the continual teaching, preaching, offering and worshipping needful therefor, while there still existed work for the Church to do, which those tied down could not attempt to perform. The planting of new Churches, and the nursing of these, in very distant places, may be taken as the patent proof.

Scripturally, we see Silas and Timothy left in Macedonia; Titus and two others, going to Corinth; Titus left in Crete, and "departed into Dalmatia;" Barnabas and Mark, sailing to Cyprus; all these and many more, to say nothing of St. Paul, evidently engaged in a work of so general a character that we cannot in any way accommodate it to the idea that it was done by those who were usually local workers.

It is hard to imagine any time that might come without bringing the need of a division of the work between the general and local workers, each equipped with powers suited to his sphere of work. In the Biblical times we see plainly the different classes.

On the other hand, we would have known nothing of the division of the workers into *kinds* unless Scripture had informed us, and we must get the Scriptural enumeration of these different kinds squarely before us. Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Pastors, Teachers, Rulers, Helps and Governments seem to fulfil the list. Tongues, Healings, Miracles, there were, but these Charisms hardly give us room for distinction into kinds. Still they can be added. If it should be thought that Prophecy should be included among the Charisms, we will see afterwards why there is distinct reason for the above separation.

As to Apostles. The word is general, meaning messenger, but in Scripture becomes *official* and means *Messengers of Christ*. That it ever means Messengers of men any more after acquiring the official sense, may well be doubted. We have seen two instances where it plainly can revert, and is claimed by some to do so; but again, it need not be so taken. After becoming official, there seems to be a narrower, and a *larger* sense. The Great Apostles, who were the first Twelve, and then also St. Matthias, St. Paul and St. James the Just, are the Apostles in the narrower sense. In the larger, we would include as among the Messengers of Christ, Barnabas, Timothy, Titus, Silas, Luke, Mark, Epaphroditus, and all that number of men like Gaius

Aristarchus, Sopater whom we see engaged in the larger work, requiring great powers in order to make successful effort. Also, as we have seen, those men called "false apostles" by St. Paul and John are of this class. The work was varied, and embraced all kinds. The Evangelists may have been limited to one kind of work, but the term Apostle in this larger sense may be taken to indicate administrative work as well as Preaching, or Ministration. If the workers are divided, as we supposed, into local and general, the Apostles would belong to the latter class necessarily.

As to Evangelists. The need of general Preachers to spread the Gospel was great, and there was no reason why there should not be men who could go about with no other work, than that of first attracting men to the Truth. Preaching and Administration call for different natures, when each are at their best. Men mighty in the Scriptures and of great fluency could be sent forth with just the one work of "Crying in the Wilderness." There could well be distinctions of grades between men given this kind of work, because they need not all press into remote regions. Sections of Cities even could afford field for Evangelistic work, while yet again Evangelists could go ahead of the more administrative apostolical workers. We have no light on the *functions of office* belonging to the Evangelists. Timothy, a man of apostolic function, was told to "do the work of an Evangelist" and again, Philip is called an Evangelist, but of his rank, we know very little. We can easily suppose however, that Evangelists could be given either of the two higher grades of office, in respect to the Ministerial functions, and so be either men endowed with the Special Functions like the Apostolic men, or only possessed of those of the Elders.

As to Prophets. We must remember that by the action of God on the day of Pentecost, the old order of Prophets was once more placed in evidence before men. Later, the Prophetical powers would settle into the form more akin to teaching, and be absorbed into the general functions of the Christian ministry, but at the first there was a restoration of Prophets in fullest manifestation of their anciently asserted claims. Now the Prophets' claim to attention always by the very nature of things, rested on the *truth* of his message. If a man was really sent from God, or

had a message from God, that ended all discussion of right. So in Apostolic times, it was enough in justification of Ananias, that *God told him* to go to St. Paul, who was praying.

There were in these days many men and women, who prophesied, and the only way of keeping them straight, was to "prove the Spirit, whether they are of God;" for many false Prophets are gone out into the world." Thus the Prophet had all things in his hands. He might be able to allege for *any act* God's authority: Whether he was an officer or a layman, it matters not. The old order of Prophets had not been involved in the grades that the Priesthood knew. A layman empowered of God, could do what God bid him, but unless so told, he could do nothing. As a kind of worker then in Scriptural days the Prophet was capable of having any office, but in case of special message, of performing any functions whether proper to his usual grade or not. Ananias seems to have been a layman: The Prophets and Teachers at Antioch Elders and Apostles. Silas was, as we know, a prophet, and also, apparently, an apostle. The laying on of hands which we attribute to Ananias and to the Prophets and teachers at Antioch doubtless proceeded not from their grade of office, but their prophetical authorization.

And while we read of Timothy that the "gift" was given him by prophecy we also read of Silas, who was with St. Paul at the time, that he was a Prophet (Acts XV. 32). Evidently the Prophet could range into any field provided he could claim God's word for his act, and, if that be the case, we need not wonder at the rank given him by St. Paul, where he says "first Apostles, secondly prophets." He was therefore general or local, and of no grade, or all grades—independent of grade, and his kind of work was according to his heavenly authority for anything he did.

When the special message ceased however, and prophecy became exposition and preaching, the freedom of the Prophet to range, also ceased, and his grade became fixed by his other powers of ministry.

Looking at these three kinds of general workers, we see that all of them must necessarily reach up somewhat into the general field, and at times need high powers. The Prophet need be given none, but could rely on the heavenly message. The Evangelist

might be able to found a Church as well as preach, and could according to his personality be entrusted with high powers, but his commission (unless also a Prophet) would come from the earthly bestowers of it. The Apostle was a man engaged in work that expressly demanded authority, along many lines and in very high degree. As to Pastors, Teachers, and Rulers, the Scripture identifies all these with *Elders*, and shows they were local officers; and the only question is as to whether the specific kinds of work involved in the functions of these officers fell, all of them together, on every Elder, or whether they could be parcelled out, so that several or only one could be possessed by the same individual. We must add the functions of Ministration and Preaching to those of Rule, Teaching, and Care of Souls, which are involved in the names above given.

The conditions of a City like Ephesus would indicate large opportunity for a division of work into various kinds, and the pecuniary condition of converts to Christianity does not allow us to think of all the Elders giving themselves all the time to their religious work. Those that labored in the "word and doctrine" must have had great drafts on their time, and were worthy doubtless of "double honor" in the way of remuneration; even if the Greek of the famous text does not mean that kind of "honor." The inherent probabilities are strongly for the view that the Elders took work of various kinds and in varying degrees. To thread our way however with any certainty through the intricacies of the situation to some definite system of division of labor, will need more light than we have. If we recall that Elders were given functions of office in the lines of Preaching, Teaching, Ministration, Rule and Care of Souls, and then we turn to the various names given them besides that of Elder, viz: Ministers, Stewards, Pilots, Overseers, and "Those placed before," we will see that our sign posts appear confusing.

The Scriptures indeed speak of "Elders that Rule well" and go on to say "Especially those who labor in the Word and doctrine," which text helps us to see not only the fact of a division of labor, but one of the lines along which the division could run. This, however, is all that is revealed, and yet there could well be more.

Rule is only one of the functions. The word too is *proëstōtes* which leans to rule over *affairs* rather than "Care of souls" or Discipline and Shepherding. We would, in a City like Ephesus, easily see some, taking the frequent services of worship; others, the round of pastoral visits; others the constant instruction of converts; others, the control of affairs, and others yet again, the growing and aggressive preaching to the heathen.

Just the distinction between preaching to regular Congregations for edification and exposition, and that done to gain converts, gives us a view of how the work could be divided, and with a ministry necessarily unable to devote all its time to the work, (we know how St. Paul labored at tent making in Ephesus), we feel sure it must have been in some such way.

But, now, though the work could be divided, yet it could hardly be that the functions of the office would not belong to all. It is natural to understand that all Elders were possessed of all functions of office, but labored chiefly in some part of the great work. All could stand and break the bread in Christ's stead; all could baptize; preach according to their knowledge; pay pastoral visits, and if need be exercise discipline and finally take part in the general affairs, and in control of them; but all did not try to do all these things equally. There is no use to suppose any thing like an atrophy of their other powers because engaging chiefly in the exercise of one. Especially must we think that the side of Ministration would be dear to each one, since the right to break the bread is, like the right to Preach, ever dear to every one allowed the privilege. It would be pushing matters very far and very needlessly to think that the text which speaks of those "laboring in word and doctrine" implied that functions in other directions were abandoned, or that the Elders who "ruled well" could not teach and preach if they wished. It is their work in the office, not the office itself that is alluded to. And how greatly beside the mark would be the inference that because in the great crowded City of Ephesus there was a division of labor, it must be so ever and always and everywhere just that way in the Church of God.

The division of labor is caused by the need for division. When circumstances should indicate the need that each function

should be exercised by, as well as vest in each possessor, the power to respond would be there, and the existence of the function is the best reason for its exercise.

Therefore we must conclude, that since all Elders were Preachers, Teachers, Leaders, Pilots, Ministers, Overseers, and Rulers, none of these gifts should be allowed to rust, even though circumstances compelled inequalities at times and in certain places.

As to Helps. It would have been strange if alone of great religions possessing a Ministry, the Christian System had omitted the assisting order. There is not as much need of Helps in the rites and ceremonies, but far more in the active work and multiplication of alms, etc. Helps must of course refer to the Deacons.

And finally there remains to be considered the term Governments. The Greek is *kubernēseis*, or Guidings, Pilotings. It is not likely that the reference is to Rulers of the grade of Elders, but to those like Aquilla and Priscilla who did so much for Apollos, and to the trainers of Children and converts, who could well be called Guides.

In the matter of Grades or Orders, there was manifest need for such a division, and the only question likely to arise, would be as to the lines along which the division should fall. The need existed, because, unless there was to be no line between the local and the general workers, and between the local workers and those who should assist them, and unless the Elders were to be under no authority, or only that of bodies of which they themselves were members, there must be a grade above them.

But let us see the whole situation:

Here were a large number of Christians from all walks of life, and especially the working classes. It must be a consequence of conditions that most of them must be simple members unable to engage in the "work of the ministry." But others would be fitted by knowledge, possession of time, dignity of character, for some work. They could labor either in a region just between the worshipper and the Minister, or in a region of true Ministry which bordered on work of secular character, i. e., secular in kind (the service of tables), but consecrated in end and purpose. They could

rise to a work religiously official, assisting in the Public worship, baptizing, and preaching even, yet not reaching up into the region of authority. Finally there would be those who could give themselves to the work as their calling in life. These would be put over the work, or flock (one would follow from the other), and be separated from those below by just that very authority. How high the work of the assistant might rise, would not be the question. It is this matter of authority that marks the great distinction. But that is the mark of an office. The usual work of preaching, Teaching, Pastoral work and Ministering, would make up part of their labor according to fitness and opportunity for its many branches, but the very possession of authority over things and men, would make other lines of work.

So far then, we have two grades of work. We can if we wish, regard the lower grade as not exceeding the layman in authority, but only in work, but if his work be of a kind, that requires authority, then, that authority will make a distinction of grade. If his work belong to an office, or should need for it a setting apart, it would be idle to deny the existence of authority and grades. At the same time, if the authority of the full grade of workers be over this class of workers, as well as the people in general, then the distinction of grade is complete.

Grades might exist along the line of kinds of work, but are rather seen along distinction in authority. The Apostles while equal *inter se* in grade, had the same lines of work. In their case there was no making one a preacher, and another a ruler or pastor, so with the Elders that the Apostles established, the line flowed not into the separation of Preachers, and Ministers, but after the combination of Preaching, Teaching, Ministering, Ruling, and Care of Souls into one whole, it was drawn around it to hedge it from those under their authority in all those kinds of work.

But, since all the authority these men had was entirely local as far as we have seen, it is quite possible for a grade to exist above them. If there existed general workers, even though the lines of their work must still be Preaching, Teaching, Ruling, and Care of Souls, yet there is room for the distinction of grade. The matter of rule over the Elders, of Appellate jurisdiction, and of

Ordination of Elders, still allows a distinction of grade to come in.

Now, it is the sight of the general workers, and of the possession of some of them, of these higher lines of work, that makes us see that there were higher functions as well, and therefore a higher grade of office.

The matter of the number of ordinations given to any one officer, now demands attention. Was there a separate ordination for each of two or three grades, or was there only one for general entrance into the Ministry, and then the rest left to some simple mode of designation? Or, yet again, was there only one Ordination, but that one a particular one to an office held for life, there being no system of progression? The first is the modern custom (dating from early times however) with those having three orders in the Ministry, and also with those holding to two. For the believers in those orders, ordain to Diaconate, and then raise the Deacon to the other orders, on occasion, by fresh ordination; and the believers in two orders, should a Deacon (whose Ministry is by them regarded as quite separate in kind rather than in degree) desire to go into the higher work, admit him to that by a fresh ordination. There is, however, this further difference, that with the one the Diaconate, whatever the early custom might have been, is regarded as the primary step in a series, while with the advocates of two orders, it is an office apart and not expected to furnish its holders a door into the regular grade of the Ministry. The second is a possible and forensic, rather than an actual theory. It plays no part in the differences concerning Deacons, but it can in modified form, well play a part in the question as to presbyters becoming Bishops, without further ordination. The third and last, as we shall later see, has the apparent support of Scripture.

Few subjects are left so much to inference as the matter of Ordination. We can not say when the Apostles were ordained, nor Matthias, nor St. Paul, nor Barnabas, nor James the Just. No man whose name is given is mentioned in connection with official ordination except Timothy and the Seven. At the same time, we see that large numbers of Elders were Ordained and some men expressly had the power to Ordain as one of their powers of

Ministry. Timothy may be taken as an instance of one Ordained twice; but only because it is said in one place "with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery" and in another "By the laying on of my hands" and it is well known that we have no way of either identifying or separating these instances. The whole subject of Ordination rests upon the argument that among the Jews, there was a setting apart, for *every* sacred and semi-sacred office, and that we have so many instances given in the Scriptures of Ordination, that, evidently the same atmosphere existed in the Christian as well as in the Jewish Church. Something, to indicate not only that the man gave himself to God, but that God gave the man Authority and Grace for the work, was of almost universal custom in Civilized religions of ancient times—something to guard the man's office as given from above as well as by men. The Priest even of Ptah, or of Shamash, must stand on the merits of the God, and the whole trend of the Scriptures is not away from, but in the direction of this natural and judicious line. Almost any sacred rite at the time of appointment would convey this idea, but the old Patriarchal and Mosaic rite of laying on of hands, is the one preserved to our view in the Bible as that of the Apostolic choice. And the same reason that would cause it to be used at all would cause it to be done for every office received.

As regards Scripture terms for Ordination, it does not matter that different Greek words are used to designate the giving of office to different ones in the Scripture, for no one can doubt that there was a religious bestowal as well as a matter of fact appointment. Until the Greek language developed official terms, only words of general meaning would be available. Greek civilization and government were highly artificial, and therefore all its terms are words that have been built up, general ideas particularized and applied. But the Greek is too delicate a conveyor of meaning not to enable the writers of Scripture to give us an insight from several standpoints. Instead of quibbling about this word and that, we should rather be glad that those passages which clearly indicate a sacred making of a Minister, should approach the matter from every side, from "election" to "placing the hands upon."

There are some who claim that when at *Lystra, on the first journey*, St. Paul and Barnabas "ordained Elders for them,"

they *superintended* an election, because the word is "*cheirotoneo*," yet it is at *Lystra* they say also, that *on the second journey*, the Presbytery *ordained* Timothy because the word is *epithēsis tōn cheirōn*, but every one knows the danger of taking words that have not settled to the technical and then balancing between the literal and technical ideas. The difficulty is, that the Hebrew rite had to be indicated in the Greek language. A really noteworthy point is, that in the early days, when the Seven were appointed, the language is *epithēkan tas cheiras*, and when St. Paul is about to die, he uses to Timothy concerning his Ordination, the same Greek words, which shows how, from first to last, appointment was by laying on of hands.

Of course, if the man in general work was only an Elder taken and deputed, or if, let us say, the Bishop of later times was only the President of the Presbytery, a second Ordination would not be inferred, but if there was a distinct office given, then the general custom in the matter of Ordination would have its force. That beyond the passages concerning Timothy there is any mention of a second Ordination cannot be claimed. In fact, if we take Scripture and search, we find no mention of any one at all promoted to higher work. Timothy is never seen in the work of an Elder—a local work. Unless it be Philip, who is seen ordained as one of the Seven, and is afterwards called "the Evangelist," and we can move amid these intricacies with assertions, there is no one of all the Biblical characters whom we see promoted in work or office. To be sure, there is the text about Deacons "purchasing to themselves a good degree," but it is the barest kind of inference that that means they could rise to the Eldership. The Elders on the other hand are always Elders, and the general workers, men of general responsibilities. Possibly Barnabas, before he was sent to Antioch, was one thing, and then became another, but if we come to surmises, we have the old tradition as to Barnabas being one of the Seventy, who could always hark back to the Lord's appointment, to general work.

Certainly the Elders are never seen emerging out of the local into the general work, nor the man of general sphere falling back upon the local work of an Elder. We see not even a trace

of any *system* of passage from one grade of work to another. What we are compelled to conclude is, that in Biblical times, men were selected for one particular office in which they remained always, and that this was *the rule*. That exceptions could occur would only be reasonable, and that even though not mentioned yet, they nevertheless did occur, would be only too natural. But, also, we must believe that each office was given with Ordination whenever it was given. In the case of Timothy, which at once rises to the mind, this line of vision would leave us debating between two Ordinations (with his work as Elder entirely left out of sight) or, of only one, as on the surface would appear most probable, with the Apostle Paul, the Prophet Silas, and the Presbyters of Lystra (Canon Gore thinks of Ephesus) as his ordainers to an office which we have considered to be the Apostolate.

It is to be noted that the repeated ordination of a man, through the three grades of Diaconate, Priesthood, and Episcopate, as seen in the present day, comes from the custom of elevating the same man through the three grades. The latter, as we have seen, was probably not the Scriptural custom, but if the same man had been promoted to distinct offices, we can not doubt but that it could have been by the usual religious rite each time. It was because the work of a man was not changed, that we fail to find the traces of more than one ordination.

The historical position on this matter remains to be discussed in another place. But if we seem shut off from holding to the idea of several ordinations, we also fail to find an instance of any confessed Elder engaging in general work: so, that, if in very truth this general work existed, it was done by men who were not Elders, but something else. This would mean that just as there was an ordination to the "Deaconship of tables" and an ordination to Eldership, so there was one to General work.

However, supposing only one ordination to be the showing of Scripture, and that the Scriptural Elder does not take up general work, there can yet be the theory that while there is a parity of office, yet there is also a difference in work—all being equal in order or grade, but some, used for local, and some for

general work. Under such a theory every man ordained to the Preaching and Teaching ministry, would be given all the powers of ministry, but some might be kept latent, only to be developed under certain circumstances, such as deputyship (in Scriptural times) and Presidency, (in times a little later).

Now, of course, the Presbyterian theory would not allow this. For the President to take the powers of a Timothy, would be usurpation of powers belonging to all, and only to be exercised by the Presbytery, or body of Presbyters—"Presbyteri in Consessu," or by a body of their creation in conjunction with other Presbyteries—a "Synod," whose pattern in Scripture is claimed to be the Jerusalem Council. This is, in fact, the virtual theory of those who see no successors of the Apostles, but do see a real and right Episcopacy rising out of the Presidency of the early Presbyteries. This theory indeed *may preserve* the principle of authority from above, but cares little for that of three orders. Furthermore, just by subtle processes of exalting election and depressing ordination, it can weaken to the point of destruction, the principle of authority from above. That, of course, is the great principle. Once that is secure, the precise arrangements made for its exercise matter but little.

The contention, however, for three orders is based, not upon the sight of three ordinations, but upon the facts of the arrangements actually made and exhibited in Scripture; upon the naturalness of such a division of power as well as of work; and upon the historic continuity of such a plan with all the religions of the ancient civilizations.

Upon the foundations that in the course of this book have been laid along the last two lines, rest the facts of Scripture, made perfectly patent by their full exhibition in the last few chapters. If the Special Functions were given, not for latent, but for dynamic possession; and given not to all, but to special ones, then there must be three orders. And again, while the idea of latent powers can agree very well with a theory of authority from the people, or a body that stands for the people, yet with the idea of authority from above, it seems an utter incongruity. Just think of it—given to so many, and exercised

by so few, i. e., given uselessly in the great majority of cases. The talent tied in a napkin, and the gift not to be stirred up, is hardly the plan of the Divine Mind.

Although so much has been said about Councils, a full fair look at the distinctions concerning them, will at this point, help to a conception of the whole Biblical system.

A General can hold a Council of War without impairing his supreme command at all, and so too, can a President consult his Cabinet. Then a number of Generals can consult together, and be guided by the opinion that prevails, without that Council becoming an institution with power to take command out of the hands of the Generals, and exercise it in its own way. So too can any set of officials meet to settle matters of perplexity, or of common interest. But when once a Council on any kind is formed, the weight of a majority opinion is so great that it becomes a kind of natural process for the Council to acquire power over its component members, even though the origin of the Council may not have been rested on any such principle. On the other hand, however, there is a different type of Council best typified by the ordinary legislature. In these, the Council has powers of its own. There may be degrees too, in these. In a board of directors, for instance, the control of the board is based on the right of the Directors, but the action of the board, as a board, is necessary for legality, and its officers and deputies have all the power that the board may give, and transcend the individual director entirely. In a legislature, however, it is the body that has the power, and the members of it acquire all they have, through being members of the body, and only when in action within the body.

These two lines of divergence begin from the two ideas of authority from above, and authority from below. With independent authority from above vesting in the members, the idea of Council for Counsel holds; with Divine authority vesting in the Council, on the other hand, the Council represents the source of the authority of the members, and so has more power as a whole, than any member or part. We have, therefore, clear lines for comparison, when we look into the real and alleged Councils of Scripture. Now everything in the account

of the Jerusalem Council agrees with the idea that it was a Council for Counsel, and we know that the authority of the Apostles was independent, so that whether we argue from the facts as seen in the account, or from the authority by which the Council gained its powers, we must rank it among the kinds of Councils which brings Consent to the aid of Authority, rather than the kinds which place Consent over Authority. As to other Councils, they are alleged, by some, but not seen. That a Presbytery was composed of Elders who derived their authority from above, as men admitted to share some of the powers which came from above to the Apostles, is '*prima facie*' evidence, that they were Councils on the line of Councils for Counsel; and we can not get beyond the '*prima facie*' aspect for all the rest of the evidence is absent.

That it was a Court of discipline like a Jewish Sanhedrim, or a Legislature like the Roman Senate, is far beside any line or word that is written. And as for descanting on the powers of its moderator, even though we know that James presided at the Jerusalem Council, and actually see and hear him, in his office, we are still in the dark as to the very gist of the points involved.

The Biblical system then seems to be as follows. A number of men of equal powers, and these the very highest possible, and covering all the range of religious affairs, are intrusted with everything in the Church. They call to their aid other workers and divide them into local and general workers. To the local, they give all their functions of office, except those of Rule over Elders, Appeal, and Ordination. To the General, they add these to the others. They also provide an order of Assistants (to the local workers presumably). In the meantime, God himself has raised up special Prophets, who by the force of their claim to inspiration speak and act as they are moved, generally in harmony with, but sometimes outside of the regular scheme. These are temporary, and can last only as long as inspiration, not, therefore, becoming a part of the regular system. Natural gifts and variety of opportunities cause other lines of demarkation among the workers. These, unlike the Prophets, are within the limitations of the three orders, i. e., depend on their order for their authority in their particular work. The whole field of work is thus cov-

ered by Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Pastors, and Teachers, Rulers, Helps, and Governments, and regularity and effectiveness ensued by the three grades or orders into which all these varieties are grouped according to the measure of their authority.

By thus disposing the workers, and by providing for Councils among the officers (and between the officers and people also by inference) and distinctly recognizing the rights of the people, the system becomes rounded into a form which recognizes and balances the claims of Monarchial, Conciliar, and Popular government, with wonderful nicety of judgment.

Election of the officers by the people, satisfies Consent. Ordination with its Gift dignifies Authority. The passing of the Prophets can work no harm to the system. When the Great Apostles die, their functions of *office* remain vested in others.

Selecting the pervading principles for plain exposure, we would arrange them as, Authority, Counsel, Consent, Order, Thoroughness, Perpetuity. Afterwards, we shall see how we must add, Elasticity.

The Apostles were certainly inspired builders upon the wonderful foundations.

CHAPTER VI

The Special Order in History

We have seen that the Great Apostles possessed the Special Functions which were adapted to the General work in which they were engaged, as distinguished from the local work of the Presbyters; and then, concluding from the nature of these Special Functions, and the perennial need of them, that they could not be allowed to die with the Twelve, we began the discussion as to the location of these Special Functions, after the passing of the Apostles. Going to Scripture, we discussed the three positions, viz: 1st, the delivery of them to a Special order of men, 2nd, to a body of officers, 3rd, to a body composed of officers and members.

It is now necessary to carry the same question into the region of History, so as to bring to bear whatever force there may be from corroboration or contradiction of former approximate conclusions.

In the first century of our era, we have only two writings that bear upon the subject of Church Polity, viz: The Didaché, and the Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians. In the early part of the next century, we have two others, which practically belonging to the same period, may be grouped with the two first. These are, the set of seven Epistles of Ignatius and the Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians. At some interval comes Hermas, Ireneaus, and the ever broadening stream of Christian writers.

The Epistle of Clement may have been written as early as the year 68, after the persecution of Nero, but certainly before the year 100. The Didache, is by some, put as early as the year 80, and it too must at least have been written within the limit of the first century. Both documents were known early, and the text reasonably certain.

We will take the Didache first.

It gives a picture of the Christian Church, in some community, thought by scholars to be in an out of the way region, accustomed to very simple life, which picture embraces these features

as regards polity. There are "Teachers" who travel about. There are also "Apostles," and these are called "Prophets." They, too, travel. These Teachers, Apostles, and Prophets, are to be tried and judged and received according to principles laid down. If proved true, they have an assured position. They are called "Your honored ones" and "Your high-priests." They are to have the first fruits, and the Prophets can at the Communion, offer "Thanksgiving" untrammelled by the form prescribed to others for that part of the worship. They can "*settle and abide*." Then, also, there are "Bishops" and "Deacons," whom the local Church is to elect for themselves, and of these, it is said, "for they also render to you the service of prophets and teachers." It is also added, "Despise them not, therefore, for they are your honored ones, together with the Prophets and Teachers (meaning the ones that travel).

As between Congregational authority, and that of the officers, the lines are made tolerably plain. The officers are called "Apostles, Overseers, High-Priests," and once the Teachers and Prophets, or Apostles, (these two are identified) are received as true and not false, their position is assured, and their authority recognized, not bestowed. On the other hand the powers of the local Church are distinctly those of Consent, and even then, there is no separation of people from officers, but the officers are manifestly included in the charges given.

As between a *special order* and an *organized Presbytery*, there is no hint of the latter at all, while there is distinctly seen, these Teachers and Prophets, and even *Apostles* coming for special work, and, as in the case mentioned of "the Thanksgiving," with high-powers, being expressly called "High-priests."

Let us note the force of the implication as to false Apostles.

In the Epistle of Clement, no higher officers than the Presbyters are seen at Corinth, and at the same time there is no hint of a "Presbytery." Nor have we any suspicion of Congregational Rule given us. The condition is just that of any local Church in Scriptural times—a Church under its local officers who are of course "Presbyters" and whose office is also spoken of as the "Episcopate" or "oversight." There has been a "sedition against

its Presbyters" by "the most steadfast and ancient Church of the Corinthians" on "account of one or two persons," and it has "ejected the said Presbyters from the Episcopate."

Now, since it is said that "the Church of the Corinthians engaged in *sedition against* its Presbyters" the idea of the Congregation being supreme over the Presbyters is ruled out, especially when Clement says, "Let the flock of Christ live on terms of peace with the Presbyters set over it" and "Ye who laid the foundations of this sedition submit yourselves to the Presbyters," "Learn to be subject." Again, the whole argument of Clement is based on examples of an order of Authority from above. Again, the officers of the Church "have been appointed by them" (the Apostles) or afterwards by other "distinguished men" with the *consent* of the whole Church." So that from a number of sides, the idea of Congregational rule is prevented, and the last quoted passage directly bears on the subject of the ordination of Elders, and distributes the two parts of Election and Appointment in consonance with our view of Consent as seen all along.

As regards the existence of a Presbytery at Corinth, we have not the least evidence. While Ignatius constantly uses the word Presbytery, Clement uses the word Presbyters, and we can tell nothing about the fact of a body, much less the kind. Apart, too, from this, the passage quoted above—"those appointed by them," (i. e., the Apostles), or, afterwards, by "other distinguished men," does not naturally look towards an ordination by a body, but towards ordination by "eminent men" who individually possessed the right.

There is evidently no one at Corinth who is above the Presbyters, i. e.—at that time. Clement himself may possibly be the nearest "distinguished man," one who in the Didache would be called an Apostle or Prophet. If the Epistle is written after Nero's persecution, he has not yet "settled" in Rome as "abiding" there, after the manner mentioned in the Didache. It can possibly be that he writes in consequence of this office, and instead of saying like Polycarp, "Clement and the Presbyters with him," he prefers to say "The Church of God which sojourns at Rome," which had by reason of its recent persecution, become so marked and beloved. However, that may be, and there is nothing but

surmise for it, there are two passages in the Epistle which *leave room* for the men called Apostles in the Didache. Who are the "Rulers" in Chap. XXI, and who are the "distinguished men" in Chap. XLIV? We can not think of a single Presbyter ordaining, and as our mind revolves the question as between a Presbytery or body of Presbyters, and certain men of Evangelistic or Prophetical or Apostolical lines of work and functions of office, the latter seems the true idea. We can not prove it; we can not assert it; but it is by large odds the most plausible of the possible surmises. On a theory of date as early as the year 68, the "distinguished men" would suggest a number of persons—Apollos, Titus, Timothy, Silas, etc., and the year 95 would not prevent the idea of the same persons. Inasmuch as the time for the *settled Apostolate* is late, and, then, too, variable for different places, the absence of the highest order of the Ministry at Corinth is a very small matter; if once the idea is caught that the General worker would not be apt to settle, until obliged by age, sickness, or the conditions of the Churches, we can easily see how Corinth in the track of all Commerce could depend on a chance coming of the General worker, better than any place on the Mediterranean Sea.

It is to be noted that on the supposition that Clement of Rome was one of this class of men, (and Clement of Alexandria called him "Apostle,") he had a peculiar condition to deal with. Absent, and held by the demands or conditions growing out of persecution in the Roman Church, he had not a case of Rule over Elders, or ordinary Appeal, or Ordination to deal with, but the rare one of rebellion against the officers, and the ejection of them from their work. St. Paul had to assert his authority very strongly, and here the authority of those placed over them was utterly upset. Of what use now would it be for Clement to deal sternly with them, when authority was the red rag to all their turbulent passions?

His whole plan and method seem as natural to the circumstances as could be, even if he could, like St. Paul, have gone to them with a rod. We have only to suppose the older system still partially in effect, Corinth wedded to it, and Clement, an Apostle (like those in the Didache), and long familiar to the Corin-

thians and trusted by them, but held at Rome by injuries to himself, or the necessity of those so broken by persecution, and all the difficulties that have seemed to gather about the Epistle vanish into thin air. But we need not do all this. It is only necessary to take the "distinguished men" of the Epistle to be the Apostles of the Didache, and the status of Corinth can be made plain. When we find Clement of Alexandria living and writing in the Second Century saying, "The Apostle Clement in the Epistle to the Corinthians," we seem to have a position well taken.

Thus now we reach the end of the first Century, and except for *the one instance* of the word "Presbytery" in St. Paul's Epistle to Timothy we would not have the slightest hint that the Elders were ever formed into any kind of body much less one with governing powers. The words "with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery" are the only source whence the idea can spring. We are about to come upon a large use of the hitherto strange term, but up to this point, there is but the one instance; and the fact is too noteworthy to pass over in silence. It is no less unexpected, however, to find that it is in the pages of such a writer as Ignatius that the foundations of the fact of such bodies being realities, must be sought. The word is ever on his lips, "The Bishop and the Presbytery."

If the Curetonian Syriac version be taken as the true form of the Epistles of Ignatius, the word "Presbytery" disappears, and the threefold Ministry is testified to as "The Bishop, and the Presbyters, and the Deacons," but if the Shorter Greek version, so completely defended by Bishop Lightfoot, be decided upon as guide, then at every turn we stumble upon something styled "The Presbytery."

There is no use to look to Ignatius for any corroboration of the rule of the Congregation: He is the worst witness imaginable for that Polity. In the other direction the fact of his using the word "Presbytery" with the great frequency compels attention, and we turn to see if in his pages we can find out the status of the Presbyters in the early part of the Second Century. Ignatius not only speaks of the "Presbytery," but he calls it "the

fitly wreathed spiritual crown," and also says "Your honorable Presbytery, worthy of God, is attuned to the Bishop just as strings to a harp." Then he goes further and declares "While your Bishop presides in the place of God and your Presbyters in the place of the assembly (*sunedrion*), of the Apostles." Still more definite seem the words "And the Presbyters as the Sanhedrim (*sunedrion*) of God, and assembly, (*sundesmon*) of the Apostles." Now the plain force of all these expressions, and the general language of Ignatius, almost wherever the Presbytery is mentioned, is to give us the idea of some body formed of Presbyters existing as an entity. It is true the word *sunedrion*, cannot be pressed as far as the technical "Sanhedrim" for the *assembly* of the *Apostles* is in mind, (as we literally see in one of the above cases, and in the other also, where *sundesmon*, falls to one phrase and *sunedrion*, to the other) but it is manifest that the Presbyters met in a body of some kind, and it is to them in their collectiveness that Ignatius refers.

This existence before the year 110, and at Ephesus too, of such a body inclines us to think of it, not as a new, but an old Institution; and as existing say, at Corinth in Clement's time, even though he makes no mention of it, and in the Congregation or Congregations to whom the Didache was addressed, though there, too, we are allowed no suspicion of its existence, by the text. In fact, an assembly of Elders that would be like an assembly of the Apostles, would be the most natural thing in the world, but we would expect both, to be similarly constituted and regulated, and this is just the idea we gather from Ignatius.

Ignatius speaks of Presbyters as well as of the Presbytery, and it needs only a reading of him to see that the powers of the Presbytery are the personal powers of the Presbyters, and not the impersonal ones of a body.

It is useless to attempt to learn from Ignatius the workings of the Presbytery, or the specific powers of Presbyters. The most distinct insight is that which we get from the fact that Ignatius always assumes that there is a Bishop (in the sense of after ages) along with the Presbytery, who occupies a higher office. The powers of the Presbyters are secondary powers. This is absolutely plain, and the question of Rule over Elders settled une-

quivocally. In the Epistle to the Magnesians, for instance, he says, "As I have known even holy Presbyters do, not judging rashly, from the manifest youthful appearance (of their Bishop) but as being themselves prudent in God, submitting to him, or rather not to him, but to the Father of Jesus Christ, the Bishop of us all. It is, therefore, fitting that you (the whole Church, we take it) after no hypocritical fashion obey (your Bishop) in honor of Him who has willed us (so to do) since he that does not so, deceives not, (by such conduct) the Bishop that is visible, but seeks to mock Him that is invisible."

But the exaltation of the Bishop in the writings of Ignatius is, as is well known, of the supreme order.

According to Ignatius, there is but one Bishop to each Church. He calls himself in the Epistle to the Romans "the Bishop of Syria" which implies that there might be but one Bishop for several Churches, but there are not several Bishops to one Church. In his mind, too, there are Bishops "*settled everywhere to the utmost bounds,*" and they who are so settled are in the mind of Jesus Christ. And, moreover, because "stewards of Christ, they are to be regarded as the Lord himself." According then to the testimony of this great writer of the early part of the second Century, there is not the ghost of a chance that the Special Functions were located in the "Presbytery."

On the other hand, the position of a Timothy or a Titus is paralleled and almost exaggerated in that of Onesimus of Ephesus, Polycarp of Smyrna, Demas of Magnesia, and Polybius of Tralles. Instead of less, we could infer from the tone, even more. But, at least, the subjection of the Church, Elders, and people, is made plain. These Bishops are indeed, "distinguished men" and correspond very closely, we would say, to such an officer as one of the prophetic and teaching Apostles of the Didache "settled" and "abiding" in a local Church. We all know how early traditions, which are accepted by early Fathers, ascribe to St. John and other Apostles a work in Asia Minor, along the line of this settling process.

The stress that Ignatius lays on the whole matter of order and harmony, and obedience of all to the Bishops and Presbytery, which he evidently regards among "the ordinances of the

Apostles" shows the welding process of new conditions with old still going on, and a matter of utmost anxiety to "the Bishop of Syria."

The Presbytery indeed, seems to resemble that Council of Presbyters around their Bishop which later became but a Bishop's appanage, so to speak. Supposing that before the Apostles of the Didache settled, the Presbyters used the Conciliar method largely, then when the Apostle settled (and became a Bishop more and more in later sense) the Council whether occasional or regular would gradually be changed as to its prestige, if not as to its usefulness; for the higher authority would be constantly on the ground, and it would more and more become an advisory body to him, rather than a determining body as it must needs have been before—a Council for Counsel, however, in both cases. This must have first taken place at *Jerusalem* under James, and then Simeon. In the year 110, it could hardly have existed with equal force everywhere even though Ignatius testifies to Bishops being "settled everywhere" to the utmost bounds, but it had full sway in Asia Minor, according to the picture presented in at least six out of the seven letters of this writer.

The picture some have drawn of Presbyters governing entirely as a board, and then the Moderator springing up into the Bishop of Ignatius' day, make just this fatal mistake—that Ignatius himself is the witness par excellence for the board theory, so far as there is any. Before him we have only one mention of a "Presbytery" that of St. Paul, in the Epistle to Timothy, and we have seen how little that text bears upon the very point to be determined. But in Ignatius the Presbytery which might at first be mistaken for a board, already seems almost an appanage to the Bishop. It is the "fitly wreathed spiritual crown or circlet," and is attuned to the Bishop as strings to a lyre.

If, then, the very existence of a Presbytery depends upon Ignatius, and yet in him is seen only as subordinate to the Bishop, manifestly Ignatius is not the witness wanted. But there is no other unless it be St. Paul, as above stated.

On the other hand, Ignatius gives the picture of a condition closely resembling, if not exactly representing, the constitution of a Church under a Bishop, a number of Presbyters, and

Deacons, just as was almost everywhere seen in times a little later. Before Ignatius, we have frequent sight of men of high powers engaged in general work, and of Presbyters occupied in local work, the transition from one condition to the other, from the condition of going about to that of being settled, must be explained, and either the extinction or the settling of the general workers must be alleged.

In the Didache we learn the general worker was allowed to settle. The extinction would be the extinction of peculiar and highly valued functions. The settling would be most natural. In the term applied by Ignatius "Bishop of Syria" rather than "Bishop of Antioch" we have somewhat of a clue even to the process. Then, in the case of Polycarp, we have Ignatius giving us Polycarp's status as Bishop, and the later Irenaeus pupil of Polycarp telling us, that Polycarp was "appointed Bishop of the Church at Smyrna by Apostles," while Polycarp himself indites his Epistle to the Philippians quite in consonance with this idea. In other words, while we look in vain for any evidence of a body having more powers than a Presbyter, we find distinct evidence of men who did so have, and the condition shown by Ignatius is but the inevitable effect of the "settling" of these men.

The reasons for such a settling, are those of *necessity*. The multiplication of Christians required larger numbers of general workers. They could easily and with advantage contract their territory. The example of Titus in Crete, could lead to the status of the "Bishop of Syria," and that of Timothy at Ephesus, to that of the "Bishop of the Church of the Smyrneans." There was necessity that the fields be somehow made distinct, and the old way of St. Peter and St. Paul, which was division along the line of Circumcision, and Uncircumcision, could no longer apply. Territorial limits seem eminently wise, and to have been so deemed by the men of those times. But while these general workers "settled" and took special territory, so as to avoid confusion, there was not forgotten for some time the older status, and respect was accorded them wherever they moved. On this ground we can understand the writing of letters by Ignatius, Clement, and Polycarp to other Churches than their own special charges, and also

we can see good reason for the tone of each of those letters. In everyone there is the sign of desire not to intrude, coupled with the tone of authority based on some sort of right to speak in a time of need. Some think this is the personal character of the writer manifesting itself, but it may just as well be a tone natural to position.

In the Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians there is no corroboration certainly of any Congregational theory that exalts Consent into Authority. So, also, there is no Bishop above Presbyters and Deacons anywhere in sight, unless the words "Polycarp and the Presbyters with him" be understood to agree with the Epistles of Ignatius as to Polycarp's precedence. There is no indication of a "Presbytery" in the Church at Phillipi. Presbyters are witnessed to, but the Presbyters are not addressed collectively or alluded to as a body. The absence of all reference to any one over them is marked. The condition is again like the condition of the same Church in its earliest days so far as anything in this Epistle is concerned. If the presence of a plurality of Presbyters be supposed to carry with it the theory of a governing body, rather than a number of governing men, then we have some indications *against* that view, for the Epistle gives instructions to the "Presbyters" which treats them as *individuals*, but covers a number of official duties, from visiting the sick, to the matter of severity of discipline; and distinctly points them to the day of Judgment. There is a sense of *individual* responsibility assumed, and not at all that of a body taking the responsibility as well as duty, from the individuals' shoulders.

Here are the words, "Being subject to the Presbyters and Deacons as unto God and Christ," (which clause of itself makes against the interpretation of subjection to a board or Presbytery by reason of the mention of the Deacons) "And let the Presbyters be compassionate and merciful to all the sick, etc.; abstaining from all wrath, respect of persons and unjust judgment, keeping far off from all covetousness, not quickly crediting (an evil report) against any one, not severe in judgment as knowing we are all under a debt of sin, for we are before the eyes, etc.;

"and we must all appear at the Judgment seat of Christ, and must every one give an account of himself."

As to the putting of Presbyters and Deacons before the people as God and Christ, this only places Polycarp by the side of Ignatius, except that Ignatius speaks the same language in regard to Bishops and Presbyters.

But this language gives us emphatically the idea that the Presbyters were for the Philippians the highest officers at hand. That could, of course, mean that the Special Functions were not exercised there, unless the Philippian Presbyters differed from all others. We have long ago seen that if Presbyters were given the Special Functions they would *ipso facto* pass beyond the rank of Presbyter. The analysis drove us to consider a Special *order*, or a Special *body* which was endowed with higher powers than the individual Presbyter, viz: Rule over Elders, Appeal and Ordination. If all Presbyters had Rule over Presbyters, etc.; there would be chaos. If one only, he would not differ in function from the Apostles. Evidently the whole status of things at Philippi is not given. Some may suppose there was a Presbytery of the board kind, in spite of silence, and the language above quoted, and some may suppose a man of Polycarp's rank somewhere in the background, in spite of some difficulties in the way. Some supposition has to be made, and it is only to be remarked that it will be a supposition.

Dr. Gore thinks that the recent passing through Philippi of Ignatius that tremendous insister on the threefold order, and believer in Bishop's "everywhere to the utmost bounds" gives us assurance that things at Philippi were normal to his thought and practice. If there were mentioned in this Epistle as there is in that of Clement "Rulers" (seemingly in contrast to Presbyters) or "distinguished men" there would be something definite to argue from. As it is, we are obliged to say that from this Epistle of Polycarp, we do not see where in the Philippian Church the Special Functions could be located, except by purest surmise, and we are left on the one hand, without the slightest evidence of a Presbyterial board; and on the other, our sole indication of testimony to the higher order, is the classification of Polycarp in the phrase "Polycarp and the Presbyters with him" taken in

connection with the evidence of Ignatius and Irenaeus, that Polycarp did indeed rank above the Presbyters of Smyrna.

The failure of this Epistle however to reveal the board of Presbyters that we have been looking for, compels us to come down to the *middle* of the Second Century without anything more in favor of such a body than the Epistles of Ignatius, such as that testimony is, and the phrase of St. Paul in his Epistle to Timothy. With the age of Irenaeus the hope of finding such a body must pass, and between Polycarp and his pupil Irenaeus, the gap is very small.

In the account of "the Martyrdom of Polycarp" we have an illuminating phrase concerning Polycarp's status in the Christian world that might help to shed light on his right to the tone of his letter to the Philippians, and certainly agrees with the idea of the existence of an order of men above the Presbyters of local Churches. It says of him, "Having in our own times been an apostolic and prophetic teacher, and bishop of the Catholic Church which is in Smyrna."

The last clause has the smack of a later writer, but the first apostolic and prophetic teacher sounds too much like the early Didache, and too little like the later ecclesiastic tone, to be so taken, and moreover, conforms so well with the words, "He said to them prophetically," used in a previous part of the account, as to have the note of genuineness.

In Hermas all that can be said, is that there is no mention of a Presbytery in any sense, and only such allusions to the officers, as to allow of the higher order, but not to prove it. He speaks of "Rulers;" of "those that love the chief seat," (or chief seats); of Apostles, Bishops, Teachers, and Deacons, "who have acted as bishops and teachers and deacons;" of "apostles and teachers who preached over the whole world;" of "presbyters who preside."

Our difficulty is that the date of Hermas is uncertain, and as Dr. Gore points out, the early date would probably give the word bishop one meaning, and the later date quite the other. If written when "his brother Pius" was Bishop of Rome, the enumeration of "Apostles, Bishops, Teachers, and Deacons," would mean the Twelve, the Bishops, the Presbyters and Deacons. If written

earlier, the term apostles would be vague, and the bishop and teachers would be identical officers.

The term "Presbyters who preside" is but a repetition of St. Paul's words to the Thessalonians, with the Presbyters made explicit in Hermas, while they were of course implicit in St. Paul. The predicate *proistamenos* is the same in both, and the men of the same order—local officers. As to the word, chief-seats, it sounds as if there might have been a kind of *sunedrion*, but then there is also the suggestion of a *kathedra*. The Rulers and those that love the chief seat, (or chief seats), are distinguished apparently, so that if we regard the language (that seems to avoid technicalities) as actually squaring with them, then the first would be the General workers, and the latter, the local—the Presbyters.

Justin Martyr gives us little to go upon. He speaks of "the Apostles in the memoirs composed by them which are called the Gospels" as though there were no need to separate Sts. Luke and Mark from the others in using such a term, but this may be only a lack of precision. Again he speaks of the one officiating at the "Eucharist" as the *proēstōs* which only carries us as far as St. Paul's *proistamenous*, and is as vague as *Hēgoumenos*, *poimēn*, *episcopus* or *presbuteros*, so far as separating between the orders is concerned. Historically, Justin belongs to an age when in many places at least, the General worker had "settled," and when present was the one who first of right would officiate at the "Eucharist," but where such a man was not "abiding" the Presbyters according to some system presumably, would have full right to act. However, we are not venturing to use Justin as far as this. For our investigation he is practically colorless, helping more to confirm an idea than to establish one.

Papias, Tatian, "Mathetes," Barnabas, Theophilus, and Athenagoras do not help us, except that Papias may be taken as the Bishop of Hierapolis, and, being so near the Apostles, help to confirm the idea of the "settling" process beginning very early. So too, if we grant that Theophilus was, as Eusebius states, the Bishop of Antioch after that Euodius who followed Ignatius, we would see the settling process becoming permanent. But the "Martyrdom of Ignatius," though not indubitably of the very

early age it purports, speaks of Ignatius, that he "Governed" the Church of the Antiochans with great care; and of Polycarp as the "Bishop of Smyrna."

Furthermore, this "Martyrdom of Ignatius" tells us the Churches of Asia through their Bishops and Presbyters and Deacons" welcomed Ignatius, and also calls them their "Rulers." Finally it says, "But the Bishop rejoicingly yielded to their (the soldiers) urgency," using the word "Bishop" in the way of a title as we would use it to-day. This may be a sign of a later date, or it may be an item of proof that it was written by friends who accompanied him, and were at home accustomed to so speak of him.

When we come to Hegessippus, to Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytus and Tertullian, we come to the age where the three degrees are so distinctly seen, that there is no need to multiply instances. Hegessippus, Irenaeus and Tertullian speak of the succession of Bishops in one or more of the Churches, in terms that allow us, no doubt of their meaning officers who were over both Presbyters and the Churches. Clement of Alexandria, speaks of the "Grades in the Church here on earth, of Bishops, Presbyters, Deacons." Hippolytus gives us the account of Callistus, "who was impelled by restless ambition to mount the Episcopal throne" at Rome. These things, and many more, leave us no doubt about conditions in this age. But very important are Clement's allusions to the "Apostle Barnabas" and mention of Clement of Rome as the "Apostle Clement" as fitting in, if not going so far as proving the idea that the Apostolic office was extended. So, also, when Irenaeus speaks as follows we catch the same idea. "We are in a position to reckon up those who were by the Apostles instituted Bishops in the Church to whom they were also committing the Churches themselves whom also they were leaving behind as their successors, delivering up their own place of government (magistracy, according to the Latin version) to these men."

On the other hand, in regard to any search for a Presbytery of any kind, our difficulty would be enhanced by the now widespread existence of this local Episcopate. That any author should go into details to the point of making it clear, how far the com-

bined result was due to each of the mingled degrees, would be unexpected indeed. For instance, Hippolytus tells us of the trial for heresy of Noetus, and though he uses the words "The blessed Presbyters" so great is the confusion of the use of that term at this time, (the early part of the 3rd Century) that we cannot tell whether they were the comprovincial Bishops of the suburbicarian diocese of Rome, or not; or (if it was not in Italian territory at all, but in Asia Minor), whether they were "Presbyter-Bishops, or simple Presbyters. At any rate, the whole mode of procedure is just what we would expect from a Council of the kind all along supposed to be possible and actual. It is not even known of what rank Noetus was or even whether he was a cleric. The custom of considering questions of Faith in Councils had probably been practiced from the first.

With Origin comes the age of Councils of Bishops, and Hippolytus reached into this period also. Cyprian, too, is the great caller of Councils both with his Presbyters and with the neighboring Bishops. There is indeed no use to go further. Jerome and Ambrosiaster will be noticed in the next chapter, and the customs of the age we have now reached are not in question at all. There were three orders in the Churches on every side. The Presbyters were losing power and prestige, and in fact the day for exaltation of the Bishops, to a point doubtless undreamed of by Ignatius, for all his ascription of place and honor to the Bishop, was at hand.

Thus we have run through the list of writers, to catch from them a view of things as they existed in their own day. A few side lights have been used, but the evidence to be used is that which bears upon the facts as they existed. We have very meagre notes, and the glimpses we catch are not those we can be sure of, yet it must be plain that the existence of three orders of men in the work is much plainer than that of two. The existence of three depends on positive exhibition of three. The existence of two only would rest on negative evidence, such as the failure of one or more documents to mention three. There is no declaration in favor of two, as there is for the existence of three. Finally, the only writer that can be used for positive evidence of a "Presbytery" is the very strongest in his assertion of three orders.

CHAPTER VII

Discussion of the Historical System in Ertensio

We are obliged to depend on History to tell us about any change in the matter of Church Government from the three-fold form which is exhibited in action during the Scriptural period, for after St. Paul's death there is still left a goodly number of General workers in the field. But previous to his death, nearly all Scripture had been written, and with the exception of St. John's Gospel and the Book of Revelation, all that bears at all on the matter of government. The former does not touch the period of the Church's growth, and the latter has but the brief reference to false Apostles, and the indeterminate term the "Angels" of the Seven Churches. *Practically, the Bible ends and leaves three orders in existence*, so we are compelled to look to History to test any alleged cessation of the highest order. St. Peter soon follows St. Paul; and St. James, certainly, and St. Jude, probably, do not survive the destruction of Jerusalem, but various early traditions mention some by name, as living after that event, and it is not reasonable to conclude that the year 71 saw the extinction of the General workers. The turning to History is therefore the most legitimate procedure imaginable in order to see what changes took place. Had Scripture foretold what would be the order of the Ministry after these men passed, the case would be different, but it makes no provision against the time when the General workers (who possessed the Special Functions) must needs be different men, or cease altogether. So we turn with clear conscience to the only source of information.

The facts which we believe we find are these: The General workers were growing more numerous, but were losing their prestige, from the double cause of the dying off of the well-known men, and the coming in of men who had to be tried and proved before allowed to exercise their authority or ministry, as they travelled from place to place. For insight into this condition, we have St. John's words in the Book of Revelation to the Church at Ephesus as to "false apostles" and the plain words of the Di-

dache concern the "Teachers, Apostles and Prophets" who came to the Churches of some region then uninstructed. Nothing could be more natural than this condition. Never mind what the Functions of these men were, yet that there were men engaged in general work, and who travelled about from place to place, according to some rule of course, but rules unknown to us, is granted by all. It may not be according to our former thought to conceive them as having such high Functions as to place them above Elders, but the Didache calls them "High-priests" and "Honored ones" and St. John implies for them high office. These men could "abide" and St. Ignatius speaks of those whom he calls Bishops as "settled" everywhere.

The condition depicted above could be met indeed by just such a process as this settling. St. Paul had himself, in the instances of Timothy and Titus, marked the way for the co-workers, but even the Great Apostles themselves had "abided" at different times and places. At first then, there would be a contraction of circuit, in some regions at least, and gradually there would come a much narrower limit, as they sought to respect each other amid crowding conditions. Traditions very probable and well attested, tell us of St. John in later life as engaged in just such work as establishing men over the various Churches, and also of others of the Apostles—Philip and Andrew probably, engaged with him. Polycarp is specifically said to have been so placed by the Apostles at Smyrna. Ignatius, calling himself Bishop of Syria, is generally known as Bishop of Antioch. Pothinus of the same age went from Asia to Gaul, and became Bishop of Lyons. The confusion as to Linus, Anencletus, and Clement at Rome, is best explained as due to some uncertainty as to whether to classify one of them according to his *range* or his *settlement*. Clement may have long remained in a travelling exercise of office; and finally have settled at Rome either because of the death, or resumption of missionary life by Linus, or Anencletus, just as some one else may have taken Crete when Titus went to Dalmatia. All of them lived in the age of transition, and each of them may have had in turn special, but not exclusive relations to Rome, during this time.

At any rate we are obliged to pass from the conditions seen

in the Didache to that seen in Ignatius. That of the Didache passed away and that of the Asia Minor Church came on apace. If the Apostle of the Didache settled, his name "Apostle" from its meaning would become out of place, and that of Episcopus become exactly descriptive. The twofold name which the local workers possessed, easily allowed that one could be spared. Up to the settlement all would be Episcopoi, but now this former Apostle was so essentially an overseer that custom would easily work the change. The opposing theory of the elevation of a Moderator to the name and work of Bishop implies a change that might happen in one or two places but not so simultaneously in so many, unless by direction of the Apostles. Besides there is no evidence of any regular body or permanent Moderator in all History or Scripture. And, finally, the struggle against a usurpation on the one hand, and, on the other, the ease of acceptance of a modification in the direction of convenience without addition of power for the officer, are qualities of human nature that make for the theory of settling against that of usurpation. 'Come, abide with us, and you will find in this our great city all the work you can do, now that you are getting on in years, and persecutions are threatening,' would be a very natural thing to be said amid the conditions of those times, and if, as we are told by early writers, the Apostles began the movement (placing Polycarp for instance over Smyrna) there was authority as well as nature.

The elevation theory grows out of words of Jerome, but these will be easily seen a little further on to indicate, naturally, another change, which was perfectly unavoidable under our supposition of the settlement theory. This elevation theory leaves the *General workers to die out, and their functions with them, and then recreates the functions*, by a process of concentration, or of usurpation on the part of one, of that which belonged to a body (or to all in a body), which body has to be assumed and its Moderator imagined. For no one pretends that a single Presbyter possessed Rule over Presbyters, but only the body of Presbyters, so that if one man finally possessed it, as we see in Ignatius, it was by concentrating the powers of all on one, or by usurpation of one over all. Against such a theory the leaning of History towards the settlement theory becomes a *relief*.

Now taking for granted the settlement of the rovers, and the fact however explained, that when they are found settled it is as overseers not so much of tracts of territory, like Titus; but rather of cities, like Timothy, we have conditions which need adjustment. These General workers when leading their roving life, on coming to any place where their claims were allowed, possessed the Special Functions, and so when they settled, they introduced into *local* work the continual supervision which before had been occasional. Now, this element of high authority had to be provided for in seemly manner, and yet the long enjoyed prestige of the Presbyters sufficiently guarded.

It is Cyprian, the strenuous Bishop of Carthage, who in his 5th Epistle, said "I made up my mind to do nothing on my own private opinion, without your advice (the Presbyters and Deacons of Carthage), and without the consent of the people" just as in the other direction the fervent Ignatius had, one hundred and forty years before, urged the Churches to "Do nothing without the Bishop and the Presbyters." Whether the Presbyters formed a regular body we can not tell, but is probable that they had some kind of organization which did not rob them of their personal authority of office but enabled them to act in concert. Such a body it is true nearly always ends by taking to the body much more power than was contemplated in the beginning, but the Presbyters' personal functions were by ordination, while the body could only claim to derive from the act of unison, both its existence and its authority, and so the rights of a Presbyter were somewhat guarded.

Now when the "Apostle" settled, his relation to the presbyters would be the same whether they met in Council or not. St. Ignatius' use of the word Presbytery implies that they did so meet, and certainly the power to do so was settled as early as the times of the Council of Jerusalem. St. Ignatius tells of the Presbytery "attuned to the Bishop as the strings to the Cithera;" and such a relation seems to satisfy the former conditions, the several powers, the essential dignities of both settling "Apostle" and the local officers. If the settling theory be true, what admirably tuned and justly phrased letters those of the lion-hearted "Bishop of Syria" are. He had doubtless been a General worker ere selected for a

settled work by the Apostles (as Timothy might have been permanently settled by St. Paul before him, had St. Paul so decided) and therefore his right to speak, and his tone of speaking, become plain.

And now there comes another problem to look into. These first workers and settlers would die, but the territorial arrangements whatever they might be, would remain. How then, would their successors be appointed? At the very first glance we would say he would be taken from the ranks of the local officers, and possibly by some scheme of seniority, as that arrangement which best avoided hard feelings. And so it seems historically to have been done. Jerome is often quoted to show that at first "The Churches were governed by the common Council of the Presbyters" but that after "each one began to reckon those whom he baptized as belonging to himself" (alluding of course to the beginning of the "Heresiarchs") it was decreed throughout the whole world that one elected from the Presbyters should be set over the rest, that he should have the care of the whole Church, that the seeds of schisms might be destroyed." Jerome is also supported by other evidence, needless to be here given, that the first Bishops were taken from the Elders of the particular Church over which he became chief officer. Now if Jerome's expression "governed by the common Council of the presbyters" be taken to prove a Presbytery of a *particular* kind, that point is to be combated; but if that question be not raised, it is undoubtedly true that before the General workers settled, the local officers were presbyters who had full liberty of meeting in common Council. Jerome in assigning the cause why the Bishop arose, as the need made manifest by the rise of "Heresiarchs," is surely correct, in so far as this was one of very chiefest reasons. Heresiarchs presented the charm, naturalness and power of a single name and personality. It was time for the chief authority in each Church to stand out as a person, rather than as a common Council. A personal leadership always has advantage over a collective one, in contests with personal opposition, but if the personal be added to the collective, then so much the better by a great deal. Jerome shows the Church's wisdom certainly. But, other conditions contributed of course, which he does not go into. Undoubtedly, too, he is correct

in stating that "One elected from the Presbyters should be set over the rest, that he should have the care of the whole Church, that the seeds of schisms might be destroyed." We are surprised to read "It was *decreed* throughout the whole world," but we would expect to find it *done* throughout the whole world.

Of course, if this simultaneous rising up of the Church in favor of one man having the care of the whole Church, (local of course), was in the time when still there lived the General workers, they would be provided for—that need not disturb the problem, and where they were lacking, as would naturally happen in many regions, the election of one of the Elders already tried and proved, would be the most fit and wise proceeding. We read in St. John and the Didache about the trying and proving of the General workers, and, afterwards, even a Roman Emperor, commends the custom of the Christians, posting the names previous to selection or ordination so that objection might be made.

It is Ignatius who fixes approximately the period when the change in the local Churches took place, for it is he that tells of Bishops "everywhere to the utmost bounds." The words "elected" and "set over" carry us right back to the selection and appointment of the Seven as given in the Scriptures, and we would expect this setting over to be by ordination, but Jerome is not to be quoted for this, but rather against it, as we shall see. Jerome does however show us that the time was very early, for he puts it for Alexandria as early as the time of *St. Mark*, so that when we hear him saying "It was decreed" we also can add "from St. Mark."

Ambrosiaster's words, so often found alleged against the three-fold order, fit in here. "Every Bishop is a Presbyter, but not every Presbyter is a Bishop." The settling process made a local officer of him who had been a General worker. He joined in with the local work and so identified himself with the workers as to share their name. As we know, the word Presbyter is the most general of all, not even squinting in the direction of official *Function*. St. John and St. Peter both claim it, and both at a time when they had settled down.

Furthermore, since St. Paul and St. Ignatius both speak of "the Presbytery," and in any kind of Council of Presbyters, the higher officer would take part, it was a title truly applicable to the

"Apostle" who had given up the work that made appropriate the term apostle and had taken one in which his work would be that of Bishop and Elder. If he fell heir to the word Bishop as his title exclusively, because now presumably, the overseer, why could he not share (as he did in fact for a long stretch of time) the title of Elder? Finally, he was from the first elected from the Elders in some places, and soon in all, and as Ambrosiaster himself says "In the Bishop are all orders," so he was entitled to the name.

The Church in Alexandria long held to the custom of taking one of the Presbyters for Bishop. Learned writers dispute over the exact status and process, but at least all agree that when Jerome says that, "From Mark the Evangelist even to Heraclas and Dionisius, the Bishops, the Presbyters always named as Bishop one elected from themselves and placed in a higher grade," testimony is borne to the fact that out of themselves came the higher officer. Now we will recall that at Carthage, in Cyprian's day, that illustrious *layman* was made Presbyter and then Bishop with great opposition from the Presbyters, so that the old custom was broken in his day in more places than at Rome.

Next, we have a change which, very natural and seemingly necessary, leads to further changes apparently un contemplated by the Apostles, if, indeed, as has been asserted by early writers, they themselves introduced the settling of the General workers, and the election and appointment of others to the local Episcopate, which we have just discussed.

It has been seen that Jerome gives as the reason for the Episcopate, the rise of Heresiarchs, and the need of conditions in the Church to combat the evil; and we have seen that one of the Presbyters was to be taken; but let us suppose the rule of seniority to be the governing principle of the election, then we must also see that very old and, oftentimes, inferior men would be chosen. There are writers who point to the short Episcopates of early ages to show that besides persecution, some principle like that of seniority is necessary to be assumed in order to account for those facts. It could well have been so as a general thing, but hardly as a fixed rule. St. Paul's words to Timothy about "those able to teach," implies that practical reasons were to be

heeded. Ignatius speaks of Damas as quite young. James of Jerusalem could not have been the oldest of that Church. Jerome says, "elected," which implies a certain freedom. And for these reasons and on the general principle of common sense, we would only regard the idea of seniority as prevailing by reason of a strong bias in its favor.

But, if once the election was not bound by rule, then as the age of heresy advanced, the tendency to select according to fitness would be increased. So, actually, we find no compelling rule applying, and when once the minds of men turned entirely to the stress of heretical pressure, and the necessity for learning and ability, the election takes wider scope, and we soon find it possible for Cyprian to be taken as a layman against the wishes of the Presbyters. Consent of the people has asserted itself in the vital matter of election, and the Bishop is finally chosen very much as the people of each Church prefer. How far the Authorities aided the pressure rising from the people, is too large a digression here, but at least we must look to popular feeling as bringing about the change.

It may look to some, as if there had been a Presbytery of the strictest order, and that its aged Moderator had gradually changed into a Bishop, but the line of changes above given seems at once, more historical and plausible. That the later Bishops exercised the Special Functions is perfectly clear and admitted. and whether we should take the theory of the reestablishment of these functions, after their loss along with that of the General worker, or the theory of their being usurped from the body of the Presbytery by the Moderator, we would have a task, in which none of the writers of that age, would assist us, and across the path of which those words of Jerome, "It was decreed throughout the whole world" would lie. For, Ignatius, by saying, that Bishops were settled everywhere to the utmost bounds cuts off all (even if they were favorable) after himself, and leaves the Didache and Clement as the only writings to explain the movement claimed.

We may wonder both how Ignatius knew of the fact of settlement, and Jerome of the "decree that one elected from the Presbyters should be set over the rest," but these are unqualified

statements of the very two writers who stand preeminently forth as witnesses for "the Presbytery" and the "common Council of the Presbyters." It is sufficient to say that if Ignatius and Jerome be taken away as witnesses for the existence of Presbyteries, all that is solid quakes under the foot of that system, and if they be left, the decree and the facts above mentioned are placed in evidence. But only add the Didache to these two, and from the three witnesses the General workers are seen *becoming* localized; men who will be made equal in function to these General-workers are seen elected out of the Presbyteries; these presbyteries become "attuned" to the former, "as strings to a Cithera" and Authority and Consent are seen taking counsel together for the good of all.

There is yet the problem of the customs relating to the regulation of these new local officers, the Bishops, to be explained. We have just seen how the General workers settled, and became Bishops rather than Apostles—overseers, rather than delegates or messengers; and how, where these were not available, Presbyters were elected to the same rank, and set over the rest of the Presbyters. We have also seen that one of the chief reasons for this strengthening of the local Church by the addition of this higher officer to the local staff, was the rise of heresies taking head and front under Heresiarchs, men who had a *personal* following.

So now we find the local Churches no longer under the rule of officers who are *Hēgoumenoi*, *proēstotes*, *poimenes*, *episcopoi*, *Kubernētoi*, and *presbuteroi*, but both officers and people under the rule of one man who is essentially all of these, and draws to himself all the titles, except *presbuteros*, almost to the exclusion from them of the other officers. (He could possibly be given this also, but does not do more than share it with the rest.)

There was need of a leader, a shepherd, one who should be stationed in front, an overseer, a pilot, and so he was found already provided and easily available through a slight though most significant change of the working plan of the Church's system. But, though losing their titles to a great extent, the Elders still retained their place and functions, and, as a Council, continually consulted, a very great part of their prestige.

However, there was always the tendency to the strengthening of the Bishop, rather than of the Presbyters. Had these Presbyters formed a close corporation by themselves, and stood over against the Bishop as *unit to unit*: they would have had greater resisting power, but the Bishop was one of themselves—a member of the Council, so that *as a Council* there was little chance of antagonistic struggle. Historically, their Council became an appanage of the Bishop, as soon as the drift of circumstances opened the way. The Presbyters, however, though they stood as Authority towards the people, towards the Bishop they constituted a kind of head and front of Consent, and as such, never lost their usefulness. The progress of the world has ultimately made a difference in tendency, and Councils have often taken revenge, so to speak, on the Bishop.

However, since this was the status of affairs after the local Episcopate (first exemplified at Jerusalem doubtless, and then at Antioch, etc.,) came into view, what control was provided for these numerous Bishops? Manifestly the ancient Episcopal jurisdictions were small—a City or a small town even, as a general rule. But this compelled the number of Bishops to grow excessive, and even though they were select men taken from the long tried Presbyters, it cannot be supposed they did not need restraint.

Now the Apostles had no one over them, and the roving General workers seem to have had no controllers, nor were there any functions of office higher than the Apostolic ones—the Special Functions, yet, nevertheless, the very number of these men made a dangerous condition. The right of election, notoriously belonging in last resort to the people and recognizedly so in the Churches, implies the right of holding all officers to account even if their Authority descend from above, but this was not enough. Historically, therefore, we see the rise of Councils of Bishops. This was not the only cause of these Councils of course, but it was one. It could not but be, that affairs that concerned a number of Churches would be consulted about. Had not the Apostles come together to “consider of” a matter of general interest? And was there not a general right and duty of consultation just from general principles? Here was the age of heresies that threatened whole regions, and truly the Conciliar plan was the only

one in sight. At first they must have been very local, and as early as the age of Polycarp we find that certain general differences between regions far apart were dealt with by a *conference* between representative leaders rather than anything like a Council—Polycarp coming to Rome. Later, Irenaeus does the same thing. But the age of Councils of Bishops could not be staved off. In Cyprian's day they were a frequent thing, provincially, and soon came even the General Councils.

The control of Bishops soon became the gist of the business of Councils, and under the plea of unifying customs, the territory of every Bishop was invaded, and things set in order as the Councils saw fit. In a little while the exigency of Councils brought the Metropolitan, and then the Patriarchal system, and finally paved the way for a presidency of Council to be alleged as a right to supremacy over the world. So, if, on the one hand, the Bishop in a Diocese throttled the Council of Presbyters, on the other, the Councils of Bishops throttled the Bishops, until once more the Conciliar plan terminated in one man claiming power over Councils and Bishops and Churches in one vast system of Autocracy. Thus we have in sight the terrors of the evil that may follow both the Conciliar and the Personal plan.

But it may be said that the true Conciliar plan was never followed, and that if the Conciliar body had been from the first allowed to act as a unit that possessed its powers as such, there never would have been the results that History exhibits, as things wind up towards an Autocracy. The answer to which is, that, either, that existence and action and power as a unit *never was*, or that the alleged unit was so weak as to lose its existence at the very first stage of History.

In spite of leading to Autocracy, and interference, the winding up process had its good results. Heresy was become a world power, and only a power as broad could prove as strong. If Jerome is right in saying that Heresiarchs led the Church to further developments in the line we have followed, "Anthanasius against the world," is the tribute of ages to the power of Personality. In spite of Rome's ultimate Autocracy we can hardly believe that heresy could have been met unless there had been a channel for concentrated powers. As the Empire weakened, and

flew to pieces, Consent began to *rage* against Authority; and had not Authority been able to gather itself to a head, the Faith may have suffered longer and more greatly than is now the case. Councils made a Pulpit for Anthanasius and Leo, as well as a throne for Hildebrand.

We turn to consider the nature of the Councils of Bishops, which so soon hide from sight the Councils of Presbyters. Were they such bodies as we have combatted—bodies of the Board type—or. Councils for counsel? In the beginning they were of the latter kind, and gradually took on more and more the character of the former. They have never attained the goal to which they travel, because of the difficulty of finding an executive for their decrees. If Consent will execute Decrees all is smooth; but if it will not, there must be found an Executor. An Executor over Bishops is not provided by Christ, or the Apostles; and can only be provided by the Church, out of the powers of Consent, but in *accordance with* the system of the Founder. Metropolitans and Patriarchs were tried. The difficulty lay in the fact that their *Functions of office* were no greater than those of the ordinary Bishops. This is Christ's protection of His system against usurpation. It must come back to its bearings, however far it wanders away. Popes came in through the need that General Councils had of an Executive, but even a Pope could only have the *Special Functions*. Inasmuch as Christ had never given any man Rule over "Apostles," there were no Functions of Office adequate to the task undertaken. In the case of Metropolitans and Patriarchs there could be no claims like those of Rome, "Feed my sheep." Before ever the stage of Papacy was reached and entrenched behind that text, the movement could have been stopped at the Metropolitan, but Consent was with it, and the movement went on. When it reached the Papacy, the world heard for the first time that Christ had given Peter authority over the rest of the Apostles. Consent paused, but acquiesced, and then, with the light of the Word making plain day, revolted. and shore off the Protestant half of Europe almost in a generation.

But if the tendency was to consolidation of the powers of Council until it should claim all things for its Executive, in

the beginning it was not so. The Council of Presbyters, which at first had no executive greater than one of its members, found one ready at hand, under the System of the Master Himself, in the General workers, whose Functions of Office included Rule over Elders; but for the Council of Bishops, no executive was to be had. Consent was therefore necessary to its decrees in so far they touched a member, or invaded his Diocese. This was wrung oftentimes by threats of withdrawal from communion with him, (which is one of the weapons of Consent, and quite different from Excommunication, which comes *ex-auctoritate*, as we see in St. Paul's Epistles), but still matters stayed for awhile under the status of this Consent. But Consent implies that the nature of the Council was deliberative and advisory—a means for gaining common and concentrated action.

If it surprises us to see the apparent weakness of the Church when we note this crowd of Bishops under no superior control, it will help us to consider that *up to this point* Authority is very firmly seated, and now by means of the rights and powers of *Consent*, can adapt itself very admirably to circumstances, as History shows us by the Metropolitan and Patriarchal system. But not so firmly seated ought it to be in a region where tyranny is easy, and hard to be met. The appeal of Authority to its powers must be limited somewhere, and Consent ought to have play on the higher, as well as the lower regions of control. There must be always scope for successful reduction of Authority to its limits. If a Council were placed over the Bishops as of God's law, then since Councils always create Executives, the end would be personal rule. If a person were placed over Bishops there would be personal rule at once. Then who would rule these persons? Other Councils? Other Rulers? The end would be the Papacy all over again. Some limit must be reached, and, following the bestowal of Functions of Ministry, that limit falls naturally where Scripture and History put it.

Besides, even if Dioceses historically began as small affairs, there is no law against their becoming larger. Why need Bishops be so numerous, and Dioceses, the units of the Church, so small? Convenience and conditions that stress certain needs vary. The age of larger Dioceses came, and with no law against them. The

very elasticity of the Episcopate that springs from General workers, Apostles, is one of the safeguards.

So, then, care of selection from tried Presbyters, Consent below and above them, liberty and necessity of Councils, responsibility, publicity of life and teaching, and the elasticity of the system, reduce the problem to quite tolerable proportions. But who shall guard the guards, is always a question—and the guards of the guards as well?

Our Lord places none over the Apostles. Except in a Papacy there must always be some guardless, and even then, there is a Borgia, rare subject for discipline, and Honorius the anathematized. If it be only the point where to let Authority stop, there can be no better point found than where the Scriptures place it—the General workers. Controlling conditions, rather than controlling persons, are then encountered.

History brings to our view another matter connected with the settling of the Apostle. In the Didache there is a form given for the "Thanksgiving" that is to say the Holy Communion, but the "Prophet" of that document, who is identified by it with the "Apostle" can use his own extempore words. At any rate the General worker was recognized as having special right to consecrate the bread and wine. So too, he was essentially a Preacher. When then he settled and became Bishop, or when a Presbyter was made Bishop, these two Functions were looked upon as belonging especially to him, and after him to the others. If he was present, it was natural for him to take the place of precedence in the offices of worship. Afterwards there was such a development of this idea, that the right to Preach in the presence of the Bishop was esteemed.

The right to celebrate comes up in the time of Polycarp's visit to Rome where he is described as requested to take the place of honor by Anicetus.

Also in Justin Martyr's allusions to the Ministry, it perhaps helps us to understand Him as meaning the Bishop when he speaks of the *proëstōs* for it is as presiding in the celebration of the Eucharist that he presents him to our view. Now in Jerome we come across the expression "For what does a Bishop do, that a Presbyter may not do except ordination?" and it is probable that

he is meaning in the sphere of Functions of Worship. Jerome would hardly deny to the Bishop of his own day either Appeal, or Rule over Elders, but in the sphere of *Worship* he means that the Presbyter can baptize, preach, celebrate and possibly confirm. In the Alexandrian Church of which Jerome is speaking, this was done by Unction and Laying on of Hands. The Bishop consecrated the oil, and the Presbyters could do all the rest. Jerome is not in accord with the rest of antiquity, if he should mean to deny a distinction in the matter of confirmation as well as ordination. In History we see not only the keeping of the Scriptural distinctions between the two orders, but even a tendency to take away from Presbyters, and lay on Bishops, extra honor in the Functions of Worship.

The question of ordination, as seen in History, must be investigated as well as the paucity of evidence in first centuries allows, and in this connection we must recall our former discussions of ordination according to the Scriptures. It will be recalled, that we concluded that we fail to find in Scripture evidence of the same man being carried through three ordinations, but rather the evidence seemed to indicate that while there were three ranks there were no promotions from rank to rank. Now in later History we find just the opposite. There were three grades, and a man entered the Ministry as Deacon, and passed up by successive ordinations. At the very least, the later centuries carried the customs of Scripture and early times to a degree of development not originally seen. The Key to this process seems found, when Jerome tells how it was decreed that Bishops should be elected from the Presbyters, and put over them. This would mean we would ordinarily think, an Ordination (just as if a Deacon should be made Presbyter); and, if so, the bridge between Scripture and History would be easily crossed. For while in Scripture a Local worker is not seen passing to become a General worker, yet when, in History the General worker becomes localized, and this decree causes the promotion of one of the Local Presbyters, we would see all things harmonized by an ordination to the "higher grade," as St. Jerome calls it. Even if we do not actually see promotions in Scripture we could not construe that fact to actually bar promotions. Jerome shows that the promotion to the "higher grade"

took place for Alexandria as early as "St. Mark the Evangelist," and his words "It was decreed throughout the world" must have reference to the same period, both because of his reference to St. Mark, and because of Ignatius' formerly quoted words as to the fact of settlement. So therefore we must conceive the failure to see the system of promotion in Scripture as due not to any rule against it, but to circumstances that made it only occasional at so early a period.

But as a fact, Jerome rises up as a seemingly positive witness against the rightness of a further ordination after the grade of Presbyter, alleging that it was not Scriptural, and that the custom of Alexandria was against it. Thus we are face to face with the question (now very old) did the Church wrongly place an ordination between the Presbyter and this promoted Presbyter called Bishop, thus causing an unscriptural distinction; or is St. Jerome wrong? First, let us understand Jerome. In his day Bishops could ordain, while Presbyters could not. He recognizes this, for he says "what can a Bishop do, that a Presbyter may not do except ordination?" But he says this comes of "The Church's custom" and not "the Lord's disposition" because Presbyters and Bishops were Scripturally of the same degree. Then he further alleges that in Alexandria the Presbyters simply *acclaimed* the one taken out of their number as Bishop; and this too, from the time of St. Mark, to that of the Bishop's Heraclas and Dionysius (Heraclas was the pupil of Origen, and succeeded Demetrius, who was the Bishop of Alexandria in Origen's time.)

There can be no manner of doubt about Jerome's position. He accepts the ecclesiastical arrangements of his day, but he declares them brought about by "Church custom" and not of Scriptural authority. He argues his case. Bishops and Presbyters were identical in Scripture, is the burden of his remarks in his "Commentary on Titus;" and in his Epistle "*Ad Evangelium*," where he is asserting the dignity and ancient prerogatives of Presbyters, he brings forward the Alexandrian Church as illustrating the original ways of things, when Bishops were first separated from the rest of the Presbyters and "set over" them. This way was, until Heraclas, like the way an army made its General, or the Deacons their Archdeacons.

But while his position is clear, it cannot be said that his statement of the procedure in the Church of Alexandria is sufficiently explicit to enable us to judge of its full status. There may have been something which would explain the divergence of Alexandria from the rest of the world that Jerome has not told us. However Jerome certainly means that there was no ordination when one of the Alexandrian Presbyters was set over the rest, and, for Jerome, this bears witness that originally there was none.

Clearly Jerome's whole position is, that the ordination which the Church placed between the two grades, and also the bestowal of exclusive right to administer ordination which the Church made to belong exclusively to the Bishop, are "Church customs" only. But at every stroke of his pen, he brings out the customs of the Church, and shows both that the Church of Alexandria differed from the rest of the world, and that he, Jerome had the *customs of the Church* opposed to himself.

Apart from Jerome we know that ordination was administered to a Presbyter when he was made Bishop, but Jerome's quotation of Alexandria, shows what was done elsewhere than at Alexandria. Jerome too, is most valuable as a witness to the fact that the distinction of grades as an actuality, however marked or made by ceremonies, took place very early everywhere, and at Alexandria from the time of St. Mark.

Now, if the actuality of difference was to exist between Presbyters and Bishops, there surely could be no evil in using ordination rather than acclamation. Jerome shows that at Alexandria there was the difference, but he claims there was no ordination. We can not but believe the custom of the rest of Christianity was better than that of Alexandria, so far as that is concerned. The real evil, if evil was committed, was in the taking power from Presbyters and creating another order over them, however it was done as regards ceremonies. In Scripture there was but one ordination because a local worker was not made a General worker, but if he had been promoted would it surprise us to find it done by means of a religious rite in addition to simple appointment? Beyond question, however, Jerome is a hostile witness against our main position in this chapter. We can use him to help us in

some important matters, but he emphatically says the Church customs which we have treated were not Scriptural. He does not claim usurpation for the beginning, and distinctly says it was by decree, and throughout the world, and at Alexandria as early as St. Mark, yet still it was not of "Christ's dispositions" but the "Church's custom." He does not stand for the rights of *Presbyteries*, but for the rights of Presbyters, yet he sees in Bishops not a perpetuation of old things, but a beginning of new, not Apostles localized but actual Presbyters given greater responsibilities because of special needs.

Against Jerome's opinion stands the "customs of the Church." She, according to himself, had no unworthy motives. The Hierarchy made a need, and to *meet it*, she adopted the Episcopai system. She ordained them probably because she was religious. But it must be remembered that what the Church did, was done, with the facts in plain view, and at a time when probably even Apostles were living, while Jerome is the digger up of dusty records, and the one puzzling over century old documents. Jerome makes nothing of the General workers of Scriptural days. He forgets Clement's words "Those appointed by them, or afterwards by *other eminent men*." He ignores the "Apostles" of the Didache. He fails to catch the import of St. Mark's abiding or settling at Alexandria. He catches at the identity of the words Bishop and Presbyter in Scripture, keeps his mind fixed on the local workers, finds the "decree" as to the change in the local Churches, reads some *exceptional conditions* formerly existing at Alexandria as the *rule* of early days (and perhaps reads it wrong), and comes to the statement that "the Bishops should know that they are greater than the Presbyters, rather by custom than the truth of a disposition of the Lord." Yet were there not men *after the Apostles* who could *appoint* Presbyters, as Clement shows? If Jerome asks "what can a Bishop do that a Presbyter may not do, except ordination?" as the essential of difference between the orders in his day, can it not be said that the distinguished or "eminent men who came afterwards" (after the Apostles) had that same personal power, as early as the first century, and that too, by Apostolic arrangement? Truly, if we must have Jerome or the Custom of the Church against us, let it be Jerome, with himself as wit-

ness that the Custom speaks in our favor. And since Jerome is certainly a hostile witness, it is well that he leaves us no doubt as to where we can find the one opposed to him.

But if Jerome shows that the Church's motives were good, and that in religious spirit she ordained this Bishop, yet he leaves us wondering from what source came the power to make the difference we see between the orders. (He is not right in saying that the difference lay only in ordination; for if the Bishop was "set over the rest" that implies some degree of Rule and Appellate Jurisdiction, and this was the fact as well as right to ordain.) As Ambrosiaster says, "It never was lawful or permitted that an inferior should ordain a superior, for nobody gives us what he has not received." Where then was the right of ordination vested before? Not in a single Presbyter, for no one ever taught or heard of that as a tenable position. In the body of Presbyters then? In that case, the body must have had powers not derived from its members, but transcending them—collectively they must have had a function which no one of them singly possessed. St. Jerome now makes them (at Alexandria which he takes as the type for right procedure) by simple acclamation pass this power to a single man. In truth, he either had it before, or thus received it. But when Jerome tells of acclamation, he is not claiming for that any virtue, but using it to show that the Presbyter had the power already, and of right. Jerome and every other man must choose in such a situation between the rocks of—Acclamation as a source of Authority in the Church; Right of a single Presbyter to ordain; and Possession by a body of greater power than any member. And, since Jerome would certainly rule out the Acclamation idea, he would doubtless be found, *like many another* balancing first on one foot, and then on the other, claiming a great deal for the Order of Presbyters but never sure whether the powers vest in the man or the body, the officer or the order, the Presbyter or the Presbytery.

The Church's "Custom" on the other hand is easily explained. From the first she believed in Authority from above, in men, and in ordination.

The explanation of the Alexandria mystery is doubtless along the line of the glimpse that Epiphanius gives us of several "Con-

gregations" in Alexandria. The heads of these may have been of true Episcopal powers, and the Bishop of Alexandria really a kind of Metropolitan. Its early history may not have been closely investigated by Jerome. The old word "Presbyter" may have held its place to the confusion of a man living so late as the end of the fourth century. But all this depends on the Scholars.

Part III

Bearings and Deductions

CHAPTER I

Discussions of Modern Systems

I—THE PAPAL SYSTEM

Not only is there no trace of an Autocratic System in the early ages of Christianity, both the Scriptural and the Historical divisions, but such a system was *impossible*.

We know exactly the conditions which made the Papacy an actuality, whatever in the previous years the *mere theory* may have found to rest itself upon.

Rule over Apostles, and after they passed, Rule over Bishops is as essential to the Autocratic Theory, as Rule over Elders is to the Episcopal. We must find conditions that *allow* it before we can allege the thing itself.

Now the steps which led to the Papacy are the steps which brought conditions enabling Rule over Bishops; and the Church did not grow into forms admitting this, till certain gradual changes forced themselves into permanence.

As long as there were but a few Christians amid large masses of heathen, Heresy was dealt with locally, because it was natural and possible, but when Christians covered the earth, Heresies were no longer local, and could no longer be dealt with locally. Then too, again, Heresies changed from being well marked, gross, easily detected and defined errors, to the subtle and intricate theories of the age of Councils; from the condition of a system in itself, to that of a secret sore in the heart of orthodoxy; from the claims of men to be new Incarnations of the Holy Ghost, to assertions of distinctions and identities within the profound region of Christ's twofold Nature. These exceedingly refined forms, and this widespread existence of Heresy drove the Churches not only to unity of decree, but effective excommunication.

In rising to meet such attacks by the only means of which she could think, the Church brought into existence for the first time the machinery that allowed Rule over Bishops.

As the system of Defence became perfected, the machinery

lent itself to the conditions enabling Rule over Bishops by one Ruler. Jerusalem sank into weakness; Antioch and Alexandria became at times leaders of Heresies; the Ruler must come from Constantinople, or Rome; and secular conditions united with religious prestige, and made it, so far as the West was concerned, Rome. When the Patriarchal crowning of the Provincial System appeared, the end drew very near; and yet still there remained the to this day, unsettled battle between the two great rivals. Between the Universal Father and the Ecumenical Bishop the strife lasted till, unable to find the long sought spot of Heresy on the garment of either, the thunderbolts of excommunication were launched on any grounds remotely available. Then in the West came Barbarism and Feudalism to complete the Rule over Bishops; while in the East settlement of Creed was taken to be the call to regard all things as ready for Crystalization, which the dying of the Empire aided from the secular side of things. In early days *withdrawal* of communion was the customary extreme of pressure against a Bishop or a Church, but later the great weapon of delivery to Satan, excommunication, and that, too, with anathema, was resorted to; and for this, Authority needed to perch very high. When it came to such a procedure between two little Bishops of adjacent towns there was very little Rule about it, but when the Patriarch of Rome or Alexandria thundered from the throne in a Council, it was a different matter, and it is very clear that Heresy made Provincial and General Councils, and Councils made Patriarchs. If the Ssystem never reached the point of just one Ruler for the world actually, it reached the point of claims undoubtedly.

But apart from the sight of the machinery by which Rule over Bishops was actually effected, and the impossibility of that particular kind of machinery being put in place sooner than it was, it is when we try to imagine what other machinery could possibly have been devised to secure Rule over Bishops, in the first two centuries, let us say, that we are brought up against the fact that the whole mode of first establishing Christianity precluded any such Rule over Bishops from being attempted.

In the Apostles' time it would have been Rule over Apostles, let us remember, and it is only after the settling of the General workers, and the birth of local Episcopacy, that the question

takes the form of Rule over Bishops. This very change to local Episcopacy would mean a change in any system that attempted to meet the new condition. The actual Church system for Rule over the People, and for Rule over the Presbyters too, we see, and we see also how the first provision for Rule over Presbyters was attended with great difficulties and after a while was modified to suit the enlarged conditions; but what possible plan there could have been devised to secure Rule over Apostles, and then Bishops, is a matter of serious perplexity. In this matter we are not aided by the sight of any *skeleton even* of an actual system. It was not, as a fact, attempted, and we know not along what lines of centralization, or delegation, or Conciliar action, it could have been tried. If, from the beginning, the system of planting Christianity had been different, a different system of control might have been initially begun, but with the system of planting arranged, as it was, by the scattering process, under stress of secular conditions; and with Churches springing up in remote regions through the return of Jewish worshippers converted during stay at Jerusalem, the planting system itself could not be systematized. Assuming the planting, what law of control at centre, or from centre by deputyship was possible?

When we come to actualities, we can find nowhere in the Acts or Epistles, or Early Church writers, any signs of provision for a system of Rule over Bishops. We have been in all these last chapters trying to trace the system of Rule over *Elders*, and found the guiding facts few enough, but beyond the facts that a Council could be held for common consideration of any question, and that St. Paul seems to have exercised some control over Timothy and Titus for instance, we are at a loss to know what data we could gather for Rule over Bishops from Scripture; while in History, the attempt at conferences, remonstrances more or less formal, and finally the beginning of Councils of Bishops appear, and the latter develops into a system which, as we saw, afterwards bore fruit.

The study of the beginning of Councils shows how far the Church was from designing the end. It is Cyprian who more than any one else adopts the Conciliar plan, but it is Cyprian also who maintains the equality of Bishops in and out of Councils. and the aim of Councils "To order all things with the religiousness of a

common consultation," Epis. XIII. It was not quite the age for the "*Brutum fulmen.*"

Here we must distinguish between the necessity for the Church to deal with Heresy, and the use of the machinery devised for that purpose to accomplish any other object in its desire.

One of the dangers of a foreign war is, the creation of an army that may be used against the citizens. Our Lord's arrangement for defence against Heresy seems to have been Scripture, the Gift and Guidance of the Holy Ghost, and the *Balance* between Authority and Consent which is in His own keeping.

Councils legitimately used are for the purpose of securing Consent. When they are turned into canons, (sic) of Authority they destroy Consent. The English Church has found a way out, by refusing to acknowledge the Authority of a Council, unless it has the Consent of the Church, but the only real safeguard against the tyranny of Council, is the liberty of Bishops. The Master did not put the Apostles under Rule. As we saw in a former place, Councils must have an adequate Executor unless they be Councils for Consultation appealing by weight, not Authority, to Consent.

And, after all, the Roman System must be judged in the light of the *Balance*, between Authority and Consent. If our Lord made no provision for Rule over Apostles, it was, we should say, that the seat of Authority should be too broad for Authority to concentrate into tyranny. Authority must have some scope for concentration, but if that power of concentration be too great, if the seat be in itself closed to the working of Consent within itself, as well as Consent without, that worst of evils, next to anarchy, tyranny is provided for.

How does the Papal System provide for Consent. That it provides many loop holes for escape from Authority is easily seen, but when once Authority gathers itself, Consent is reduced to zero. Even if practical workings reduce somewhat the result, yet the theory is, (and the theory is but the clear logic of the premises), the Consent stands at absolute Zero.

The Papal System recognizes emphatically—Grace in Authority, even to the point of *official* infallibility, and impeccability—its corollary, but for that Faith that dwells in Consent

whereby God brings even resistance to Authority, it knows no tolerance. If Consent will blindly follow Authority, that is well, in the papal view, but if it resists, what is Authority for but compulsion?

Every function of Ministry was by the Master given in so many words to each of the Apostles, and the utmost that the special words to St. Peter could be construed to mean by any one, would be in the province of "Feeding" or of "Binding and Loosing," both of which look *from God to man*. Yet in the Papal System the Reader, the Singer, the Offerer of Alms or of Prayer not to speak of the one who "offers the Gift;" the Eucharist, looking *from man to God*, must hold his Ministry from the Head of the system under plea of special gifts to St. Peter.

The autocracy of Pharaoh, of Nebuchadnezzar, of Antiochus, and of the Romans, was the terror of the Jews, but it is this form that the Papal System claims was followed by Christ. The Sheik system of the Arabs, the Judge system of Moses and Joshua, the mild Monarchy of Saul, and David, and the successors of Rehoboam after the lesson of the revolt of Israel, the High Priest and Council system of the Maccabees, all of these are considered trampled under foot as too weak in Authority for the strenuous Church of God whose "little finger must be thicker than any of the predecessor's loins" even if it out-Herod Herod.

Finally, there is not a principle of all these seen in our analysis that is held in moderation. Even that which we saw in the beginning, that Faith persuades people to God's Church, and keeps them there is swallowed up in the balancing idea that by Grace they are placed there, and bound there as by fetters, and with no chance of release unless cast out by the one who "binds on earth, and it is bound in Heaven."

It is to be noted that if we take the three spheres of Rule, Care of Souls, and Ministration, spheres in which, as we saw, the functions of Bishops are greater than those of Presbyters, then we have an analysis as follows: In the sphere of *Ministration* there is no function above that of Bishop. Not even an Apostle could do more, for there is no room above except by manufacturing functions, when baptizing, administering, and ordaining *Bishops* are past.

In the sphere of care of souls, the Zenith was reached when St. Peter and St. Paul, each of them alike, smote the offender with the visible sentence of God. And if this be not the Zenith, but decision in matter of doctrine (for Heresy is an offence in the care of souls) then surely St. Paul is the equal of St. Peter, as the record shows. Then for St. Peter to surpass the others we only have left the sphere of Rule (Teaching and Preaching, when once authority is received, are matters of personal powers). If St. Peter then was Chief-Pastor in what did his pastoral office prove superior? Feeding is not exactly "Rule over," but let us take it in that way, since nothing is left.

It is well to see then that the precise sphere in which the superior powers of the Pope could lie, *at the very most*, is the sphere of Rule. But the powers which are claimed extend into every sphere of every function.

In conclusion we can stand or fall with the correctness of these assertions. Christ made no provision for Rule over Apostles; the Apostles made none for Rule over Bishops; Consent is the "Executor" of Councils whenever the limit of a Bishop's authority is passed; the Papal System in destroying Consent precludes all possibility of Godly government, since even God does not govern that way, in Heaven or on Earth; autocracy stood to the Jew, and ever since, must stand to all, for bondage, captivity, desecration of their Temple, and Herod,—who though he builded in God's name more grandly than Solomon, yet ruled as the *despot* of—Rome.

II—THE CONGREGATIONAL SYSTEM

This System of course, lies at the opposite extreme. Where Rome exalts Authority to the death of Consent, this system exalts Consent at the expense of Authority.

Let us examine the foundations of the Congregational System. Historically there was under Browne and then Barrowe, an effort to combine the idea of rule by Elders and rule by the Congregation. And, after these men, there was an attempt to harmonize with Presbyterian systems to greater or less degree. But, finally, the mingling of the two ideas of rule was seen not to be possible, and

the polity blossomed out into pure Congregationalism. Even the Conciliar principle is set aside by the out and out Congregationalists, viz.: the Baptists, and that of Association alone admitted. The principle of Fellowship, supplementing that of Congregational independence, is expected to supply all needs beyond the limits of each Church.

Now the right of a man to self-control does not give, but precludes the right to control others, so when we have a number of such units brought together, the problem is presented of how to get a higher unit than the individual, and there is no possibly consistent way but one (which somewhat in fact compromises the original idea) that of majority rule.

The Consent of a large number is taken as calling for, if not compelling the Consent of the rest. By this agreement the Congregation can be made a unit. Then, if these units could do the same thing, the system could continue to grow and become quite complex, but the need for the uniting of Congregations is not felt as much as the need for the unity of the individuals that make the Congregation, and so these further steps are omitted by those who jealously guard the rights of the Congregation.

The submission or acquiescence of a minority is always a subjection to rule, but there is no other way to secure unity, and with the right of the minority to separate fully conceded, the compromise of principle, thus far, is essential; while to carry it further, and into the higher unions, might strike at the liberty of that unit, which is made the actual basis of the System.

But while all this must be taken into consideration, it must be remembered that it is not claimed that *Scripturally* the individual is any unit at all, but most specifically the Congregation is chosen to be such. The Congregation is both beginning and end. Nothing is *below* it, or *above* it. Each Congregation is the equal repository of whatever there is. It is only when this Congregation comes to act with regard to the units of which itself is made, that the principles are seen to reach down. For, if the Congregation, because of rights of self-control, can not allow itself to be controlled, on what basis could it claim control over the individual except by violation of its dearest principles? All of which is said to bring out the fact that Consent is everywhere in this system the

actual basis of Authority, and the latter only exists by and through and in the former. And as a matter of fact, in practical working, the individuals are consulted at every step. Themselves are over themselves, and the minority is governed under the theory of "majority rule," and not under the theory of right of control. Consent can put on the face of Authority, but it is actually very different.

The idea that Grace puts us in the "Churches" and binds us there, is reduced to its lowest terms, and the idea that Faith alone keeps us there exalted to its highest.

The idea that Grace is in Authority amounts to nothing. Authority merely formulates the propositions of Consent. God's workings in the Faith which leads to acceptance or rejection of the formularies is the sheet anchor of the system. The yea and nay vote is all in all. There is indeed no vehicle of Authority, for the reception of Grace, over and opposite the vehicle of Consent by the action of Faith.

The Functions of Ministration have lost much of their semblance to the old idea of personal possession by instruments of God, in that of being perquisites of all, representatively brought to a focus.

The type of Polity is more extreme than any presented to the Master by sight or tradition. The Master's tremendous words of bestowal, and the immense reach of the power bestowed on the officers whom He personally commissioned, are treated as having no bearing on the future of His Church's system.

The appointment system so emphasized by the Apostles is set aside for the Elective which was clearly its complement not its antagonist.

The strain against the fair meaning of words like *Hegoumenos*, *poroēstōs*, *poimēn*, *kubernētēs*, *presbuteros*, and *episcopos*, is out of all reason.

The grounds for this system in History are negated at every turn. It is simply out of the question from first to last. The Apostles of the Didache, the appointing system seen in Clement, the "Presbyteries" of Ignatius (to say nothing of the Bishops) all the traditions given by Irenaeus, Tertullian, Heggissipus, Polycrates, and Jerome, as well as Eusebius—the whole and entire

body of records run counter to it, with a set of tide simply overwhelming.

The History of Heresy in the first six hundred years of the Church's life shows a struggle of the most terrible nature, and it is only necessary to imagine what would have happened under a system incapable of concentration, while the leaders of Heresy could gather their thousands in solid phalanx, in order to see how fortunate it was that, as Jerome states, leaders could also be put forward to meet them. If a heretic could contend on the field of majority rule he would have just the conditions he would choose. Again, the problem of self-government is always attended with innumerable difficulties among a savage or ignorant people. In civil affairs where the custom of popular government is to *create strong centres of control* even for the most civilized, thought breaks down at the idea of testing the system among savages; and would the Church rush in to leave every group as autonomous? If in modern times we have seen some testing of the Congregational system among such people, let us remember that it has not been without the Board system, and its pecuniary method of control, so effectively used by all systems, as a matter of fact, in these days of money power.

Once more, the right of appeal must find less recognition in this system than in any other, for the Congregation is both beginning and end for all things. Let us remember that the great desideratum in any system of discipline, is to secure for the one condemned the feeling that it is of God that his punishment comes—a very hard thing. Trial by the mass, and conviction without appeal is not conducive to such a feeling. The loss of this particular one of the Special Functions, is in itself a weighty charge against the Congregational System, and is one of the spheres in which Consent can never rise to the dignity of Authority.

Finally, even though Scripture be written it must yet be understood and explained, and in the ages of Heresy the definition of Orthodoxy is the most delicate of operations. If the Heretic is to be condemned, the true interpretation must be set forth. If discipline be in the hands of the Congregation, interpretation of the Law and Gospel must be too. But how unprepared for such a

burden a Congregation must be? In its jealousy of personal liberty and Congregational independence, the System sacrifices the power needed for the great broad work of God in the world, and throughout the ages.

III—THE PRESBYTERIAN SYSTEM

The problem that this System has to face is the location of the Special Functions. Rejecting the idea of Congregational rule, and denying the existence of any order above that of the Presbyters, it is compelled to utilize the local workers—the order of Presbyters as the recipient and holder of all official powers. But to do this requires some adjustments. There are powers of Rule over Elders, of Appellate jurisdiction, and Ordination, which no Presbyter could have if taken by himself. How then could the order hold that which no *individual of the order* could hold? The theory is advanced that “*jointly*” Presbyters could hold what “*severally*” they could not. This, of course, means that these powers, the very highest of all, are lodged in a body, or, let us call it a Council.

This raises a question: What is there in the principle of Association that can *create* power? In order to see clearly our matter in hand let us leave out of consideration powers that might be involved in *territorial* conditions, and take only those of the so-called “Sessions” which answers to such local bodies as were formed, in Scripture times, by the Presbyters who existed in each Church, to the number of several, (it is claimed), at least. This form of Presbytery, and proof-model of the larger form, professedly has powers not belonging to a single Presbyter. Even if called powers of “jurisdiction” yet they are, some of them at least, the same as powers of “Order.” And to narrow the question for clearness sake still more, we will select one power—that of Ordination for discussion.

The Presbytery that is said to have ordained Timothy, is said to be proved by the fact that there were several Presbyters in each Church, (some “Ruling Elders,” and some that “labored in the word and doctrine.”) These Presbyters then constituted a local body, and could ordain. Does then the power of Ordi-

nation come from the principle of Association; or is it a power of the Presbytery as a body, and only to be exercised by the body? If we say the latter, then we have something definite to go on. We have a gift of power to a *body*. But, can three or more Presbyters, not of such a body but just informally meeting together, or being on hand, ordain? Then, that would be power springing from Association since none could, singly, do it, but together, they could. Which position is true? Furthermore, it would be seen to be power of "Order" not of "jurisdiction." No system ought to stand on either one of two legs. These great Functions which the Apostles wielded as their own special functions, must be seen to rest definitely either on the *Order* of Presbyters, or on a body specially created to hold them. As it happens, the principle of Association depends on the powers of Consent, and those of the body on Authority from above, so the range of the dilemma is wide, and the legs far apart,

But after all, the real under-pinning of the System is undoubtedly, the body, and the accent all there. Bodies are formed, (and variously called) all formed of Presbyters, which bodies have more power than any Presbyter; and their powers are not treated as those that come from any voluntary association, but as those of a body authoritatively constituted from above, and from the source above drawing its powers, and, also to it, acknowledging its responsibility.

So then let us conclude that in the Presbyterian System we have an instance of a body or Council set over the Church and holding the Special Functions.

Now Councils are organs of Consent and not of Authority. Here lies the fatal mistake of the System on the philosophical side. If Councils in the Apostles' day were organized to create or assert Authority, we would have only the one of Jerusalem to prove it by. But, they came together to "consider of this matter." The proceedings show plainly a *consultation*, and the "decree" of the Elders of Jerusalem (and probably the brethren also) must be seen in the light of weight rather than that of Authority, so far at least as the other Churches of Syria were concerned. Plainly these Apostles did not need Authority, and at best the Council could only have the Special Functions. No

more far reaching mistake could be made than to so misconstrue the debate and decision reached then and there, as to deem it an attempt to gain Authority. Unanimity among themselves, approval of men of all orders, the weight of the Mother Church, these were the forces sought to be made explicit. And to press the matter to the very crux, let us ask here, as has been done before, what Executor the Council could find? As long as a Council appeals by weight, its ground is secure, but let it once appeal to the unconsenting as Authority, and there is not an Executive that can be imagined. All can recall the words "Let him be anathema," the efforts to utilize the Emperor, the placing of power in the hands of Metropolitans and Patriarchs, the rise of the Papacy, and also the failure of all these. The *weight* of Councils remained enormous, but their power was most successfully defied. They were never intended to be organs of Authority, but of consultation, agreement, harmony, in short—Consent. *The base they afford for Authority is too broad for that faculty.* Its very breadth is evidence that its function is to secure Consent ere Authority attempts action. Authorities can test Consent before or afterwards. Councils enable it to be done beforehand. Finally, the oft heard phrase—The Authority of Councils, General Councils especially, grows out of the idea that what the whole Church agrees to, must have more behind it, than the opposite; and the criticisms of the Latrocinium, for instance, turns not on the technical points, but on the moral and religious character of the proceedings, proving the test of weight.

However, this is to be certainly conceded, or rather asserted as a part of the claims here made, that Authority makes an *appeal to Consent* by means of Councils and in so far they are organs of Authority, and such Authority as proceeds *out of Consent*, for there is such, is thus gathered by these, but this marks the extent. How fatal a mistake then it is to make such an organ the resting place for Authority, not for its appeals, but for executions.

Now, if this system allowed Authority to spring from *below*, that is *out of Consent*, vesting the chief powers in a Council, that would be consistent; but when the position is stated, that the gift of Christ was to the "whole Church," so far as *power*

is concerned, and to the officers, so far as its "*exercise*" is involved, we have a further departure from the rightness of things, for such a view of the origin of power, makes both power and its exercise come from *above*.

There can be no doubt that this System does view power as given by *Christ* to the "whole Church," and Ministry as coming from Him also; and this being the case, it is a most patent anomaly to vest the highest power in councils. The very essence of power—derivation from above—is the idea of Stewardship and Responsibility.

So, too again, Grace in Authority is an idea truly welcome in this System, but the Council has many minds and hearts, and is, therefore, liable to sway and change, as votes change.

The location of Authority in respect to its highest powers in Councils has yet another evil in that besides injuring Authority, it robs Consent of a stronghold. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Presbyterian System is one of the strong governments. All powers are exercised for the whole by the officers. The officers form the *organs* of *exercise* it may be said, and just as an animal walks with its legs or eats with its mouth, so the Church, to which the power is given, exercises all those powers through its officers, except that election is only superintended by the officers, and perhaps a few other things are left to the people. Ruling Elders lead a lay life, and may be in a measure regarded as laymen, but the Councils are made up of officers only. Thus the play of Consent is small. If, then, Councils constitute a proper place for Consent, according to Scripture, the making of them the throne of Authority does a two fold wrong.

As an entrenchment a Council is a strong fort. Poor Consent not only loses its own, but must storm a stronghold in its battles. Are the officers, however the organs for Consent as well as for Authority? If so, the annihilation of Consent is almost as easy as in the Church of Rome, the difference being conspicuously this—that Rome has a strong executive, and Councils have only committees. We say committees, for an Elder has lost all powers of *Jurisdiction*, to the Councils, and his powers of *Order* are unavailing. His order only avails to enable him

to become a member of a committee. *He must even find as a committee greater strength than as an officer.*

In fact the gift of powers to the "Whole Church" is fair in sound, but under the arrangements, the failure of Councils to find adequate executive avails more for the people than all their share of the original grant. Of course it must be remembered that some of these arrangements are not inherent in the theory of government by Presbyters, but they are logical to it, and for the main point essential.

Let us suppose now, that all the Grace which God should give to the officers, who stand for Authority, was unheeded, and God should begin to work with Consent to withhold its assuagement and even resist, what means would lie open. Are the ways by which to avoid convulsions adequate? There would be elections, and the always dangerous way of rebellion, but theoretically none others.

There is, however, a consideration that here gains force. In the Roman system, the view that Grace puts men under Authority and binds them there, is very much a part of the System, but with the theory that the "*whole Church*" possesses the power, and the ministry is only the organ of its exercise, then when the wrong exercises by the officers comes (or let us even say there arises a dissatisfaction with it) then the resumption by the people of the power is primarily a constitutional right instead of an unlawful proceeding. (We remember that Clement tells us that the Presbyters of Corinth were "ejected" so that assumption by the people would be called resumption).

Does Grace bind or Faith persuade? We cannot but believe that the sense of being the real power would weaken the sense of obligation to Authority.

This brings us to consider the idea that power is given to the "whole Church." Surely that is not a correct view. If God's government was by a balance in the *degrees of Authority*, we might look in that direction for the balance of Christ's System, but it is not. The balance is between Authority and Consent. *All Authority* is given to the officers, and *Consent* is left full powered in its *natural abiding place*.

By election and by Councils, Parochial, Diocesan, Provin-

cial and General, Consent can find full play, in the way of peaceful assertion; and the inalienable right of Revolution is there for the day of insupportable tyranny. The power of Consent is greater, if anything, than that of Authority. Authority needs to be strong, but Consent needs its avenues all kept open. So too Grace puts us under Authority and binds us there, and Faith should persuade us and keep us there, but Consent must be held as the stronghold of defence, and it is equal to the strain.

History tells of no tyranny until Consent was first allowed to throw away its power, or yield it to Authority. When it comes to destroying the particular Authorities that oppress us, by Revolution, in order to rectify, or to abandoning the Church of God to set up our own, or to live in another, the first is better than the last, but the right of Revolution does not rest upon the basis of a gift of Authority to the "whole Church," but upon the natural right to give or withhold Consent, and judgment as to when the limit of endurance is reached, and the wisdom of the means employed.

As to this matter of the power being given to the "whole Church" and only "its exercise" to the officers, we can plainly see that there is a large promise of instability in such an arrangement. If the Church has power, then its *de facto* gift is the great point always to be kept in view. Even though it create new offices, yet if only it bestow upon those holding them, the "exercise" of power it would be hard to show that such exercise would not be perfectly valid. Thus, if having the gift of power, the Church should inaugurate a Methodist or a Congregational system, to exercise that power, it would be possible to allege that such a system was not after the Scriptural pattern (from the Presbyterian standpoint of course), but hardly possible to empty it of validity. Only by tying to the gift of power some proviso to cover the point—alleging the following of the Scriptural pattern, as a necessary requirement to validity could the Church be held off from drifting to leeward along some such track. The Presbyterians to-day recognize the ministry of various bodies on precisely such grounds, viz., that in as much as power is given to the Church (not the officers), if the body recognize the officers that is sufficient; but they are far from admitting that any

"Form of the Christian Temple" is Scriptural, but their own. Now, considering how easy it would be for the men to change the forms, if only they felt sure of never losing the "power," we can see that such a doctrine almost guarantees changes in the course of time amid the stresses of world-changes of all things around.

On the other hand, if the officers are given from above not only the right to exercise power, but power itself, not as personal but as pertaining to the office, while tyranny and laxity are not avoided, yet the element of stability is secured. The office which is the seed of the rest will abide; while the body of the Church, never having been given power of office, will still possess its own inalienable power, which is utterly different from the power of office. According to the Presbyterian view, the "whole Church" receives the power of office as well as all other powers, but the true view is that each part receives its own gift according to its own order and functions. The Ministry can far less easily change the body, than the body of the Church could change the ministry. The powers of the body are those of Consent, great, strong and basic—natural and inalienable. They can be claimed and seized at any time upon either natural or Scriptural grounds. The powers of office are subject to definition and limitation, and depend on interpretation. Only when God is deemed to be behind the offices is there any security at all for them.

Along the lines of Historical forms of government on which the Master might have patterned His Church, this System makes the mistake of selecting for the chief seat of Authority the one that, however valuable as a help, had never had success as the main reliance. Councils had proved their value certainly, but when had they brought the activity, not to say, aggressiveness needed for a struggle for empire?

The Roman Senate was even supplemented by Consuls, but when the days came when Italy was outgrown, the days of the Senate were numbered. If Councils be the Head, then they must be either increased in number or enlarged as to representation; and world government is too great a task for the machinery. *The fact is that the world is too large and too diverse for any one man, or any one thing, to govern, in Church or State.*

Finally, there is one of the Functions of Ministry that has been but little noticed because of desire for as simple a line of discussion as possible, but it is nevertheless a Function. It is most congruous, and of real importance, that from the seat of Authority and Discipline should come the Authoritative Blessing. Even if Appeal, and Rule, and Ordination can vest in a Council, the Ambassadorial pronouncement in Christ's stead of His great Blessing, must be a personal Function.

The Pastor is there for local Church, but the Moderator even of a great Synod has only the Synod itself to bless, even if he summed up in himself the powers of Synod. In a Synodically governed body, the Blessing from the great Head of the Church through the highest seat of Discipline is lost, to its own great detriment.

In conclusion, let it be said, that in aim and purpose no religious body ever seemed more desirous to be Scriptural in fact, *anti-historical* in spirit, gracious to the people, strong in Authority, careful of the gifts and functions, and chary of change in customs, than these same Presbyterial bodies, who have borne so much good fruit under their wonderful system; but beginning in times of passion and upheaval, pressed by needs, blocked from historical paths, casting around for something effective for the times—something strong enough to cope with Rome, and firm against the tendency of their own liberated peoples, they found under the shadow of Calvin's great name, an interpretation of Scripture responding to all their requirements. The chief of these requirements was something that depended on no Bishop, but maintained Authority. To strengthen the weakness of the Presbyterial order by gradations of Councils seemed under the circumstances the happiest of thoughts. They had all the material for the building, and a strong and beautiful building it became.

The result of it all was, however, that in the very heart of the System, they based *Authority* on the *organ of Consent*, struck down the principle of Stewardship and Responsibility, and manipulated the Order of Presbyters to purposes which their powers of Order did not allow. Making their "*joint*" powers greater than their "*several*," they established the increase of power on a per-

fectly untenable basis. And in order to do all this, they had to exalt the Ministry vastly, at the expense of the people. If the logic of the Papal System was the infallible Pope, the logic of the Presbyterian is the supremacy of Council—but Council entirely perverted from its Scriptural design.

CHAPTER II

Discussion of Modern Systems—Continued

IV—THE EPISCOPAL SYSTEM.

The study of Scriptural and Historical facts taught us as regards the four systems, First: That the Congregational System could only hope to get a *prima facie standing* by stripping the words *hēgoumenos*, *poimēn*, *kubernētēs*, *proēstōs*, *presbuteros*, and *episcopos* of all their customary force, and also taking away the *facts* of their force as exhibited there.

Second: That the Papal System can point to no provision for Rule over Bishops, whether by Christ, or the Apostles, or the Church, until the latter through a system of Councils opened the way by means of a Metropolitan or Patriarchal gradation.

Third: That the Special Functions, lodged by the Presbyterian System in Councils, were not so lodged, and that Councils were not instruments of Authority, but organs of Consent, until in the struggle with Heresy, and as Councils of Bishops they acquired powers not before possessed: That a smaller foundation than the Scriptural warrant for "Presbyteries" could hardly exist, and in History there is none until Jerome stands as Authority for the existence of "the common Council of the Presbyters," (whatever kind that was) centuries before his day.

Fourth: That the Episcopal claims for an order above the Presbyters are excellently founded, and both by name and work this order is exhibited from first to last. It must indeed be by testimony much more scanty than we would like that any position can be either attacked or supported, but taken comparatively there is no system that begins to fare as well as the Episcopal. Let the Roman gather evidence for Rule over Bishops; or the

Presbyterian for the gift of the Special Functions to Presbyteries; or for Ruling Elders; and small as the volume is for three orders, it is indeed, voluminous compared to the collections of the others. The proof certainly bears upon the *actuality* of the thing sought. The Presbyterians' proof is all in the region of inference. "The Elders that Rule well," being taken to mean a volume of inferences, and "The laying on of the hands of the Presbytery" reaching as far as the entire Polity.

So, too, the Romanist builds on the text, "Feed my sheep," a wondrous structure of Rule over Apostles." But the General workers are seen side by side with the local workers, and their powers can be studied by acts. The Didache and Ignatius in almost the same age as the Scriptures speak out clearly with no chance of misunderstanding. The "distinguished or Eminent men" of Clement can hardly be wrested from the line of Clement's own life. The early existence of the three orders everywhere is put beyond cavil from a mass of evidence, which if not contemporary is yet near enough to be trusted to speak.

In short, the whole form of proof for this is different from the form necessary for any other. And just to illustrate this, we will take an instance. The Presbyterian writers say that Clement's letter shows that Corinth was under a Presbytery of their own kind. How? Because no Bishop (in later sense of the word) is mentioned, and if there had been a Bishop, etc., etc.,—The Episcopal advocate quotes writers who directly state that *Clement was a Bishop* (though not of Corinth of course). Now inferences are legitimate, but statements are as a rule much more convincing. And so it goes all along the line; there is a greater appeal to *direct* evidence by advocates of three orders than by the advocates of all the rest put together.

But not only in *volume* and *directness* is there superiority, but in *weight of the facts* themselves. The fact of the existence of some kind of Presbytery at Lystra, or at Ephesus, would not carry with it the existence of the System claimed, and the *existence* of "Elders who Rule well" does not mean the *place* assigned them; but the existence of General workers with powers like those of Timothy and Titus and Barnabas means three *orders* beyond power of controversy.

Thus in matter of volume, weight, and directness of evidence, the claims for the Episcopal System can go far beyond the others. As we have seen, the Congregationalist relies on the failure of all proof of Pope, or Bishop, or Presbytery, to leave him as the residuum, it being the necessary residuum, if the others fail to make out their case. The positive line of his evidence bears only on participation by laymen in local affairs.

In the facts alleged as proving the existence of three orders, the advocates of the Papal System, and the Greek Communion would agree with the Anglicans, and as the life of the Church from early ages gathered around the Episcopate, and even Heretical systems adopted the regimen, whatever weight comes from such immense unanimity of agreement must be recognized. It may be hard to estimate, but undoubtedly it counts. Then, too, so far as the survival of the Special Functions go, the Presbyterian advocate must himself approve. His own location of them in a Council, after they were personally held by the Apostles, may accent his denial of the Episcopal order, but also accents the fact that the need for some organ in which they might vest was real. But Calvin did not vest Rule, Discipline, and Ordination in Councils until the break with the past, and the pressure of the outlook rendered the situation very critical. The birth of the Presbyterian System, and its alleged death in the first and second centuries, both weaken the fight it would make against the locality of the Special Functions.

The proper location of the Special Functions raises the question, how, in a matter of such vital importance, the Church could ever have gotten wrong. There is seldom vagueness about such matters, as the seat of Rule, Discipline and Ordination. Ignorance, failure in discrimination or forgetfulness may apply to some things, but not to such matters as the Special Functions. Now, if, at first, they were located in the Apostles personally, then passed to Councils, and then back to persons, we would have something remarkable. St. Jerome states that "the Churches" were governed by "the common Councils of the Presbyters," but this is the matter of local government which confessedly was by Presbyters (and certainly they were at liberty to have their "common Councils.") St. Jerome does not show the nature of such

Councils, or go into the matter of "joint" and "several" powers, and his language is natural enough under any supposition; but it is most clearly the local Churches. Thus the Special Functions are not covered by St. Jerome's statement, not only as regards their local aspect, but still more their general. Where were these? In view of the lack of any evidence to specify the opposite, their location by the whole Church, so soon as we have any documentary light at all, in the persons of Bishops is most significant.

In the light of St. Jerome's, "It was decreed throughout the whole world," there is no use to talk of usurpation. And as to the Church of that age (St. Jerome says, "From Mark the Evangelist," and Ignatius shows the same date practically) doing wrong, there is no need whatever for any such accusation. The place of the General-workers was being filled by local officers raised to the same grade, as proved by their possession of the same Special Functions. To accuse any organization of not knowing what officers are proper to have, and of wrong processes in appointing them, is not a right proceeding on any ground but that of clear proof. The weight of the action is too great to be lifted by anything less. But even if Jerome be taken to prove the existence of local Councils, what evidence is there of any higher? Yet can the Special Functions vest in *local* Councils? Before wrong can be alleged, the right must stand reasonably plain; but after acknowledging the Rule, Discipline and Ordination involved in the Special Functions, and the inadequacy of local Councils to handle them, by erecting above Sessions, other "Courts," there is a total failure to produce anything higher as existent in these times. A Council (of Presbyters) of higher grade than the local Council is altogether the unfindable thing of Ecclesiastical History. The whole charge then of wrong doing by the Church rests on the existence not of St. Jerome's "common Council of the Presbyters," but of something more capable than these of holding the Special Functions, which, as an existence has never been produced.

The Council of Jerusalem was a Council of Apostles who Possessed these same Functions—each one, personally. (Now let one be found composed of *Presbyters*, (who confessedly did not

have the Functions) from the time of Jerusalem to that of the well known Councils of Bishops.

Thus while in Scripture, there are three orders, and in History three orders, the oft-spoken of "tunnel" between the two, in the short intermediate time, is not so dark as claimed. When once we clearly separate between the powers of Elders and Apostles in Scripture, we have a burden that must be dropped or carried—the burdens of the Special Functions. Nearly all agree they are not dropped. Then how are they carried? It lies between Councils and Men. The only Councils of any regularity, actual, probable, aye, even possible, are the little local Councils of local officers—the very class for and over which the Special Functions were designed. (Rule over the local Churches both officers and people). If any other Councils of Presbyters existed, let them be produced.

Since the local are incapacitated, and the others are not facts, the other theory is left. But this exclusive process is not satisfactory, standing by itself. What if it were reversed? However, taken with the facts that can be produced in favor of men as the bearers of the burden (for it came through the tunnel) the matter stands differently. We do not search in vain for men. Lists of names are given by the writers of even the second Century. Contemporary writers give us facts. Ignatius tells of the extent. If we lug in St. Jerome from the Fourth Century, we have reasons, processes, fresh testimony to facts given by others, and new facts. Taken all together the harmony is wonderfully more striking than any alleged discrepancies.

So, then, we assume the proof of the System, and proceed to Judge it:

It is a monarchical system of course, but of the type where the Consent of the governed is as vital as the Authority vested in the officers. A constitutional monarchy, is theoretically, simply one in which nothing is done without Consent. The arrangements for this often amounts to giving Consent a place of Authority, but that is the working out of a theory amid the difficulties of practice. In the Church's constitution, Consent secured its place by right of Elections, and right of Councils. The right of these implies the right to judge all things, and to acquiesce or

withhold agreement. The wisdom of gaining Consent before Authority acts, is greater than that of acting and then awaiting the rebuke or agreement of Consent, but it must also be remembered that Authority ought to be quick and versatile and concentrated, so that if Consent pushes into the preliminaries too much, the very purpose of making Authority personal is lost. But since some things ought to be done slowly and carefully while others rapidly and energetically, a better combination, when rightly used, cannot be imagined than this monarchical system, with its constitution enveloped by Consent.

When Consent *creates* its Executive or Monarch, it is chary of grants of power; and where Consent has been allowed to regulate the Monarch, it has often tried to leave him but little: but, in the Church, those bold grants of power which were traced guard Authority because it is weaker than Consent. At the same time the place of Consent is also made secure. The Monarchy in the Church is therefore a Constitutional Monarchy.

Furthermore, this right of Council soon brought about a body of Canons amounting to a written Constitution. Even if Councils have often been used to aggrandize the Bishops, yet they have just as often been used to check them. The Metropolitan system exalted one, but secured hundreds of restrictions on others, and so too the Patriarchal. Even the Pope is not, practically, above the Canons.

The main thing seen in the workings of this system in its balancing between Authority and Consent, is its Elasticity. In some places the Bishop became almost an autocrat, and in others almost a cipher; and generally it has been according to needs, and the people. The Romans wanted some one to take the place of the Emperor. The Middle Ages needed a mailed hand. But in England among the British, and in Ireland in early times, the Episcopal rule was hardly a feather. In America to-day, the Bishop has been called a "confirming machine." At any rate it is a fact, that if Authority vest in the officers, and the people be left a full Consent secured by elections and Councils, the strength of Government will follow the age and the people, and will cope with the needs. All the criticisms of tyranny and weakness can

be allowed to pass as true, providing the Elasticity of the System be conceded.

The system of Councils runs throughout. When the Apostles established them in the highest place, the sanction for them extends to all. As an organ of Consent the decree is worth no more than its weight. This weight can often be mistaken for Authority, but the two must be distinguished fundamentally. The extent of territory, the number of members, the dignity and degree of office of the same, the authority of names, all these go to make up the value of the decree. If the territory represented has sent representatives and agrees to abide by the vote, then it is bound by its Consent beforehand, but it has often been decided that where not represented, the decree must be accepted in order to acquire force. Councils having the power have often gone beyond the limits, and carried their point, but in true understanding, it is Consent and weight that sustains them as Authority. Christ gave no authority to them, and the Functions of the Apostles included the highest degree of every power ecclesiastical. What they have, they draw out of the regions of Consent. Their power of Discipline came when the right of a Church to withdraw from Communion with another, and the right of a Bishop to excommunicate one of his flock were confused; and from the number of Bishops in common agreement, a right to excommunicate was inferred.

This brings us to the problem of Rule over Bishops of which we have already seen something. The Master stopped at Apostles. There was nothing over them. Bishops, successors to all the Functions of Apostles, are single rulers, Monarchs, the sum or concentration of their Diocese, and the unit of combination in the great whole of the Church. But do they not need rule? And if so, where is the instrument? Now, even Bishops have a power of Consent. There is no precise limit to Consent. Canons are not wrong instruments of Government. Consent is one of the twin forces of Government. The Master carried Authority (the grant of His Authority) as far as Apostles, but left a whole region above them as a territory for Consent, probably of deliberate purpose. We may say there is an *Authority of Consent*—that which springs from the people; but it is fluctuating, given

and taken away. The Master wished certain things to be definite and immovable amid a changing world, and His grant so stands, but He also wished leeway left for the adaptation of this very Authority to varying needs of men and of time.

We have seen some of these very heads in a Monarchical system exalted, or thrust down in position, to meet changes of the world's needs or opinions, and can easily suppose just this elasticity secured in part by leaving to other forces the problem of Rule over Bishops. In old times by Canon it was ordered that no Bishop could leave his Diocese without Consent of his Metropolitan. That was a stringent rule, surely, but it is not even in the sphere of Ministerial Rule. Why cannot common agreement to even such a Rule establish that Rule—not as of God, but as of force till changed. This we take it to be the method of Rule over Bishops. All along the line of parish and diocese, and of province and Patriarchate, if these had been formed, came these Councils, accomplishing by common rule of Consent, and by the principle of power from the people, a vast number of things; and in the midst of them, grounded and based on God Himself, an Authority that none could deny, and around which the other could gather, persisted.

The Presbyterian Councils claiming to be possessors of God's Authority for the Special Functions, are apt in forming their actions, to overlook the difference between the decrees which spring out of Consent, and those strictly of that Authority.

The Congregational theory increases this danger. But the Papal, by putting Authority above all Consent, is apt, in stamping Canons of Consent with the seal of Authority, to prevent their repeal and cause crystalization. Very few Canons were made to live, and if Creeds did not rest on God's Word, Councils could not keep them alive, either.

The difference between Rule over Bishops, and Rule over Elders and Churches is largely this—the difference of an Executive. Above the Bishop, if the Church make one, yet would he be but the creature of Consent. Below, God has appointed one. A Bishop is not an Authority of the legislative mold, but of the executive. He, of course, has powers of Consent, as well as other officers, in the region of legislation, but he is essentially an execu-

tive. Given the Commandments, the Scriptures, and the Canons duly agreed upon, and he comes in the name of God to bind and loose by them. The Presbyter is this in the parish, and, if there are several, some Council for counsel would be a necessity to avoid confusion; but to surrender their executive power to the Council would be both wrong and stupid, and that such a Council and not they should possess said power by grant of God, is out of the question.

The Bishop can execute Canons of the higher Councils too, within his Diocese, but there is no executive for Rule over Bishops. Is there need of one? Consent can create one, but with the contingencies of Consent understood. The Diocese can bring pressure upon its Bishop; the other Dioceses can also bring pressure; the region of his life is very elevated. But, probably, we can see that, if there had been *more than one* Ruler for Bishops, there would have been depression of grades rather than elevation, and the result the same in the end; and on the supposition of *only one*, we would have a Papacy with no Council above.

If, now, we have been clear in what we have said all along, about the Conciliar system, it ought to be plain that for a Council of *Bishops* to meet and try, by decree of Council, to get more Authority than that which by right of their office they have, is repugnant to the balance between Authority and Consent, to the rights of Consent, and especially to the right limits of Authority. It was this that hurt the Conciliar system, and made it an instrument of tyranny. It is for this kind of Council that no Executive can be found. To execute such a decree in his own Diocese, a Bishop could only have his own Authority. A decree of any kind of Council of Bishops only, or of mixed orders, or of all orders, that was a Council of Consent, placing its appeal on the grounds of common consultation, due representation and common agreement, would stand in an utterly different light. Its so-called Authority is after all Consent. But to try to double up the Authority which is from God, by a machinery of Council, is to transcend the limit of Authority which God has placed by His very grant, and to use machinery of Consent for purposes foreign to its nature. Such machinery has no claim to any grant of God's Authority whatsoever. The principle of Association cannot evolve it, except along lines of Consent. In early days, Coun-

cils of Bishops were for Consent, but later came the effort to evolve God's Authority, in greater degree than possessed by a single Bishop, and the Metropolitan became an Executive armed with his ordinary Episcopal powers, plus something else. In so far as that something else was by Consent, the damage was not so great, but soon Consent did not acquiesce, and then came tyranny. In so far as that, something else was a power of Consent, he could rightly use it; but in so far as it was claimed to be of God, it was usurped. The danger of the latter was there all along. On the other hand, the fight of the lower orders of the ministry, and of the Laity, to get a place in all Councils is historical. It was the antidote of the poison, for, at one step, it made the Council seem an instrument of Consent. In the American Church this has gone so far that the House of Bishops can do nothing without even the Lay-deputies of the Lower house assenting—a plan which admirably secures Consent, but makes the Authority which springs out of Consent appear far above that which springs out of God's Authority. Still in his own Diocese each Bishop remains the Executor of the Canons. *It is here most vigorously asseverated that he is more than a "Confirming machine."*

In Diocesan affairs the conflicts of Authority and Consent, have been equally marked by corresponding movements needless to go into. Consent in the main, is the stronger power. Popes and Constitutions alike fight against Bishops, and very fortunate it is that he is guarded by nothing less than the Authority of God. Oppress him they may, rob him of the exercise of his Functions they do, but to strip him of his *right*, is beyond the power of man.

In the parish, the conditions which allowed "Presbyteries," according to that view of Scriptural days, soon passed, for many places; and finally plurality of *Congregations* in Cities changed the situation so radically, that a single Presbyter to a single Church became the rule. From the first, there is no reason to doubt, Councils of Clergy and Laymen often met. Here, too, was a battle ground for Authority and Consent, and both have come down in a healthy state of conflict to this day. Facilities for the contests have varied, but the struggle has never ceased.

There can be no doubt that as affording to Authority and Consent the chance to grapple, no system can approach the one that sees in the Bishop a Monarch, and in Councils Houses of Representatives. And if any one thinks he can tell which is the dominant idea of the system, it is only necessary to change the land or the age, and the picture can be reversed. Such elasticity may not seem wise to those wanting the Church to seem like the immovable Rock of Ages in a changing world, but to those thankful to find it the tossing Ark of Safety amid the floods, that element of strength seems the very gift of God.

The place of Bishops in the legislative system is one of great importance from the fact that the Special Functions can be exercised only by them, and that they stand at the head of the units which compose the Church. They are chief Pastors of *each* Parish as well as the only Diocesan Shepherds. The Consent of those in Authority is as vital to harmony as the Consent of those under Authority. Councils of Bishops *only* are indeed but expeditious ways of determining the attitude of Authority, and influential ways of producing the agreement of Consent, but the action of all such Councils needs ratification by the other part of every Diocese, as well as its head, in order to deserve to stand. In the General Convention of the American Church, two points of wisdom are greatly to be commended, which are: that there is a House of Bishops to gain weight, and the agreement of Authority; and the Consent of all orders and all units is secured in advance. But, on the other hand, it is to be remembered that the whole Convention is an organ of Consent, and if it practically gains the highest place in government, it is in danger of elevating the Authority growing out of Consent at the expense of that commissioned by God.

In an age and country like the ones that supply the environment for such a Council this may pass muster, but not always, nor everywhere. The reserved rights of the Diocesan units are a most important part of the system.

There has all through the ages been a longing for Authority in controversies of Faith, and it can at a glance be seen that, on the basis which we have laid down, there can be none but the

Whole Church *in its capacity of Consent*. God has not made any Authority capable of settling the interpretation of God's Word, but it cannot but be that He is with His Church, and if in all its elements there can be agreement, by that very sign we would have the assurance of His presence. But controversies of Faith are not intended to be settled so quickly as men sometimes wish. Instead of seeking a tribunal that can speak over night, and call the world, from the rising of the Sun, to the going down thereof, to obedience to a decree, we must accustom ourselves to the idea that time is a necessary element. We have only to compare the settlements made by decree, with those made by time, in order to see the worthlessness of the one and the value of the other. The decree is only the beginning of the struggle. It is only man's impatience that wants life focused to a word. When Cardinal Manning left the Church of England on the ground that it was so weak on the side of Authority, he simply showed himself one of those impatient spirits that resent the leisure of God, one foolish enough to think that even when God is with Authority, the latter will always hearken to God. God is with His Church, and its voice is Consent as well as Authority. We can not help this, and a study of events ought to make us thankful that it is so.

Running over, now, the positions founded by the early chapters, we are able to say that as regards Grace *binding us under Authority*, the position is very natural. Baptism places us as by a birth in a new world, the Church, and when there the circumstances existing in that world are beyond our control. The rights of Consent come to us, and the powers that be, are ordained of God, there, as in this world, which we are also bound to accept as we find it. The privileges of Consent can easily reconcile us to the hardships of subjection. God is with us in our part as well as with Authority in its power and responsibility, but we must not forget He is with Authority. The forces are too evenly balanced to make us despair, and as God works with both, we can safely trust the future. And as for the faults of each, those of Consent are as great as those of Authority.

By binding us in this new world by bonds we cannot break, God forces us to play our part. Could we break our way out, it would only be to establish new Authority, and could we claim

that God was behind that, and was obeyed? Authority of some kind can never be dispensed with, though that Authority to which God has promised Grace can be abandoned or destroyed, for one that we have made ourselves. How much better were a Faith that would persuade us and keep us where Grace has placed and bound us.

The Grace of Orders is, as we saw, intimately connected with Authority of Orders. The line of Authority is the line of Grace. It is a Presence of God certainly. As to its being a character of God, that would depend on the reception of, and obedience to, that Presence. This Presence of God must always be recognized. The denial that it is followed is the privilege of Consent. Tactual succession can assure the line of *Presence*, for each act of Ordination assures the Presence for that one. God can not be hurt by allowing His Presence to follow the line of Ordination; for all the sin in the world has not debarred His Presence in the world. What men want is, to know the line which God recognizes as the one He will follow with His Presence. That would mean the offer of Grace, and if accepted, the fact of Grace. Any theory supposing the idea that a good man could impart God, but a bad man could not, is wide of the mark. The process may be said to be, that God chooses a pathway for Himself to bless with His Presence, and this pathway is made known to men. He has pledged Himself to follow it, and He does. All along its line then, God will be found. His Presence can always at *any point*, be utilized, and brought into action of a ministerial nature. This means, of course, that the basis of God's gift is there for every function of ministry and only needs to be stirred up. The Grace of God is there for all exercise of Authority. But the action must be determined by the Grace, and the Grace will not conform itself to bad action.

The Presence is always there, and the Grace ever in reach, so that the actions may actually have the Grace, and always the benefit of the possibility, but conformity to Grace must be the pre-requisite of actuality. In other words, the gift of office is the gift of Authority to exercise that office, and the benefit of the Presence of God, but all the rest depends upon utilization stirring up. The ministerial acts of the bad man, however, will not be cut

off from the Presence, by the badness of his character, if his act be in accordance with the purpose of the Presence: It is where his act, or any officer's act, is out of line with right, that it can not hope to drag Grace into wrong. Certain well defined acts—the regular functionings of ministry can always be assumed to have Authority and Grace. If the character of the man should be a bar, how would any minister be able to show a title, in view of the fact that all are sinners.

All the functions of Ministry are consolidated as to character, and divided out as to exercise, in a way that follows distinctly the laws we traced. Preaching, Teaching, Ministering and Ruling, all belong as spheres of action to the ministry of the same men. This, both for sake of economy and for sake of dignity, seems eminently wise. And, in addition, there is gained the strong guarding against ignorance and lack of force, for the various demands of these spheres are so great, that only in a system where men could break into the work by self appointment, or in an age or region of low standards, would they be likely to be entrusted to unequipped men. Then, as to the division of exercise—the employment of general workers, local workers, and assistants, meets rational custom on its own ground, while in more ministerial line, the gift, to some, of the Special Functions, to the great mass of workers, of the ordinary functions; and to allow without too rigid limitation of powers the assisting order to range almost anywhere in the region of temporal affairs, and even in the spiritual region, as near the second as the marking of degrees would allow, seems to meet all the Historical systems, and especially the Jewish, precisely where no possible objection could be urged. The High-priesthood of Bishops is as old as the Didache, runs through the early literature of Christianity without check or hindrance, and rightly understood, should stand without a protest.

In systems that had bloody sacrifices he was the chief sacrificer. In a system without bloody sacrifices his functions could still be Special without reference to such things. Without any reference to the Eucharist, but simply as the bestower of the Gift of the Holy Ghost, the Ordainer and Confirmer and Chief Blessor of the people (being the chief administrator of Discipline), he

could be regarded as a chief Minister, even if the word Priest be rejected.

But all the Ministries that ever were, existed to offer to God something. The priestly side of things cannot be ruled out, except as regards bloody offerings; and since they were the *accident* of the office, and the fact of offering the essential, there is no reason on their account to disparage a real truth of Nature and the Book of God. We are all a royal priesthood, because all are offerers as well as ministers.

The best type of Government presented to our Lord by a review of History, for the purpose in His mind—a religious organization which should be the Kingdom of God, was the Civil Government of Moses and Joshua. Congregational assembly, Councils, Elders who were Princes, and the single headship were its features. It had a balance of Authority and Consent never seen elsewhere, except in the Church of Christ. It fell because no line of succession for the chief place was provided—which condition was doubtless designed on the civil side, just as on the other side, a succession was distinctly provided for the religious through the line of Aaron. The difficulty with the Jewish civil governmental types of Christ's own day was, that they were but parts—Jewish members of a whole that had its head elsewhere. So, then, we may look for the Christian Government just as the Christian Ministry and the Christian Religion, to spring out of Judea, with the patterns woven by God to be followed by Christ.

Lastly—The Essential of Organization is what?

First of all, we have seen that Government is due to two forces, Authority and Consent, working as complementaries to each other, and so we can easily say both are essential. But, both are always likely to be present *de facto*, even though one be weakened and one strengthened, according to circumstances. That is to say, something posing as Authority and something asserting itself as Consent will always be found; and each of these will have some degree of strength. What we must be careful about is, that the *de facto* is also *de jure*. Now in the case of Consent, which possesses power not as of gift, but as of born right, there is no trouble about the *de jure* status of that side of things; it

is the *de jure* aspect of Authority that concerns us. In all questions of Authority, the *de jure* aspect is of great moment. The merely *de facto* may work, when judged by certain standards, but when judged by all standards will always be found impotent. Manifestly then, it is Essential that Authority be *de jure*.

If, now, we see the Essential to be—that, on the side of Authority, whatever may pose as Authority be *de jure* as well as *de facto*, we can pass to discuss as Essential to all, what the particular Essential of Authority must be.

If the people of the Church had power to confer Authority, then the Essential of Authority would be as easily determined as the other powers lying on the side of Consent, and vesting in the people, but if God has separately constituted Authority, then we must look for some definite feature of the same to stand as its Essential. We want a seed, stem or spring, from which all the other requisities of full action can grow. An office that can produce all the rest of the system at any time and in any place, must necessarily loom large as an Essential, and, to cut the matter short, it would certainly seem that the Apostolic office, the only one that Christ Himself took care to bring on the scene of action, and which possessed the ordaining power and the other Special Functions, is the seed of all *de jure* Authority.

But this office comes to its dignity of place, as the Essential, just because its functions is to ordain, or impart the "Gift." Not merely because it can appoint subordinates, *but because it can give those appointed the "Gift,"* and thus bring God into the work, it takes its place as the Essential. Clearly then, that impartation of the Gift is involved, and we cannot ignore the means of impartation so intimately connected with the Essential. The impartation is certainly Essential to *de jure* standing, and the means of its impartation may itself have its own Essential to be considered.

Assuming then, (here at the end of a volume of discussion) that the Apostolic office is the Essential, we will look into the question whether Ordination is Essential too, and within what limits.

There is no difficulty in seeing that the laying on of hands, was the chosen way, and indeed the only way known of imparting

the "Gift." Any system that recognizes the Gift ("Stir up the Gift") will recognize Ordination. The difficulty is not there: The difficulty comes when we try to see the limits within which Ordination is Essential.

As we saw, there appears to have been in Scriptural days, but one Ordination, while in Historical times, we find one for each of three offices. We account for this on the ground that in Bible times men did not rise into higher grades, but were selected for their particular work, and Ordained to the corresponding office. The Historical way was to select men from lower grades for a work in the higher. The block that prevents clear vision is the possibility of Timothy having been twice ordained, and, on the other hand, if only once, then, the use of Presbyters acting with St. Paul and the "Prophet" Silas, for an Ordination to Apostolic work.

Several suppositions, some favorable and some adverse to our Analysis, can be raised to avoid the difficulty, but they would only be suppositions. Yet we can run over them.

Two Ordinations for Timothy would clear up all, but as much as we never see Timothy engaged in the work of an Elder, but always the general work and also because the time between the departure from Lystra and the letter to the Thessalonians from Corinth seems hardly to allow for such a change, we are inclined to negative the idea of two.

If the presence of Presbyters at his one Ordination inclines us to dismiss the idea that it was by that rite he became a general worker, or Apostle, yet we must remember that the word "Presbytery" is all undefined, and their presence could be from the side of Consent, or pure Religiousness even, while St. Paul and Silas, the "Prophet," stood for Authority, and yet all taken together be called the Presbytery *as the only inclusive word for all orders*.

There is the idea that, possibly, Ordination admitted to Ministry, and something else determined grades, as with the Methodists to-day. But that something else is unknown, although of vital importance. It would be on the side of Consent, and not of Authority, and so leave open the door for usurpation of the higher work. For if the Divine Authority came by Ordination,

and was equally received by all who were Ordained, and only human Authority, or Consent (as it amounts to) was needed for the particular grade of office, the doors would be indeed wide apart to self assertion.

In the days of Heresy there would have been great trouble. Then, too, no office so much needs Divine Authority behind it as that which exercises chief powers of Rule and Discipline.

However, the old Hebrew custom was to Ordain to specific office, and in the case of Aaron and his sons, each was dressed in the specific robes of his office before consecration. In the Church of early days, too, the office was designated, and in the Ordination of Deacons and Elders in Scripture we catch the same idea. If all is not clear in Scripture, we are not surprised, for the Scripture seems at absolutely no pains to cover the point. All the mentions we have of Ordination are of the most casual nature, only enough to show it was done, just that and no more.

All the scholars that ever lived, have never straightened out the case of Timothy. It must stand to catch light as well as give light. Our own idea is, that there was only one occasion, and that Presbyters engaged with St. Paul and Silas, and that the inclusive word "Presbytery" alone could comprehend all elements present, and so was used by the Apostle in his letter just as naturally as in *Jewish* circles, the same word was used to include all the grades of the Sanhedrim. With St. Paul and Silas present for Authority's sake, any others (even laymen) could have been used as representing Consent and Religion. Ordination, like legislation, had better combine all elements.

To sum up now, the great Essential is the "Gift." It is given with Ordination. The Ordainers must include an Apostle, and can include the other grades. The Apostolic office and Ordination therefore are both Essentials. The office is so as the seed of the system, and the rite is too clearly identified with the Gift to be dispensed with.

No great attack on Ordination as an essential has ever appeared, comparable to those made on the other. The bodies which have *system* all recognize and use it, so we will not discuss further, but pass to consider the question of the effect which abandonment of the Apostolic office must have.

Consent would not be destroyed, even if hurt. It would be Authority that would suffer. Yet, there is an Authority that can grow out of Consent. The two contending forces might still appear on the field. There would be, however, something lacking to this Authority, and sooner or later, the lack would become manifest. Just because it held "Moses' seat" and was the *recognized Authority*, whose functions was to wrestle with Consent, God would be with it, but still there would be something lacking that in the long run would crop out. God's processes are very long. Man's substitutes for His institutes must sooner or later succumb in a battle that only the things God has fashioned can endure. God may, and probably does, either through mercy, or regard for Authority, wherever found and however constituted, stand behind it, to secure to those under it the expected benefits, but still the strain is not so much there, as in the ingrained weakness of man's best, as compared with God's best. Validity can be weak from other causes, and invalidity be strong through compensation, but validity will live and invalidity will die. Just as the hope of the world is in lawful marriage, so is it also in lawful Ordination; and this is the case not because God empties every other plan of vitality, but because only through His own best can He win His own hard battle.

Thus now the very end has been reached. Surely we begun at the very beginning, and just as truly as we reached out for first principles as guides, so now, having run through every one that promised to hold us to the philosophic and religious truth, we have come to the extremity of application.

Our conception of all government, but most essentially of Church Government, is, that it must, before all things else, be a *Pathway for God*. It is not designed to govern men for God, but as a means for God Himself to govern them. There is no question which, if thrown between the millstone of Authority and Consent, will not in course of time be ground to a settlement.

We have only to maintain the one in its Heaven born strength, and the other in its Heaven recognized breadth, in order to have God's Government in its most essential principles. And the means to this is to provide for Authority, the Episcopate; and for Consent, the Council. Since Consent is quite equal to providing its

own Councils, let the chief care be to guard the Episcopate which God gave, so that it neither lose nor gain by any acts of man.

Finally, it may be said, that the only possible way to this is, to *recognize its original endowment as of God, and that it persists without break or modification* to the end of time. The doctrine of Apostolical Succession is the shield and defence of this endowment. If that doctrine be taken to warrant claims, it ought also to be seen that it warrants restrictions. No *Papal* powers can come by way of *Apostolic Succession*, but only the *Special Functions*.

CHAPTER III

The Problem of Unity

It is this Problem which gives life and practicality to any discussion in the present day of the matter of Church Government. If only the differences that range along this line could find adjustment, the impetus toward unity would be too great for any resistance likely to occur—at least as between all but one of the great Protestant bodies. We know that with the Baptists there is yet another barrier, and that of greater separative force even than this, and it would be too much to hope that they would be drawn towards any center until that principle of their system offered no further obstacle. But with Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists and their kindred of other names, the removal of the trouble in the sphere of organization would be followed by great desire to yield to those impulses of the Holy Spirit which move us all in these days towards a Christ loved unity.

As to the Anglican Communion, the desire for unity is so great that there is serious fear lest there come such a minimizing of all things in the sphere of organization, such a disposition to treat everything as a product of environments, later than the mind of Christ, and referable to heathen and secular conditions and patterns, that the real struggle will be to hold herself back from a sacrifice of principle. Her genius is so far from the Italian, and her spirit is so close to thorough-going Protestantism, that her heart is unquestionably all for any reasonable compromise. Side by side, in Reformation days, German, French and English Protestants fought till the great battle was won, and the succeeding internal differences presented few elements of gratification to that one of the three allies which must lose most through disagreement. When the Church of England checked her progress towards the goal gained by the others, she did so at the cost of all those great bodies that flew from her borders. The love of freedom and self-government, and desire for deliverance from *personal* authority is immensely strong with all English natures, and now there comes an age whose glory it is to

upset all things but the doctrine of Impulse. The bitterness of old controversies and warfares is gone, and her old allies appear to her so softened and bettered by the kindly atmosphere of easy going years that she is earnestly trying to persuade herself that they are altogether lovely in all essential respects. View-points have some advantages over convictions, and especially in an age that seeks for them; so Anglicans have climbed to a broad plateau whence at many a view-point they see that during all these centuries of their own hard labors these courageous old allies have grown and prospered and softened, and so they are saying, "If the Lord Himself had not been on *their* side, we had swallowed them up quick when *we* were so wrathfully displeased at them." Oh! the congenity of the argument of life and growth! Again, too, while the Oxford Movement has rolled an immense wave in the sea of Anglican *feelings*, its results have been rather higher beach-marks in matters of Ritual than a deepening of channels of Doctrine. The broadness of the age has counteracted its tendencies in doctrinal directions, while the culture of the age has helped the drift towards high ritual. Its successes have extended practices, originating long after Christ, while doing little for really Primitive and Apostolic teaching. Lightfoot and Gore, Hatch and Wordsworth have abandoned so many of the old contentions in the matter of the Ministry as almost to have created a movement away from high views of the Church's Organization, and towards the old position of Whately. In other words, the inclination of the Anglican Communion is tremendously towards, (and there is even danger lest she should follow) the lead of scholars (not Gore, of course) who derive the Episcopate from ephemeral conditions rather than from the mind of Christ, and practically sacrifice the doctrine of Apostolic Succession. This temper and tendency may pass. The inertia of large bodies is very great. But, certainly there is no field to-day where Broad-Church tendencies have so much sway as in that concerning Organization.

The sphere of Organization is itself a seemingly minor field, as compared, for instance, with that of the sphere of Faith, or of Conduct. If men believe rightly, and above all, do rightly, many a person will not care one iota under what system those persons

prefer to live. And, in fact, the most rigid minded man of all can hardly in this age rate variations in organization as he does variations in the other spheres. Even though there be then some Essential of Organization, yet the very sphere of organization, is that too Essential?

It is very easy to think just in an *a priori* way that Christ created a society and left that society to settle its own internal structure after He had Himself given it a first start. In a broad age fond of Evolution, (as we all are now) it is exceedingly winsome, this tracing of prophetic forms and preliminary steps amid strangely powerful molds, towards issues that justify everything that eventuates, and makes one thing as logical and legal as another. And, on the other hand, it is far more difficult to bind all the future by hard and fast holding to the doctrine that this Society was given an axis of crystalization, and would emphatically be judged with reference to it. Yet, as a matter of fact, the issue is right there. The Apostolate is, or is not, the axis of crystalization. If it is, then the Society is not free (and consequently right) in any form into which it might develope. If it is not, then the Society is foot-loose, except only in so far as the general principles of Christ's religion bear upon such a matter as organization.

If the Anglican Communion were to sit down to confer over the stand to be taken with regard to Unity, there would be, as of old, two schools, one of which would contend that the Episcopate is the Apostolate modified by the lapse of personal powers, by geographical necessities, and by conciliar agreements, and the other of which would see in it an after product of Evolution, justified by early, wide-spread, continuous, and emphatic legislation of the Society, which was made by Christ competent to settle its organization. To the first school, the Church-Government of all the Protestant bodies with which Union is desired, would lack co-ordination with the very axis of Church-Government. To the other, it would only lack homogeneity with Church *Legislation*.

To the first, the spiritual power and fine success of these bodies would only tend to show that their near approach to co-ordination with the axis secured such a result; or that their faith and energy made splendid use of grace received through all the

channels kept open; or that God has very large recognition for *de facto* conditions, yet without exalting them to just the plane of the *de jure* side of things. To the other, the success of the opposing system might even weigh as much as to shake its faith in the wisdom of the early Christian Society as sufficient to legislate for modern times.

Now the breadth and even sweetness of this latter view may be very manifest, but it is hardly possible that the quality of steadfastness can be attributed, but on the other hand, although the first view gives promise of steadfastness in maintaining the Historic Episcopate it may be well asked what promise is there for Unity?

In as much as this whole book has been written on the subject of the Apostolate being the axis of organization, it will now be in order to discuss the problem of unity from the standpoint of that position.

First, then, let us get at just exactly the crux of the whole matter. The question of the Grace of Orders need not enter. "Tactual Succession" has been a term that has played a part indeed, but in as much as the "Touch" in ordination is merely a sign, it should be so treated in the mind. Grace does not flow *through* fingers any more than soul-cleansing through water.

The sneers at the idea of Tactual Succession all seem to be based on something like a conception as of a current flowing through a conduit made of men and fingers. But every one understands how a man rising from his knees after ordination can, by that very sign, believe that he has been given an authority he never had before. And if there be no other way to receive authority than that, there must be a succession of such proceedings reaching back to the original organizer of the series. No one knows how to dispense with ordination. All systems have it, save those that have no outward ordinances. Now, if God be behind each ordination to make valid the authority, that is all that is requisite, let anyone add what they please on other grounds. But the gift of authority carries with it the gift of *Grace*. Nor is it necessary to think of one supply of Authority given at first and brought to the present day by a conduit. We can leave to God his own ways, satisfied if only the outward sign or laying on of hands testify

to the fact of inward Grace, then and there received. Ordination is not a means of tapping a former supply, but a going to a present God for Authority for a present man, and God pledging the same through His own officer, and with a well known and symbolical sign. So, too, any break in the series is not an interruption of a stream, but marks a place where a man got his Authority through a false agent, or if from a true agent, yet in an irregular way. He can never surely assert God to be behind the one, or consenting to the other. Our trust in ordination by a true agent rests in God's pledge, and nothing in the world else.

Now all the organized bodies act on the above principles except in so far as see in the whole Church, or even in parts more or less large, a power to remedy any break and begin *de novo* a series of true agents (a wholesome looking theory, but one which allows John Smith to get a congregation of less than fifty souls to make him the starting point for many things). It is on this theory that the Presbyterians, who for themselves, hold firmly to rules providing for Succession, recognize the ministries of bodies who confessedly violate the principle. The doctrine of the restorative power of the Church or its parts threatens Succession terribly, but does not interfere with the doctrine of the Grace of Orders unless Grace be conceived to lie in a lake, as it were, at the beginning, and to be brought down to our day through a conduit.

But if the doctrine of the Grace of Orders finds enough recognition from all for practical Unity, is there anything else that we can eliminate?

Possibly an opportunity to draw nearer to some bodies exists along the line—the apportionment of Authority.

The Presbyterian theory is that Authority was given to the whole Church to be exercised by the Ministry, and it might be that a clear distinction between Authority that comes from above and that which comes from below might enable them to meet Anglicans in a view that would satisfy both sides. There is need that a Ministry should rest immediately upon God in at least some respects. The inherent power of the people is so great that there can be no sufficient resistant, nothing out of which can arise a balancing power, unless God be in the background of sup-

port for this. Government, as has been showed, needs two strong opposites, out of whose clashing emerges the course of events, according to God's providence. Now, the Presbyterians in saying that power is from above, and in assigning the exercise of it to the Ministry, show their purpose to assert God as back of ministerial acts; and in asserting that the power was given to the whole Church show their desire to guard, in theory at least, Consent. Their use of Councils is directly to the same point; while the fact that those Councils are composed of Officers, points again to their desire to emphasize Authority. The Anglican too, even though he locates Authority itself, and not just the *exercise* of it in the Ministry, yet makes such a large use of councils (except where restrained by the civil powers that be), and so exalts the powers of Consent, that he meets his brethren upon what might be called common ground. Their systems it is true differ, but both are animated to accomplish a recognition just and right of the two forces. With the Presbyterian, the Council is supreme, but *in* the Council, Elders are the power. With Anglicans, councils are far more representative of the whole Church, but the authority of the officers is individual or "several" and not "joint;" and the "joint" powers grow out of the "several," except in so far as they are mere delegates of the people (Authority from Consent).

However, from these considerations it would appear that for a practical unity the difficulties could be made to disappear, and that the grounds for agreement are great.

The innate feeling that has governed both Presbyterians and Episcopalians towards an effort thus to emphasize and make place for the dual powers of Authority and Consent, has also pervaded nearly all the bodies separated from each other in the general tendencies of post-Reformation times. Their systems, more or less open to criticism, all aim to accomplish the same balance.

The real crux cannot be removed by adjustment. It is not the Grace of Orders, and it is not disagreement as to the necessity of both Authority and Consent, although provisions for the same may vary in different systems. It is simply the existence of an office above that of Presbyters endowed with powers of Rule over Presbyters. (There are powers belonging to that of-

fice besides this, but it is sufficient to mention this one). It is the question as to the seat of Authority *in its highest manifestation*.

It is necessary to remark that since the problem of Unity is to be considered from the standpoint that Authority must rest on God, it would be quite out of place to bring forward an office out of Consent, as would be the case if the Episcopate arose as an after-thought, and a product of the Church's legislation or usurpation. That kind of Authority can be manufactured to-day as well as at any other time. The kind to be predicated is the kind based on the only true base for Ministerial office.

Of course, with such a crux as this, the issue becomes a square, up and down, clear cut one: and it is well that it is so. It plainly involves the abandonment of the Episcopate by one side, or the taking it by the other. There is room for some compromise, but it would not reach the whole way. That compromise would be as follows:

All parties believe that there is authority of some sort in every order of the Church, and some sort also in congregations, in councils, both of laymen and officers, and of officers alone, and in individual officers. If all these elements were combined, authority of all kinds and degrees would be brought together. If they all united in ordinations, those so ordained must necessarily receive authority. If they became the sole source of ordinations for the future, the cause of division would be removed. The difficulty would be that Bishops must take part, and those ordained must be ordained to the order of Bishops, in order to satisfy the Anglican side. The other side might not object to Bishops taking part, but if the men ordained then ranked as Bishops, the so-called compromise would be wholly one-sided.

There is no possible help for the issue. It cannot be avoided.

The strange part of it all is, that the field of the controversy will, in the future, be History rather than Scripture. Since Lightfoot and Gore and Wordsworth, the Anglican argument from History has weakened. The fourth century Jerome who used to be pooh-poohed is taken now as an authority on some first century affairs in a most surprising way. But more than this, it is evident that the *opponents* of the Anglicans will prefer the *historical*

field. In Scripture the Elders were ruled over to the end of Scripture. The Apostles ruled over them. Men ruled over them. If there ever came a time when they were not ruled over, it must have been in historical times. History will therefore be ransacked to find a time when they were free to rule over themselves in or out of councils. Scripture presents but one council and Scripture covers many, many years. To see councils, we must go to History. The ablest analysis of that one council cannot extract light on the desired point. The most extensive argument from analogy cannot build a system out of it. The Apostolic element in its membership differentiates it radically from everything else. In fact the limited use of councils in Scripture weakens all argument that they were a regular part of the machinery of government. It is History which exalts councils. Then, too, it is History alone which can trace the changes in the work and powers of that order of men which, it is claimed, passed from an Apostolate into an Episcopate.

Our strife in the historical field will not be as bitter. If once it be agreed as positively settled that there were in Scripture times functions of Ministry (the Special Functions) which Elders could not "severally" possess, and which could not lapse, and we go to History to see what became of them, surely that is not a question beyond the reach of amicable settlement.

Above all, let it be borne in mind that deviations from God's appointed ways does not set Him angrily to deprive of Grace, nor is His chosen way His only possible way, but each and every way has its own capabilities, and God will use it at its fullest value, and probably even increase that value in order that His loved ones be not deprived. There is great capacity in some of these post-Reformation ways to all human judgment, but let those who believe they have God's own chosen way abide in it faithfully and charitably.

THE END.

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